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Martin Kratz*

The Creator and the Benefits
of Creation: Protection of
Software in the Information
Revolution

1. Introduction**
Mankind is presently passing through a technological
revolution unlike anything seen in any prior era. In a world
where the total mass of man's knowledge doubles in less than
two years' information has become an increasingly valuable
commodity. Similarly, the means by which information is
manipulated has become evermore important.
The development of the computer 2 has been the catalyst of
this information revolution as it has freed man from many time
consuming and monotonous tasks. The development of the
computer industry has been phenomenal. 3 It has gone from
its infancy in the late 1940's to a stage where annual sales figures
read in the hundred billion dollar range. The growth of this
industry has been marked 4 by a seemingly continuous series
of lawsuits. In fact, the first computer law suit was between
the rival claimants to the honour (and Patent rights) of being
the first inventor of the computer. 5
**The author wishes to thank a number of people who laboured over early
versions of this study and identified many of the grammatical and spelling
errors and also contributed to the quality of the technical discussion. In
particular, I would wish to thank the ever patient Margaret Burghardt who
was kind enough to proof read several versions and Robert Rolf, systems
analyst, who enlightened me on several technical matters.
1. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock New York: Random House Inc., 1970)
2. Also known as a general purpose data processing device. It is generally
either a digital computer, analog computer or a hybrid computer.
3. This typically western phenomenon has even resulted in a computer
revolution in Eastern Europe. See Economist Jan. 19, 1985 at 71.
4. Or is it more appropriate to say checked?
5. This dispute was between John Vincent Atanasoff, who developed the
"ABC" (Atanasoff-Berry Computer) in conjunction with his graduate student
Clifford Berry, and John W. Mauchly who later developed ENIAC
(Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer). This dispute finally was
heard in 1973. See Honneywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp. and Illinois
Scientfic Developments U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth
Div. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civ. 138.
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The legal system was not then and is not now capable of
dealing with an industry of this complexity and dynamism. This
is not difficult to understand given the nature of law itself.
The common law has developed slowly over time and has not
been able to keep up to the furious pace of the computer
industry. Statute based law is fixed in time and usually "freezes"
the law as was appropriate for the technology in existence at
the time of the statute's passage. It will be shown that two
branches of law have been able to keep up with the computer
industry. These are the law of contract and certain equitable
doctrines dealing with confidence and fidelity between certain
parties.
The basic reason why these branches of law have "survived"
the onslaught is due to their basic character. The law of contract
deals fundamentally with the ability of individuals (or groups)
to make binding arrangement between themselves with very
little restriction. This has allowed contractual terms to evolve
with developments in the new technology. The law of equity
has its origin in the prerogative of the Queen to do justice
between contestants. It developed a number of doctrines that
are applicable in the type of transactions that this paper will
deal with. Equitable remedies are generally discretionary so a
good deal of flexibility has allowed these doctrines to adapt
to the needs of the computer industry.
II. Scope of This Analysis
There are many elements involved in the growth of the
computer industry that have given rise to difficult legal
problems. This discussion will be limited to a contemplation
of mechanisms available to protect software. 6 For the purpose
of this analysis, there are 2 components in most modern
computer systems.7 These are:
(a) Hardware
6. The protection of software, in both object and source versions, is
conceptually one of the most difficult legal problems in the high technology

industries. It is noted that most of the analysis following in this paper is
equally applicable to other forms of high technology innovation.
7. For perhaps the most thoughtful judicial review of the elements of a
computer system see the majority judgments in Apple Computer Inc. v.
Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and Suss, (1984), 11 Fleet Street Reports 481
(Federal Court of Australia).
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(i) The Central Processing Unit
(ii) Input and Output Devices
(iii) Communications Equipment
(iv) Memory Devices 8
(b) Sofiware
(i) System Software 10
(ii) Application Software"
This paper will examine a variety of potential and commonly
used methods to protect software. Particular emphasis will be
placed on application software as opposed to system software.
System software is, generally, quite machine specific and so
'lifting' an operating system from one machine to use in another
machine would normally require considerable modification in
the program. It is noted that, particularly in the micro computer
market, operating systems are more readily transferable. This
2
is due to the number of 'clones' available in this market.'
I. Definition of Software
Software is composed of a number of discrete components
including the computer program, the program description and
any ancillary materials which might be supplied. The computer
program 3 consists of the set of instructions which cause the
8. Typically, a medium or larger installation will use magnetic tape or
magnetic disk drives. Some portion of the memory may be in the form of
Random Access Memory (ie. silicon "chips").
9. For the purposes of this paper computer programs stored in the form
of firmware will be considered software. The particular issues relating to
the firmware form of storage are addressed in the following discussion.
10. This is also known as the operating system. These programs basically
provide the set of rules that govern the operation of the central processing
unit.
11. These are programs that solve specific problems (ie. accounting systems,
wordprocessing, data storage and retrieval). They operate within the
framework established by the System (also called operating system) Software
and so must be compatable with the rules established in the System Software.
12. For the purpose of this paper, a clone is a machine that uses, so far
as is legally possible, identical hardware and firmware as that in a machine
developed by a market leader (ie. I.B.M. PC or APPLE) so that application
software developed for the market leading machine can also be used on the
clone. Often the clone manufacturer will make improvements in the way the
clone handles these application programs. A further discussion on the status
of clone machines will be dealt with in the section on Copyright protection.
See I.B.M. v. Spirale(1984),80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
13. World Intellectual Property Organization definition in "Model Provisions
on the Protection of Computer Software".
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computer to perform the desired function or functions. The
program description means
A complete procedural presentation in verbal, schematic or
other form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of
constituting a corresponding computer
instructions
14

program.

An example would be a flowchart. The ancillary materials
are generally instructions for using the computer program.
These are most commonly in the form of manuals 5 and
therefore in a tangible written form with which the court is
far more comfortable.
This analysis will be primarily concerned with the protection
of the computer program itself rather than its supporting
materials. As will be discussed further below, written materials
should get copyright protection without encountering the
6
conceptual hurdles that the computer program encounters.'
The process of developing a computer program is complex,
expensive and usually requires considerable creative input from
the programmer or program designer. This analysis will chiefly
be concerned with the end product of this work, the marketable
computer program. It is noted that the problems to be discussed
below may also arise during intermediate steps in the
development phase. The considerations of protection will,
however, be similar to those involved in dealing with the
marketable product.
'7

14. W.I.P.O. Model definition. Liberman, in The Protection of Software in
Australia (1981), Australian Business Law Review 234, at note 7 disagrees
that the program description need not be in a tangible form as this definition

implies.
15 Note however that many computer programs can come with a separate
computer program which instructs the ultimate user in an interactive fashion.
These computer assisted instruction programs will have the same protection

concerns as the main program.
16. See L.B.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.) where Reed
J. used this fact and the right of the copyright holder to reproduce the work

in other forms to find an alternative basis for prima facie existence of
copyright in object code and source code.
17. In fact, it is arguable that there may be a greater degree of secrecy and
confidence during the research and development phase. If so, then it ought

to be somewhat easier to establish the basis of trade secret protection, to
be discussed later.
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2. Tangible or Intangible?
The limitation of the study of the "computer program" 8 does
not really make things very much clearer as there is still
considerable fundamental disagreement about the definition
and character of a "computer program". These disagreements
reflect the basic difficulty in determining what the nature of
a computer program is. The origin of this difficulty is in the
fact that the program has both a tangible and an intangible
character depending on what one wishes to see. In the United
States a computer program can be a "good" under that Uniform
Commercial Code. 19 In this sense the program is a tangible
item, it is a thing which can be moved. Similarly, the fact that
a computer must read a computer program into its memory
implies a tangible aspect. 20 On the other hand, a program may
be considered from the perspective of the underlying algorithm.
This focuses on the ideas or the concept behind the program
and, thus, seems intangible.
The characterization of a computer program is vital when
one seeks to invoke one of the statutory schemes of protection.
2
There are basically three possible characterizations. '
(a) Computer ProgramAs Intangible
If the court concentrates on the intangible aspect of a computer
program, such as the algorithm, then copyright and patent
protection may be inappropriate. Copyright does not protect
the idea or concept behind the series of steps and, if the only
novelty is seen to exist in the concept, then traditional copyright
protection will not be available for the codified manifestation
of the concept. 22 Similarly, if the logic is the essence of the
program it may be inappropriate as a subject of patent
18. The further difficulties in dealing with the source code and object code

versions of a program are dealt with in detail in the section dealing with
copyright protection.
19. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honneywell, Inc. 457 F. Supp 765
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) reversedon other grounds 604 F.2d 737 (D Cir. 1979).
20. Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive
Analysis (1983)23 Jurimetrics J 339 at 343.
21. M. Popper, (1977), Technology and Programming - Is it a Problem
in Definitions? As listed in Palmer & Resendes, supra. The citation given
for the report is 6 Rutgers J Computers and the Law.
22. John Palmer & Raymond Resendes, (1982), Copyright and the Computer.

Consumer and Corporate Affaris Canada, Copyright Revision Series at 9.
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protection under the mental steps doctrine. 23 Furthermore, if
the ideas or concepts behind the unique logic are the essence
of the program then one is faced with the public policy position
that one can not have a monopoly on an idea or principle.
(b) Computer Program As Tangible
It is possible to see a computer program as a part of a complex
machine, much like a camshaft in a typical automobile engine.
This definition sees the program as a machine part which
together with the rest of the machine, performs a specific
function. The sense behind this more functional perspective is
that without the computer programs a computer is only capable
of heating a room.24 Seen in this light, the program is the
controller, the missing machine part that gives life and purpose
to the machine.
By concentrating on the tangible aspect, the setting of
electrical switches in the computer, patent protection may be
a viable mode of protection 25 if novelty can be shown in
physical operation of the computer.
(c) Computer Program As Instructions Fixed in a Tangible
Medium
This view ignores the intangible and tangible aspects of a
computer program, concentrating instead on the form of the
26
program's presentation. This is the most widely held view
27
being recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Canadian
Patent Appeal Board 28 and the software subcommittee of
CONTU. 29 The emphasis in this definition is to see the series
of steps fixed in some form. This series of steps is then able
to direct the computer in its performance of an assigned task.
The emphasis is on the form of the program, and the set of
23. Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 10. See Patent Protection below for an
explaination of the mental steps
24. That is the only function it can serve is to pass current through its circuits
and incur 12R losses.
25. Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 12. The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has advance this view.
26. Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 10.
27. Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 1972.
28. Patent Office Record, August 1, 1978 p. 27.
29. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works,
(1977), Software Subcommittee Report and Additional Views Washington
D.C. U.S. Department of Commerce in Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 11.
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instructions and so copyright might be a viable form of
protection.
It is submitted that this view does not adequately recognize
the reality of the computer industry. There are virtually an
infinite number of ways a particular problem can be solved
in a computer program. Different computer languages can be
used and different programming techniques can be used. It is
submitted that the quality that makes one program a
commerical success, and therefore of value, and another a
commerical failure is a combination of (a) the logical steps used,
(b) the programming concepts invoked and (c) the particular
attributes of the language used. 30 The form of the program,
the steps used, are merely the mechanism to implement the
unique logic. In fact, as will be discussed later, program
encryption is becoming one form of providing technical
protection for a program. Encryption prevents, to a degree,
a person from analysing a program listing to derive the unique
logic underlying it.
(d) Computer Program As Having Tangible and Intangible
Aspects
It is submitted that concentration on one or another aspect
of the characteristics of a computer program will only lead
to unsatisfactory legal results. If only the form is seen as
valuable then only the form is protected, as in copyright. The
result in copyright is that the underlying concept or logic can
be freely taken, once "decoded". The time, effort and money
expended to develop the program's unique logic will not be
rewarded if only the form of the program listing is protected.
If the program is seen as a machine part, so that patent law
might apply, then other concerns arise. It appears to take at
least 18 to 24 months and considerable expense to register a
patent. The unique logic of a computer program might give
it a market life on the same order of magnitude. Patent
protection, it would seem, would be too late to protect against
misappropriation of the program immediately after it appears
on the market. These reasons, as well as the underlying
uncertain existence of statuory protection in the first place, have
30. Of course, marketing has a significant role (perhaps the major role) to
play. This is, however, outside the scope of this analysis.
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resulted in wide spread industry use of contract and trade secret
protection. These forms of protection are able to protect the
"know how" that makes a program competitive. Yet, as will
be seen later, these methods of protection are also limited.
The nature of a computer program raises significant
conceptual problems. Yet this should not be the basis for the
adoption of a simplistic view of the problem. Reform of the
law, as it relates to this most important industry, is needed
but it must be reform that accepts the realities of the complex
world of the information age. The analogy of the dual nature
of the electron might serve as a guide. Is it a wave or is it
a particle? One test shows "wave like" characteristics, such as
defraction and another shows "particle like" characteristics,
such as scattering. The real problem is that we are attempting
to define new concepts in old forms. The reality, in the case
of subatomic physics, is that an electron can be both a particle
and a wave 3' depending on which tests are done. Heisenberg's
"Uncertainty Principle 33 might be acceptable in the world of
science but a legal system strives for the removal of uncertainty
and so abhors a fundamental uncertainty. It is submitted, that
in these circumstances the legal system ought to concentrate
on the reality of what is desired to be protected and then, in
the light of public policy considerations, determine to provide
the extent of that protection.
1II. The Problem of Protectionin the "Information Age"
The problem of the protection of one's investment in creative
effort arises particularly in the unique characteristics of the
computer industry. As has been noted earlier, this is the fastest
growing industry of all time. This rapid growth has led to
significantly high levels of employee mobility from one
computer firm to another. As a result, there is a greater
opportunity for employees, highly trained with the employer's
latest innovation, to move to a competitor and remove the
former employer's competative edge. To further complicate
31. Robert

H.

Dicke & James

P. Wittke, Introduction to Quantum

Mechanics. (London: Addison Wessley, 1960) or Werner Heisenberg, The
Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory. (New York: Dover Publications
Inc. 1946). (in translation).
32. Heisenberg, supra,at 20.
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matters, it is very expensive and very difficult to create
commercially viable computer programs. The creativity needed
is not found equally distributed throughout all of mankind and
so those particularly creative and successful programmers or
program designers will be expensive to employ. They will
require expensive facilities on which to create the new program.
This will require time and considerable financial investment.
On the other hand, once developed, a computer program can
be copied into a completely operational form for less than
$5.00. 33 As a result, there is a tremendous economic incentive
to allow someone else to incur the development costs and
simply copy the result.
The economic incentive coupled with the greater opportunity
has resulted in a significant problem of software piracy.
Estimates of the extent of this piracy range from five "pirated"
37
36
35
copies for each program sold 34 to nine, ten or even thirty
"pirated" copies for each legitimate copy of a program that
is sold or licensed.
These problems have resulted in a variety of attempts at
either preventing the illicit copying of computer programs or
providing disincentives if programs are copied. Generally,
technical methods of protection fall into the former class and
legal forms of protection into the latter.
IV. Technical Methods to Protect Software
The most secure method of preventing illicit copying of a
computer program is not to allow any access to the program.
This might be effective in certain specialized applications but
is not satisfactory if you wish to market the software to a large
audience. As a result a number of methods have been developed
33. This is the approximate retail cost of a "floppy" diskette.
34. WGBH Boston, NOVA Adventures in Science, Software Bandits (New
York: Addison Wessley, 1982) at 218.

35. See also responses on conference topics dealing with legal and technical
means of protection software: (1) MCRO:MICRO at the University of
Alberta, (Program used is: CONFER 11 (06/83) - designed by Robert Parnes,
Trademark: Advertel Communication Systems), and (2) LAW:FORUM at
Wayne State University (Program used is CONFER 11 (10/83) - designed
by Robert Parnes, Trademark: Advertel Communication Systems Conference organizer is Professor Jennifer Bankier, Dalhousie Law School)
36. Laver, Fighting Computer Pirates, MacLean's July 23, 1984.
37. R. McGuire, Software Piracy, INPUT March 1985 at 8.
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to provide some technical protection against copying after the
program is out of the seller's hands.
1. AIlachine Dependent Programs
The system software is necessarily dependant on the
architecture of the computer hardware on which it is to be
used. As a result, this program is not that portable and, usually,
cannot be used on other, different, computers. This state of
affairs however limits the marketability of the system software.
In recent years system software is becoming more portable
especially in the micro computer end of the market. Where
it was once considered "safe", system software is now coming
under the same piracy pressure as application software.
I.B.M. made a bold marketing move in the late 1960's when
it decided that application software should be portable within
the I.B.M. 360 series of computers. This move, by the giant
in the computer industry, reflected the consumer demand for
less expensive application software and has resulted in
portability being one of the hallmarks by which modern
application software is evaluated. The rise of the micro
computer market resulted in a tremendous expansion of the
market for application software. The application packages now
available are readily characterized as portable within a specific
operating system (ie. CP/ M, MS-DOS or UNIX).
While it is possible to develop machine specific programs,
there is little commercial incentive to do so except in very
narrow and specialized segments of the market. A further factor
mitigating against the use of machine dependant programs is
the fact that most application software is developed by parties
quite independant of the hardware manufacturers. These
software developers have no incentive to limit the potential
market for their products to a particular machine or operating
system.
However this form of protection is still viable, particularly
in the case of specially developed application software. It is
noted that there are many other factors, such as the
interdependance of the developing and using parties, in this
case which also serve to limit the threat of illicit copying.
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2. Limiting the Ability to Copy
A more effective way to protect mass marketed application
software is through the use of some mechanism to prevent
additional copies from being made. These techniques are never
absolutely effective and there is a constant technical "race"
between the developers of copy protection methods and
developers of copy techniques to circumvent this protection.
The need to make copies exists for several reasons. First,
the programs and data are usually stored on some form of
magnetic media. These storage media are very vulnerable to
physical damage, electric or magnetic fields, or extremes in
temperature. All of these factors may modify or destroy the
information that has been stored. Secondly, while computers
are very reliable machines, they will, from time to time,
"crash". 38 When a system crashes, it may alter or destroy all
the programs or data that might be stored in the computer
at the time of the crash. As a result, the wise practice of
maintaining a collection of backup copies of programs and data
39
has developed.
A number of copy prevention mechanisms are listed below.
This is not intended to be a comprehensive list and given the
rapid developments in this area certainly could not hope to
be so.
(a) Issue software in the Form of FIRM WARE 40
Issuing a program in this form makes duplication more difficult
for the average user since the program listing is seen as
38. A system "crash" may occur when an error occurs from which the
computer can not recover. This is most often due to software design errors
or transient failures which cause the system to loose track of what it is doing.
If due to a hardware failure, then the entire system might be powered down
to protect the internal circuits from further damage.
39. A backup copy allows one to continue to use the computer, once the
problem causing it to crash has been solved. Given the potential results from
the loss of all one's computer records (ie. extreme financial insecurity ranging
from loss of accounts receivable to bankruptcy) it can be seen why this
practice is required.
40. Firmware is a term used to describe a program that is written on a silicon
"chip" rather than on a "floppy" diskette or magnetic tape. ROM chips are
used as distinguished from RAM chips. ROM is Read Only Memory - a
set of instructions that can not be changed by the user of the computer.
RAM is Random Access Memory - the main memory area in a computer
where information can be read in, changed or erased.
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unintelligible. However, equipment is available which allows
one to read the instruction set in such a chip and so it would
be possible to make copies or determine the unique logic of
the program. The issue is complicated further by a development
of variations on the ROM 41 theme. With the availability of
PROMs, 42 EPROMS 43 and EEPROMs, 44 which allow for the

relatively easy programming or duplication of a new instruction
set, it becomes easier to copy a program in ROM form. Indeed
it is copying of software in the firmware form that has given
45
rise to some of the most important litigation.
(b). Hardware Dependant Software
It is possible to create a program that requires a certain
hardware option in order to operate. Typical of this form of
protection is the encryption of the instruction set. A copy of
the program will be unusable without a special "decoder"
module plugged into the computer. It is far more difficult to
make a copy of the "decoder" circuitry than it is to make a
copy of the program. Therefore it is easier to maintain control
over the hardware module and restrict its access to the class
of permitted users. One drawback of this form of protection
is the independant development of compatible "decoder"
modules outside the control of the program developer. Another
perhaps more important flaw is the fact that it will almost
certainly cost more to sell this program with a "decoder" than
to sell the program itself. This tends to make the program less
commercially attractive.
A simple form of this technique involves the software reading
a machine "serial number" imbedded in the hardware. The
software will only run on the machine for which it is sold or
created.
There are other hardware dependant protection mechanisms
such as a date-lock. This is mainly used as a form of access
control rather than as a protection mechanism. The date-lock
would not allow a program to operate after a certain date.
41. Read Only Memory.

42. Programmable Read Only Memory.
43. Eraseable Programmable Read Only Memory.
44. Electric Eraseable Programmable Read Only Memory.
45. See, for example, Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and

Suss, (1984), 1I F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).
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Most computers have internal clocks which allow the time and
date to be altered so that it is quite easy to circumvent this
protective scheme.
3. StructuralProtection
Structural protection refers to programs offered to the public
in such a way that the user will be continually dependant on
the seller in order to make most effective use of the program.
Typically this could be done through the registration of the
program (ie. each program has a unique serial number which
the seller notes). The seller would only provide updated copies
of the program to registered users. Similarly assistance with
the operation of the program or recovery from any errors or
program failures would only be available to registered users.
These serial numbers might be embedded in the program
instructions and so also provide a unique identifier to assist
in determining the source of any copies found or to help prove,
in court, that it is a copy.
Other methods are to sell incomplete packages to the users
and have the seller complete a vital operation in person. For
example, in an accounting package, the program to develop
the year end financial statements might be missing. This
mechanism is generally only effective when dealing with a small
volume distribution program unless the seller's organization can
manage to provide the labour to satisfactorily serve a large
disbursed user group.
Another method used is the provision of a password to make
the program operate. This might be effective in deterring a
person outside the seller's organization or outside the user's
organization from copying the program. However, it would not
prevent someone from within either of these organizations from
making working copies for third parties.
Structural protection may also refer to the physical
environment in which the computer facility operates. The
considerations in such forms of protection would relate, in part,
to limiting the access of potential pirates or other computer
abusers from the system or programs. Often a risk analysis
will be conducted by a security specialist, particular where large
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systems are involved. 46 Such an analysis becomes increasingly
important as the value of the programs or data increases or
as the data contains sensitive information. The rapid increase
in telecommunications access through the use of modems 47 has
given rise to significant problems of designing physical and legal
48
solutions to the resultant computer abuse.
4. PsychologicalMethods of Protection
There are a number of protection mechanisms that rely on the
premise that most people are basically honest. These methods
would provide little challenge to copying but would tend to
rely on the user's basic honesty. One such method is to provide
"Freeware". These are computer programs which are available
without initial cost to the user. The user is encouraged to send
a contribution to the developer if satisfied with the product.
It has been estimated that approximately one in ten users do
send the contribution and this covers the costs of development.
A refinement of this scheme is the duplication policy of
"FreeSoft". A user sends in his or her contribution if they like
the software but the user also has a further option. The user,
for a small additional sum, can become a local distributor and
is issued a diskette with a serial number. The local distributor
receives a percentage of all new users who register under that
number. As a result there is considerable incentive for the
registered user to make copies and have others register.
A variation on this theme is to provide programs at a very
low cost and have copies available at a cost just above the
cost of the copy media. Most people would just as soon pay

46. For an overview of some of the considerations in conducting such a
risk analysis see D. B. Parker, Safeguards Selection Principles (1984), 3
Computers & Security 81.
47. A Modem is a "modulator-demodulator", a device, simply put, which
permits one computer to communicate with another computer through the
use of the telephone network.
48. For an overview of the situation particularly as it applies to the Datapac
network, see A. G. Dobson, The Ballad of the Hacker (1985), 10 Computer

Data 10. For a more thorough review of the telecommunications and other
computer security situation see the proceedings of the 2nd annual I.F.I.P.
Conference on the "Security of Computer Systems", September, 1984 and
the proceedings of the 3rd annual IFIP Conferences, Dublin, August 1985.
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the slightly higher amount and have a legitimate copy. 4 9
These methods are of limited appeal since they do not provide
any security that large, expensive software will be able to
generate sufficient income to pay for development costs much
less earn a profit. The methods appear to be effective when
dealing with particular classes of users who might be restrained
by some peer group pressure from "cheating" when the cost
to have legitimate copies is so low.
Another form of psychological protection is to arrange for
the customization of all user's programs. For example, a
business might licence an accounting package and the seller
would arrange for the business's name to appear on all forms
that are printed out. The embarrassment of another business,
in using forms with the legitimate users name on them, and
the time and effort in locating and changing all these titles
provides a further disincentive to copying.
The provision of extensive written documentation (which is
clearly protected by copyright) means that a person who wishes
to copy a program will also have to copy the user
documentation. The developer should, if it became necessary,
be able to enforce the documentation's copyright. More
significantly, the effort of copying a large amount of
documentation would serve as a disincentive to the "casual"
50
program pirate.
5. Marketing Mechanisms of Protection
If a product can be marketed fast enough, it may capture a
significant portion of the available market before a competitor,
using the "acquired" creative innovations of the original
developer, can affect the marketability of the original work.
Studies 5' have indicated that the average life span of particular
49. See comments about the likely viability of protection in the educational
context in Robert A. Abell, Implementation Study of Microcomputer
Technology in Science Education (1983), PhD Thesis University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta at 109-110.

50. Some "pirates" simply collect software with no intention of making
significant use of the stolen program. See R. McGuire, Ex-PirateJumps Ship
INPUT March 1985 at 10 quoting Kevin Pickell "Most of the pirates I know
locally collect software like stamps."
51. Palmer & Resnedes, supra, at 44 Study of 5,328 I.B.M. application
programs - average life span of approximately 16 months. See note 2 Frank,
(1979), In Depth 10.
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computer programs is in the area of 16 months. Given this
very short time in which a program can maintain its
marketability, the danger would appear to exist more from
copying rather than from reverse engineering. 52 It is therefore
prudent to attempt to market the program as quickly as
possible, not only to return the developmental costs and
maintain the liquidity of the company, but also to avoid any
competition from copies.
In fact a related marketing strategy is sometimes cited in
support of software piracy, if the marketplace is using pirate
versions of, say, wordprocessing made by firm X, then that
market segment is generally closed to Y, who makes a
competing product. It may be that the pirates might acquire
legitimate copies if they find the software useful and they need
53
manuals or software support from the vendor.
A related marketing concept is that used by "freeware" and
others mentioned above. PC-TALK III, for example, a
"freeware" product, has gained a very significant legitimate
market share for communications software for microcomputers. Because it is possible to readily copy and pass on copies,
such a product can significantly undercut the competition. It
may be noteworthy that prices for microcomputer
communications software appears to have dropped since this
phenomenon began.
6. DiseasedSoftware As A Means of Protection
Few would deny that software piracy is epidemic as a
phenomenon. Some software developers are taking advantage
of that fact and may provide diseased software to their
customers. A diseased program is one that will perform some
function or functions, generally unknown to the user, that may
have a destructive effect on the program itself, or on the other
programs or in extreme cases on the hardware. As a result,
a program may, after some condition precedent is met, say,
the program has been copied 5 times, self destruct or cause
some other damage.
52. Reverse engineering is the process whereby a competitor will attempt
to determine what the creative logic existing behind a product is, usually,
by disassembling it and attempting to determine what algoriths were employed
in the products creation.
53. See L. Davidison, Software Priacy May Be Beneficial, Chappel Davidson
Associates Inc.
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One approach is the release of a "worm", a small program
that moves through the memory space of the computer and
destroys the information stored there one line at a time. 54 The
"worm" may destroy the applications software or, in some
55
cases, disable the operating system.
Another, perhaps more devious, approach utilizes a "virus".
A "virus" is a program that may destroy random lines of
program code in the program. In one case a disk operating
system was infected with a "virus" that caused it to reinitialize
the disk immediately after bootstrap and the sixteenth self56
reproduction cycle.
This concept appears to have developed out of a game, called
"Core Wars", in which two or more computer programs move
57
through a defined memory space and try to destroy the others
and also out of certain practices in large systems, such as the
provision of "trapdoors" 58 during the creation of the program.
It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the possible
legal consequences of the provision of diseased software to an
unknowing public.
7. ConspicuousLitigationas a Means of Protection
Litigation of software pirates has a significant non-legal effect
on the protection of software as part of a complete marketing
strategy. Where very publicity-vulnerable pirates are sued in
a manner which generates considerable publicity; then a
significant deterrent effect may be realized with similar classes
of pirates. For example, Lotus Corporation brought action in
late 1983 against Rixon alleging copyright infringement of more
than 10 copies of the popular "Lotus -2-Y programs and
claiming the maximum statutory damages of $50,000 for each
54. See PC Magazine, Nov. 27, 1984 at 54 for an example of a commercially
available "worm" from Prolock, a software security company.
55. See A. K. Dewdney, Computer Recreations, Scientific American 1985
vol. 252 No. 3 14 at 19 for an example of a "worm" for an Apple
microcomputer.
56. See Dewdney, supra, at 20.
57. See A. K. Dewdney, Computer Recreations, Scientific American, 1984
vol. 251 No. 5 at 14.
58. A "Trapdoor" is a means used by the programmer to facilitate rapid
and unobstructed entry into the heart of a computer program. It is used
for debugging or otherwise editing the computer program. A "Trapdoor"
may often be left in a program even after release.
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such unauthorized copy plus costs. Rixon quickly settled and
agreed to a permanent injunction against further unauthorized
copying and also paid an undisclosed sum.
In July 1984 Lotus Corporation sued Health Group Inc. on
similar grounds. This action was also settled by consent, by
a decree in September 1984. Again a permanent injunction and
an undisclosed sum formed part of the settlement. 59 These suits
and other similar actions produced widespread publicity and
presumably caused some embarrassment to the corporate
defendants. There appears to be a deterrent effect produced
in the industry, at least insofar as Lotus Corporation software
is concerned.
If such litigation becomes part of a protection strategy, then
there is a need to target the defendants carefully for the greatest
effect. Presumably pirates within such organizations as schools,
universities, user's groups, government bodies, and such
commercial organizations as software manufacturers,
consultants and law firms would make suitable defendants.
Some Canadian distributers have certainly evidenced a desire
60
to "bust pirates".
8. Summary of Factors Affecting
Protection

Non-Legal Methods of

There are potentially an infinite amount of protection
mechanisms possible. These may be more or less effective,
depending on a number of factors such as:
(a) The expected volume of sales,
(b) The regional extent of the market,
(c) The particular class of users and their particular
characteristics,
(d) The type of computer used,
(e) The programming language used,
(f) The options available in the systems software, and
61
(g) The nature of the program itself.

59. See R. G. Sterne, P. J. Saidman, Copying Mass-Marketed Software,
BYTE February 1985 at 387.
60. See R. McGuire, Software Piracy, INPUT March 1985 at 8.
61. Most of this list was suggested by Al Dunbar in the micro computer
conference on Legal and Technical Protection of Software, MCRO:MICRO
at the University of Alberta.
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Just as there are infinite possibilities of developing protection
systems, so also there are infinite possibilities to circumvent
these systems. In the final analysis, it appears as though no
guarantee can be provided against the possibility of copying
computer programs. Given that some copying will take place,
then what are some practical methods to identify a particular
program as a copy?
V. Identificationof the Software
Several significant problems arise in any attempt to enforce
legal remedies. First and foremost is the knowledge that an
offence has taken place. This very difficult problem is
dependant on the information available to the seller/ developer/
rights holder to the program. It is beyond the scope of this
analysis to consider mechanisms available to increase the
detection of software priacy. A second, lesser problem, is given
that piracy has been detected, how will one prove to a court
of law that the pirate copy is in fact a copy?
A number of programming techniques serve to assist in
making this identification. First, any given programmer has
62
virtually unlimited options for solving any particular problem.
Most programmers will make consistent decisions in the style
in which the problem is solved. If this style can be identified,
say in the repeated use of favorite routines, then identical usage
in the pirate version raises doubts about its genuineness. A
second, and better, method is for programmers to embed serial
numbers, or dummy routines or instructions within a
program. 63 If a pirate does not thoroughly examine the logic,
64
then this should serve to prove the origin of the program.

62. Judicial recognition of the creativity that results in this unique aspect
of computer program may be found in I.B.M. v. Spirale (1984) 80 C.P.R.

(2nd) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
63. The author's initials, imbedded in source code, and translated to the
object code version lead to a conclusion of copying in Apple Computer Inc.
v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and Michael Suss (1984), 11 F.S.R. 481 (Federal
Court of Australia) per Fox J. at 494 and per Lockhart J. at 525.
64. Consider Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International,Inc. 685 F.2d
870 (1982 U.S. C.A. 3rd Circuit) where a "buried" copyright notice served
as an aid to proof that there was "manifest similarity" between the two
programs.
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In the videogame cases in the United States, 65 courts have
looked at the percentage of the instruction set that was identical
to determine copying. Note that in these cases the plaintiff had
to establish "substantial similarity" since he was relying on
copyright protection. It is submitted that satisfaction of the
"substantial similarity" test should be sufficient to establish the
fact that one program is a copy of the other.
In S & H Computer Systems, Inc. v. SAS Institute, Inc. 66
the court dealt with a claim of copyright and trade secret
infringement of an update of a pre-existing computer program.
Wiseman D. J. examined the evolution of the program. At
p. 423 he said:
However, if a party adopted an already prepared computer
program and made very simple changes in the program
involving mere rearrangment of the existing expression to
disguise its copying, there would certainly be an absence of
worthwhile imagination, creativity and independant
thought ....
The copyright "cannot be limited literally to
the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations". Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co. 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930).
The determination of whether or not one program is a copy
of another will ultimately rest on the facts of the individual
case. As Judge Learned Hand said in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc.
67
v. Martin Weiner Corp.
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond the 'idea', and has borrowed its
'expresssion'. Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.

65. The video game industry has been estimated to have gross revenue of
$7,700,000,000 Pay Meter Nov. 15, 1983, at 44 (estimated at $7,000,000,000
by Business Week Dec. 6, 1982, at 39) annually and has resulted in
considerable litigation. See for example Nintendo of America Inc. v. Elcon
Industries, Inc. 564 F.Supp 937 (D. Mich. 1982) "Donkey-Kong", Artic
International, Inc. v. Midway Manufacturing, Co. J.26068 June 1983 (U.S.
S.C.) where it was indicated Midway had sold more than $200,000,000 worth
of machines to play the "Pac-man" videogame, and approximately
$120,000,000 worth of machines to play the "Galaxian" videogame, and
Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics 564 F.Supp 1471 (D. Nev. 1983)
"Challenger Wildpoker". These cases and others are discussed in the copyright
protection section, following.
66. 568 F. Supp. 416 (1983 Tenn. D.C.).
67. 274 F.2d 487 at 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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The next question is how to prove which program is the
original. This can be done in a number of ways. One is to
file a copy with an impartial party as evidence of time of
creation. This is substantially how the copyright register works
though this could be done through the creation of a private
filing and registration system 68 that would not face the
69
disclosure requirements under the Copyright Act.
VI. Legal Protectionof Software
There are basically two types of legal protection possible in
the Canadian Legal system. These correspond to the two
sources of law in our legal system, statutes and the common
law. Statutory forms of protection exist under the Copyright
Act 70 and the Patent Act. 71 Numerous mechanisms of
protection exist at common law but most important are the
law of trade secrets, equitable doctrines relating to fiduciary
obligations and constructive trusts and the law of contract.
These forms of protection 72 will be examined in the remainder
of this analysis from the paticular perspective of the software
industry. Note, however, that these doctrines have much
broader application to coverage in the high technology
industries in general.
VII. Statutory Legal Protection of Software
1. Patent Law

73

A patent is a monopoly right in respect of an invention. 74 The
patent system is intended to encourage innovation and
68. Software escrow functions are often used in the licencing of custom
software in circumstances where the licensee wishes to have access to the
source code on the happening of some event (such as the licensor's
bankruptcy) and where the licensor does not wish to disclose the source code
except on these circumstances. This function may be of some evidentiary
value of first creation where a software copyright is not registered.
69. R.C.S. 1970, C.C30 as am.
70. R.C.S. 1970, C.C30 as am.
71. Patent Act R.S.C. 1970, c.203.
72. The contractual aspect of licence agreements is outside the scope of the
present discussion. The license agreement as a means to create the relationship
of confidence is examined in some detail in the trade secret section.
73. Note that an earlier version of this section has appeared in (1985), 2
Canadian Computer Law Reporter 72.
74. See 35 Hals. (4th Ed.) para. 303.
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continual improvement in technical and industrial creativity.
Under this system, the inventor is given a monopoly to the
use of his invention for 17 years from registration as a patent.
The price the Crown exacts for this exclusive right is the
disclosure of the invention through the registration process.
This differs from Copyright protection where neither disclosure
75
nor registration is required to vest protection in the creator.
The law of patents is derived, originally, from the Statue of
Monopolies76 and declared all grants of monopoly rights at
common law to be void, with certain exceptions, one of which
was "letters patent" to the true and first inventor of any manner
of new manufacture. 77 In Canada, Parliament has exclusive
legislative jurisdiction in the field of patent law under s.22 of
the British North America Act. 78 Pursuant to this legislative
79
competence, Parliament has enacted the Patent Act.

The scope of patent protection is limited to an invention
that is within the class of "new and useful art, process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter". 80 The invention must
also satisfy three additional tests once within the statutory
definition. The invention must have utility, novelty and not
be obvious to a person skilled in the trade.
The first step, in considering patent law as a candidate for
the protection of computer programs, is to show that the
program falls within the class of "new and useful art, process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter". Clearly, a
computer program might be a "new and useful art", it might
be a "process", or it might be a part of a "machine". 81 An
initial consideration is that "machine" claims and "process"
claims are treated somewhat differently. "Process" claims
concentrate on the steps of the process. These steps must be
novel and not obvious. It does not matter if the machine, on
75. In this sense it has been argued that technical or scientific creativity is
afforded much less protection in law than the forms of creativity that exist
in the humanities.
76. 1623 21 Jac. I c.3.
77. s.6.
78. 1867 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3, Now cited Constitution Act, 1867.
79. R.S.C. 1970, c.203.
80. Patent Act R.S.C. 1970, c.203, s.I as am.

81. This particular characterization is possible if the program is seen as a
machine part, such as a cam shaft.
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which the steps are performed, is not novel or is obvious. On
the other hand, a "Machine" claim must establish that the use
of the ideas underlying the invention are used in a novel or
not obvious manner. In this case it is not necessary that the
idea itself be novel or not obvious.
Given that the computer program might fit within one of
these categories, depending largely on how it is characterized,
the next step is to examine the three tests mentioned above.
First, and easiest, an invention is of utility if it performs some
beneficial function claimed for it by the program's creator.
Virtually all computer programs should be able to satisfy this
test since they will, generally, convert data from one, less
meaningful, form into another, more meaningful, form. The
utility test would, of course, not be met if the computer program
did not work.8 2 This basic test will be met if the program yields
83
the result promised in the specifications.
The obviousness test requires that the invention must not
be such as would be obvious to other skilled persons working
in the same field. Not only that, but the unique composition
of the invention's elements must also not be obvious to other
skilled persons working in the same field. Lord Reid, in
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Mills and Rockley
(Electronics) Ltd.,84 stated that the notional person to whom
the invention must be obvious is the uninventive person, skilled
in the art, capable of assimilating the contents of scores of
85
specifications, but incapable of a scintilla of invention.
86
Therefore there must be an inventive step.
Finally, the invention must be novel. That is, it must be
something new. An invention must not have been known or
used prior to the application, in the industry. The invention
cannot just perform the same functions as an existing invention
in the same way in which the existing invention performs the
82. See Mullard Radio Valve Co. Ltd. v. Phi/co Radio and Television
Corpoartion,(1926), 2 All E.R. 920 (H.L.).
83. See the classic case of Manton v. Parker (1814), Dav. Pat. Cas. 327
on this point.
84. (1972), R.P.C. 346 (H.L.) at 355.
85. See also 35 Hals. (4th Ed.) para. 492.
86. See Benmax v. Austin MotoCo. Lt.d (1953), 70 R.P.C. 284 (C.A.) on
appeal (1955) 1 All E.R. 326 (H.L.) and Beecham Group Ltd's (Amox.ycillin)
Application (1980), R.P.C. 261 (C.A.).
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functions. It is, however, sufficient if "one or more features
of the claim are new by themselves, or by themselves form
a new combination" that was not anticipated.8 7 Note that the
novelty and obviousness requirements are related but also
distinct. Not everything which is new (hence novel) is inventive
(not obvious). 88 Similarly, though not usually, an invention may
89
be old without being obvious.

(a) Advantages of Patent Protection
Patent protection allows the Patent holder to enforce the right
to exclude others from making, using or marketing the patented
item for a period of seventeen years. This provides a very strong
monopoly for basically about eight to sixteen times the market
life of most software. Unlike copyright, there is a very limited
access to the patented invention, as there is no "fair use"
exception or limitation on the protection provided. Compulsory
licencing will occur only after three years 90 and only if Patent
rights have been abused.
(b) Disadvantagesof Patent Protection
The first obstruction to Patent protection is the very debate,
to be examined later, over whether it is possible and under
which circumstances it might be possible to patent a computer
program. It appears, from the trend in recent U.S. cases at
the Supreme Court level, that it may now be easier to get Patent
protection for computer programs in the U.S.. The question
still remains to satisfy the Patent Office, whose stated policy
is to not grant patents for computer programs, that the
requirements of Patent protection are fulfilled.
Patent protection is only limited to the physical embodiment
of the ideas utilized by the invention but does not protect the
ideas underlying the unique logic of the program. There can
be no Patent on ideas, mathematical or scientific principles on
87. See 35 Hals. (4th Ed.) para. 462; Almanna Svenska Elektriska AB v.
Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (1952), 69 R.P.C. 63 (C.A.) and Martin
and Biroswan Ltd. v. H. Millwood Ltd. (1956), R.P.C. 125 (H.L.).
88. Riekmann v. Thierry (1896), 14 R.P.C. 105 (H.L.).
89. An example is Re Molin's v. Industrial Machinery Co. Ltd., (1937), 4

All E.R. 295 (C.A.). Constrast this with the usual case, as in Saccharin
Corporation Ltd. v. Anglo-Continental Chemical Works (1900), 17 R.P.C.
307.

90. Note in case of food or drug patents there is no three year waiting period.
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public policy grounds in favour of preventing the creation of
a monopoly of ideas.
It takes approximately 18 to 24 months to have a Patent
application approved, assuming you are able to satisfy the
stringent requirements to show the invention is patentable in
the first place. This time and the cost from a minimum of about
$5,000 to $10,000 or more depending on the complexity of the
application make Patent protection fundamentally unsound.
The program is of most value in exactly the time when it is
not protected, in those preliminary 18 to 24 months. 9' Similarly,
again assuming that the program can be considered patentable,
it will be that first version that is patented, not the version
(perhaps already second or third generation) that is being
marketed at the time the Patent might be issued. Finally, it
has been estimated 92 that approximately 50% of all successful
Patent applications that are subsequently challenged in legal
proceedings are struck down. Thus, after you have had to make
a full disclosure of the workings of your program and have
undergone the time and expense of the application, now, since
your invention is in the public domain, you can not even get
trade secret protection.
(c) The United States Perspective
The cases in the United States have proven to be particularly
persuasive with Canadian courts dealing with these issues and
so, due to the large amount of litigation in this area in the
U.S., this is the most relevant starting point.
In 1966 the U.S. Patent Office stated in its guidelines that
computer programs could be patented 93 if they consisted of
"utility steps" and not "mental steps". 94 This reflected the case
of In Re Abrams 95 which established what was later to become
the "Mental Steps Doctrine". This doctrine basically provides
that if a process could be undertaken mentally, say, by working
91. In Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J. S. & A. Group Inc. 628 F.2d 1038
(1980) (U.S. C.A. 7th Circuit) reversing 480 F.Supp. 1063 (1979) (U.S. DC

Illinois) the competitor marketed a similar program (Chess game) within
about one year of the original programs marketing debut.
92. Comments by Grant Hammond.
93. Under 35 U.S.C. s. 101.
94. 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 1(1966).
95. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
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out a formula on paper, then it could not be patentable. Most
computer programs basically provide for the very fast execution
of processes which are fundamentally capable of mental
execution, but in a long time. This doctrine was limited in
subsequent Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cases.
First, in In re Prater96 and then in In re Bernhart97 the
C.C.P.A. allowed claims, based on a characterization of the
programmed computer as a new machine, on the ground that
"the steps were performed by a machine and therefore were
not "mental". 98 A test for process claims developed indicating
that if the claim could be in the "technological arts", though
performed on a computer, it was patentable since the steps
were not "purely mental". 99
This expansionist trend of the C.C.P.A. was cut short in
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gottsehalk v. Benson. 0 0
Here the court was faced with a patent claim for an invention
described as being related "to the processing of data by program
and more particularly to the programmed conversion of
numerical information" in general-purpose digital computers. ' 0'
This broad claim was purported to cover the method in a
general-purpose digital computer of any type. The court
addressed the issue of whether this was a "process" capable
of patent protection. The court recognized that the process,
here, could be performed without the aid of a computer. The
claim was so broadly framed as to be akin to the claim to
0 3
or a principle. 10 4
a scientific truth, 10 2 a disembodied idea
96. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
97. 415 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
98. Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive
Analysis (1983), 23:4 Jurimetrics J 337 at 349.
99. See In re Musgrave 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), In re Foster 438 F.2d
10ll (C.C.P.A. 1971), In re Mahoney 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970) and
In re McIlroy 442 F2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
100. 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (U.S. S.C.).
101. Douglas J at 64.
102. Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp. 306 U.S. 86 (U.S. S.C.) at 94 "while a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge
of scientific truth may be".
103. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard 20 Wall. 498 at 507 "an idea of itself
is not patentable".
104. Le Roy v. Tatham 14 How. 156 at 175 "A principle, in the abstract,
is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these can not be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right".
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Here, if the patent was granted it would pre-empt use of the
mathematical formulation and this would be too broad a
monopoly. No general rule was stated and the door was left
open that, under the right circumstances, a program might be
capable of patent protection.
This rebuff forced the C.C.P.A. to curb its liberal approach
and the "point of novelty" test developed. That is, in a patent
application, if the point of novelty was the use of the computer
program to execute a mathematical formula then the claim
would not be allowed. The "point of novelty" test was a narrow
reading of Benson but still struck down a large number of broad
or unspecific claims. An alternative approach to patenting of
computer programs was to avoid the entire issue of the subject
matter's fundamental capacity to be protected under the patent
system. If the court looked, instead to the use of a particular
machine capable of being programmed 0 5 or more efficient
mechanisms to operate a machine 0 6 in order to validate the
patentability of the program.
This renewed effort at finding computer programs as capable
of patent protection was cut short by the U.S. Supreme Count,
again, in Parker v. Flook.07 Here, a patent was claimed on
a process for updating alarm limits during a catalytic
conversion process. 0 8 The only novel feature of the claim was
a mathematical formula. The claimant did not seek to wholly
pre-empt the use of the formula, but did seek to pre-empt its
use in a limited class of uses. The court rejected the claim since
the discovery of a new use for an existing principle or formula
does not have the requisite novelty to found a patent claim.
Just prior to the decision in Flook, the C.C.P.A. had decided
In re Freemand'0 9 where a computerized typesetting claim was
allowed. This was achieved based on a two step test:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or
indirectly recites a mathematical algorithm.
Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain
whether in its entirety it preempts that algorithm. 10
105. In re Noll545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
106. In re Deutsch 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
107. 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (U.S. S.C..

108. Stevens J at 585.
109. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
110. Davidson, supra, at 351.
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In re Walter' the second part of this restrictive reading of
Benson was modified after the decision in Flook to:
If the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific
manner to define structural relationships between the
physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to
limit the claims steps (in process claims), the claim is
statutory subject matter.
If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented
and solved by the claimed invention and is not limited in
any manner to the physical elements or process steps, no
amount of post-solution activity
nor limited field of use will
2
render the claim statutory." 1
This new tactic, the C.C.P.A.'s third attempt at bat after
two strike outs, was accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Diehr" 3 when it allowed a claim in which a
computer program was one step in an entire process and where
that process was, itself, patentable. This at least leaves the door
open for a patent claim where one element in a process involves
the use of a computer program. In a split decision, which
therefore affirmed the C.C.P.A. decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court also held a patent claim involving a computer program
14
in Diamondv. Bradley.
Subsequent C.C.P.A. decisions have allowed patents claimed
on specific processes, not general concepts" 15 and have restricted
processes that rely on computer programs to situations where
more than mere calculation is done." 6 Even the Patent Office,
traditionally opposed to patent protection for computer
programs (as is the case in Canada), has issued guidelines
basically reciting the Freeman two step test as modified by
Walker. 1 7 The new approach appears to be an emphasis on
120
9
and proper disclosure tests
the novelty," 8 obviousness''

111. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
112. Davidson, supra, at 351.
113. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (U.S. S.C.).

114. 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (U.S. S.C.) affirming In re Bradley 600 F.2d. 807
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
115. In re Abele 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
116. In re Pardo684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
117. Manual of Patent Examining Procedures s 2110.
118. In s. 102.
119. Ins. 103.
120. s.112.
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rather than the nonstatutory subject matter test' 2' as in the
22
pastt
This trend opens up the possiblity of patent protection, albeit
in very limited circumstances. It must be remembered that most
computer programs will not have sufficient novelty or nonobviousness to meet the strict tests necessary to qualify for
patent protection.
(d) Patent Protectionin Englandand the F.E. C.
Under the Patents Act 1949 several patent claims were upheld
on the characterization of the programmed computer as a
modified machine. In Slee and Harris's Application123 the
applicants put forward several claims. The court held that the
product of the computer's operation, intellectual information
which was valuable was not a "vendible product" and so this
characterization did not proceed. However, the programmed
computer could fall within a manner of new manufacture if
considered as a machine modified in a particular way. Similarly,
a claim to a means of controlling the operation of a computer,
in analogy to the operation of a camshaft with a novel profile,
was allowed. The same characterization was used to uphold
patents in Badger Co. Inc.'s Application124 and Gevers'

Application.125
The focus in apparatus or machine claims was, therefore,
on the computer and not on the program. A similar approach
was used in process claims, as in Burroughs Corporations
Application.126 The test was whether the process results in a
new machine or process or an old machine giving an improved
result using the method. 127 The only limitation was that the
results of the process must have "economic importance or
28
advantages in the field of useful as opposed to the fine arts."'
Up to this point the Tribunal had not seriously considered
the issue of novelty. This state of affairs was ended with the
121. s.101.

122. Davidson, supra, at 353.
123. (1966), 9 R.P.C. 194 (Patent Office).
124. (1970), R.P.C. 36 (Patents Appeal Tribunal).
125. (1970), R.P.C. 90 (Patent Appeal Tribunal).

126. (1973), F.S.R. 439 (Patent Appeal Tribunal).
127. at 447.

128. at 449.
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decision in International Business Machines Corporation's
Application. 29 The claim was for a product that stored and
updated prices and sales information in such a way as to retrieve
the price at which goods are to be sold in a manner dependant
on the last comparable pair of buy and sell orders. I.B.M.
claimed that the price selection scheme was not a manner of
manufacture and could not be transformed into such merely
through the use of a computer. The Tribunal inverted this
argument and came up with the proposition that a computer,
"which was a manner of manufacture, could be transformed
into a new manner of manufacture - a new computer simply
by the input of the novel programme". 130 As a result, I.B.M.'s
claim was upheld. In this process the Tribunal considered that
two elements of novelty had to co-exist. The first element was
the requirement that the claim must disclose a new concept
or idea, which would not be, of itself, capable of patent
protection. The second required element was that the medium
on which the program was stored must be novel due to
"different holes in the card or different patterns on tape, or
some other automatic control imposed to ensure that the
computer carried out the particular operation required".' 31 In
effect, as Liberman points out, there are two products - the
new computer and the unique storage mechanism.
The U.S. Supreme Court had appealed to Congress in
Benson and Flook for a reform of the U.S. Patent Law. As
was seen above, the C.C.P.A. and the U.S. Supreme Court
ended up taking on this task. Similar pleas in England did
not, however, go unheeded. In 1977 the Patents Act 1949 was
repealed and replaced by the Patents Act 1977.132 This new
Act expressly provided that computer programs are excluded
as proper subjects for patent protection. 33 This provision puts
129. (1980), F.S.R. 564 (Patent Appeal Tribunal) Note: The decision was
handed down on October 16, 1978. The application appears to have been
brought prior to the repeal of the Patent Act 1949 and the express exclusion
of Patent protection for computer programs.
130. Adam Liberman, Patentability of Data Handling Systems (1982), 56
Australian L J 80.
13 1. Liberman, supra,at 80.
132. chapter 37.
133. s.l(2)(c) supra, However, Niblett argues that patent protection may still
be available in some cases. See B. Niblett, Legal Protection of Computer
Programs(1980), at 30-33.
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England in step with other E.E.C. countries. For example, in
Germany, computer programs are expressly excluded from
patent protection. 34 A similar express exclusion is found in
35
the European Patent Convention.1
While the English cases, above, will certainly not be typical
of post-repeal cases in the future, they do provide a potential
viewpoint that might be accepted in Canadian courts.
(e) Patent Protectionin Australia
Under the Patents Act 1952, similar to the Patents Act 1949
(U.K.), the Australian Patent Office practice is summarized:
1. So far as product claims are concerned, two categories
are relevant:
(i) The medium upon which the programs are written or
recorded may be viewed as a manner of manufacture. Such
medium, however, has to be novel in order to be patentable.
The Patent Office contends that there is no novelty in punch
cards or magnetic tapes or discs.
(ii) Computers programmed in a particular manner may be
viewed as a modified computer and therefore a manner of
manufacture. The novelty of such manner of manufacture
may however be doubtful.
2. So far as process claims are concerned, these cannot be
viewed as a manner of manufacture because they do not
result in a "vedible product", rather they are merely a "new
way of solving mathematical problems" or are 'in the nature
136
137
of a scheme".
To date no Australian courts have ruled on the validity of
38
these Patent Office practices.
(f) CanadianPatent Protection
The Canadian Patent Office policy looks pessimistically at the
possibility of obtaining patent protection for computer
programs. The law, as contrasted from the Patent Office policy,
has outlined a familiar story. The few decisions show that here,
as elsewhere, the characterization of the computer program and
134. Bundesgesetzblatt (BGIB t p. 1273) s.t(2) no. 3.

135. Art 52(2)(c).
136. British Petroleum Co. Ltd. Application Nos 30390/63 and 30391/63
38 A.O.J.P. 1020.
137. Adam Liberman, The Protection of Computer Software in Australia
(1981), Australian Business L Rev 234 at 246.

138.

Liberman, supra, at 247.
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its function in a machine or process claim is vital to the success
or failure of the claim.
The first case, decided only at the Patent Appeal Board level,
was Waldbaum. 139 The applicant in Waldbaum brought
forward three characterizations: (1) a method for controlling
a data processor to determine the relative number of Os and
ls in a data set. (2) a method of operating a data processor
with specific application to counting the number of busy and
idle lines in a telephone system, and (3) a process consisting
of a new use of a computer.140 The Patent Appeal Board was
deciding prior to the later U.S. Supreme Court restrictions on
the C.C.P.A.'s expansionist policy and as a result relied on
the reasoning in In re Bernhart.14 1 The Board adopted the
characterization of the program creating a different machine
from the unprogrammed computer and was thus patentable.
The leading Canadian case is Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Patents. 42 Here, Schlumberger sought to
patent a system which analyzed the various instrument readings
made during the testing of a well. The measurements were
recorded on magnetic tape and then input into a computer
which had been programmed, according to the mathematical
formulae applicable. The output of this process was useful
information.
The Patent Commissioner rejected the claim on the ground
that Schlumberger had, in effect, claimed a monopoly on a
computer program and also that such a program, even if new
and useful, is not an invention within the meaning of the Patent
Act s.2.. Schlumberger appealed claiming that the invention
claimed is not merely a computer program but a complex
process, which is effected by computer.
The Federal Court of Appeal examined the claim for novelty.
It found that there was nothing new in using a computer to
make the kind of calculations that were involved here. The
novel element was the discovery of the mathematical formulae
or relationship. The court applied the mental steps doctrine:
139. (1972), 5 C.P.R. (2d) 162.
140. Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 64.
141. supra, Note that Bernhartwas overturned by the rule in Benson, supra,
142. (1981), 56 C.P.R. (2d) 204 (Fed C.A.) Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada Dismissed Oct. 20, 1981 (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 261 (S.C.C.).
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"If those calculations were not to be effected by computers,
but by men, the subject-matter of the application would clearly
be mathematical formulae and a series of purely mental
43
operations; as such, in my view, it would not be patentable".1
S.28(3) provides that no patent shall issue for a "mere scientific
principle or abstract theorem".
Schlumberger argued that the steps were not mental but
mechanical and were only part of the process claimed as an
invention. Pratte J. said "If the appellant's contention were
correct, it would follow that the mere fact that the use of
computers is prescribed to perform the calculations prescribed
in the specifications would have the effect of transforming into
patentable subject-matter what would, otherwise, be clearly not
patentable. 44 In effect, the basic process was not patentable
and the use of the computer can not change the nature of the
basic claim.
The court is clearly using the charaterization of the computer
program as identical with the mathematical algorithm that
underlies its logic. The door does not appear to be closed by
this narrow characterization, as is shown in the later case of
Re Application For Patent Of Lelke (Now Patent No.
1,113,194).145 In Lelke, the claim was for a system to lay out
advertising copy by computer. On amendment by including a
limitation that an essential feature of the invention was the
bit image memory refreshing the display, the claim was allowed.
Note that this case seemed to avoid the issue of subject-matter
patentability and concentrated on the narrow, apparently well
defined, claim.
Lelke was decided just after Diehr 46 and so does likely not
give us a Canadian commentary on Diehr.14 7 It appears that
the claims in Schlumberger and Diehr were similar so it may
be useful to contrast the cases. In Diehr the claim was for a
process which involved the measurement of temperatures
during a rubber molding process. These temperatures resulted
in recalculation of the cure time. It is difficult for the author
143. Pratte J speaking for the court, at 206.
144. at 206.
145. (1983), 72 C.P.R. (2d) 139 (Fed C.A.).
146. Lelke April 21, 1981 and Diehr March 3, 1981.
147. NOTE however that the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to have
been aware of Diehr when it denied leave to appeal in October 1981.
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to see how this is substantially different from what
Schlumberger was claiming, a process of measurement,
subsequent calculation and then the production of useful
information. Diehr was decided by concentrating on the process
as a whole and not on the mathematical formulae that made
up part of the process. Justice Rehnquist stated: "We view the
respond ants' claims as nothing more than a process for molding
rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula". 48 It is significant that in Diehr the court expressly
found that the applicant did not seek to pre-empt the use of
the mathematical relationship. It does not appear that this
limitation was forcefully argued in Schlumberger though it is
noted that the Patent Appeal Board allowed the claim in Lelke
when the claim was limited.
In Re Application of Honeywell Inc. (Now Patent No.
1,130,462)149 Honeywell was successful in claims 2 to 6 for an
invention entitled Synchronizing System for a Microprogrammed Computer. The first claim was rejected as being too
broad in the light of the cited art. As in Lelke, the successful
claim characterized the invention as a system. Computer
programs are, then, part of an otherwise patentable process.
In summary a claim for patent protection of a computer
program will be difficult to justify but in the proper case
computer programs, as apart of an otherwise patentable process
or machine, have been allowed. Characterization of the role
of the computer program is vital to the success or failure of
the application. Where the court wishes to see the program
as a machine part, something that changes the nature of the
machine or controls the machine, then patent protection is
possible. Where the court assimilates the algorithm underlying
the program with the claim for patent protection, a very
difficult road lies ahead for patent protection of computer
programs.
The Canadian courts have shown a great willingness to follow
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in this area. 150 This
148. Diehr,supra, at 191.
149. (1984), 79 C.P.R. (2d) 281 (Fed. Patent Appeal Board and
Commissioner). Decided May 21, 1981.
150. See, however, Justice Walsh's comments contrasting the U.S. and
Canadian law on obviousness in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing v.
Lorcon Inc. (1983), 73 C.P.R. (2d) 176 (F.C.T.D.).
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is understandable given the greater experience of the U.S.
courts with these matters and also given the fact that Canada's
largest trading partner is the United States. It has yet to be
seen whether the Canadian courts will follow the more liberal
trend away from a concentration on the algorithm as evidencing
the character of a computer related claim, and concentrate
instead on the tests of novelty, non-obviousness and
inventiveness as the proper criteria to determine whether or
not a computer program might be eligible for patent
protections.
2. Copyright Law
(a) The ConstitutionalBasisJbr Copyright
The federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over the field
of copyright by virtue of s.91(23) British North America Act. 51'
Prior to Confederation there existed a common law doctrine
of copyright. Parliament in the exercise of its exclusive
jurisdiction has completely covered the field, as is seen in s.45
52
of the Copyright Act:1
No person is entitled to copyright or any similar right in
any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work otherwise
than under and in accordance with the provisions of this
Act, or any other statutory enactment for the time being
in force, but nothing in this section shall be construed as
abrogating any right or jurisdiction to restrain a breach of
trust or confidence.
It is clear that, unlike the United States where a common
law copyright still subsists, in Canada the CopyrightAct
governs the entire field. The latter words of s.45 are very
important since they implicitly recognize that the right of
copyright co-exists with the law of trade secrets. It is submitted
that the law of trade secrets is fundamentally within the scope
of s.92(13) of the British North America Act, 1867153 and so
is within an area of exclusive provincial competence. This
would be so since there are no express provisions of s.91 which

151. 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, Now Cited Constitution Act, 1867.
152. R.S.C. 1970c.C-30 as am.
153. 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3, Now Cited Constitution Act, 1867.
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would limit this legislative competence.1 54 The doctrine of trade
secrets and breach of confidence was surely known to the
fathers of our confederation and so it is submitted that the
latter words in s.45 are necessarily implied even if they had
not been expressly stated.
(b) Nature and Elements of Copyright
Copyright confers a limited monopoly, for the benefit of
authors or creators of works appropriate for copyright
protection. Unders s.3(l) it is clearly a negative monopoly right.
For the purposes of this Act, "copyright" means the sole
right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial
part thereof in any material form whatever...
The basis for the law of copyright is that the protection of
the author's moral rights (such as claims to paternity) and the
protection of copying rights will encourage individual artistic
and creative gain. While this might have been the original
intention, copyright protection now appears to be broadly
available without the necessity of an "artistic" rather than
"utilitarian" aspect of the work. 55
It is important to distinguish the difference between the right
of copyright and other rights, such as possession. Possession
of a copyrighted work may allow the possessor to use the work
in many ways but the possessor is not permitted to make copies
of the work. It is very possible, in fact the general case, that
one person or entity will own the copyright to the work and
another distinct person or entity has a right to use the work.
Copyright law is concerned with the rights of the copyright
holder, not the possessor.
154. Note however s.7(e) Trade Marks Act R.S.C. 1970, c.T-10 which
purports to legislate that "no person shall... do any act or adopt any other

business practice contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage in
Canada". One of the functions of the law of trade secret and trust has been
to provide a minimal level of commercial conduct. S.7(e) certainly moves
into this area. There is prima facie a broad purported inclusion of the
province's jurisdiction under s.92(13) of the B.N.A. Act. By analogy with
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada(1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.) this is surely
unconstitutional.
155. Apple Computers, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation (1983), 2
C.L.R. 335 (U.S. C.A. Third Circuit) August 30, 1983 and LB.M. v. Spirale
(1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.). Note, however, The White Paper on

copyright, which appears to insert a requirement of aesthetic appeal as
justification for expropriating copyrights from software developers.
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Certain formal conditions must be satisfied before it is even
possible to come within the protection of the Copyright Act.
Briefly, these are:
(1) Author or creator must be, at the time of creation:
(i) a British subject, or
(ii) a resident of Canada, or
(iii) a resident of a country that is a member of the Berne
Convention, 56 and
(2) The work must be within the class of works protected under
s.4(l): "copyright shall subsist

. . .

in every literary, dramatic,

musical and artistic work ... "
For a work to be capable of supporting copyright protection
it must have certain attributes, as follows:
(i) An OriginalCreation
This implies, first, that a work exists and second, that it is
an original work. Original is defined in a negative sense,
meaning essentially that the work is not copied from someone
else's work. 157 To be original, the work must emanate from
the author, it must be the product of his labour and skill and
an expression of his thoughts. A mere amanuensis who does
nothing more than take down what is dictated to him does
158
not exercise labour and skill of the required character.
Copyright is only concerned with the form of expression and
so it is this form which must be original. The ideas underlying
the form of expression need not be original. This is the basic
problem, to be discussed in detail later, in copyrignt protection
for computer programs. For the valuable part of the program
is not so much its form of expression but rather the unique
logic that underlies that form. This is not protected by
copyright.
(ii) Fixation in a Tangible Form
The work done, to be capable of copyright protection, must

156. The Berne Convention was the first international attempt to provide

some degree of international intellectual property protection to residents of
member countries. Under this agreement, the member countries allow
reciprocal protection of copyright in the member states.
157. University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., (1916),
2 Ch. 601.
158. Canadian Admiral Corporation Ltd. v. Rediffusion Inc., (1954), Ex.
C.R. 382 (Exchequer Court).
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be fixed in a tangible form. 59 Through the idea of fixation,
the work must have some form of permanence. This would
coincide with general legal theory in favour of certainty and
order. It would be very difficult to acknowledge an enforceable
right in a person when it can never be proven what the subject
matter of the right consists of. Fixation provides a tangible
work against which an alleged copy can be contrasted. The
requirement of fixation is an indication of the courts' difficulties
in dealing with transient intangible phenomenon.
The requirement of fixation is generally satisfied in the case
of computer programs, since they will be "fixed" in some form
of magnetic or other media.
(iii) Requirement of Registration
Unlike the United States, which requires notice of copyright
on the work, in Canada, there is no formal requirement for
registration of notification in order for copyright to subsist in
an appropriate work. Once the labour, skill and judgment
results in an original work that is fixed in a tangible media,
the work is protected by copyright. 60 There is a register for
copyrights in Canada, but its value is only evidentiary in nature.
Under s.20(3) registration provides certain useful presumptions
which would assist in an action enforcing the right. The
Supreme Court of Canada, in Circle Film Enterprises Inc. v.
C. B. C., 161 has held that registration may give rise to a rebuttable
presumption of copyright. In Blue Crest Music Inc. v. Canusa
Records Inc. 162 it was held that where copyright is presumed
to exist, then originality is also presumed. The Blue Crest
decision was followed in Bally-Midway Mfg. Co. v. M.J.Z.
Electronics Ltd.,163 a case dealing with a claim of copyright
in a computer program.
Note, however, that registration also requires a disclosure
of a human readable form of the work. This might be
disadvantagous since a competitor could determine what the
underlying logic of the program is. It might also provide a
159. Canadian Admiral Corporation Ltd. v. Rediffusion Inc., (1954), Ex.
C.R. 382 (Exchequer Court).
160. Gribble v. Manitoba Free Press, (1931), 1 D.L.R. 169 (Man. C.A.)
Dennistoun J.A. (1959), 31 C.P.R. 57, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 211, 19 Fox Pat. C.
39, (1959), S.C.R. 602 (S.C.C.).
162. (1974), 17 C.P.R. (2d) 149 (F.C.T.D.).
163. (1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 160 (F.C.T.D.).
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problem if trade secret protection is sought concurrently with
copyright protection.
(c) Ownership of Copyright
Under s.12(l) copyright will reside in the author or creator
of the work. Where the author is an employee and creates the
work within the scope of his employment, then under s.12(3)
the employer is entitled to the copyright. 64 Where the
programmer is a consultant, and absent any agreement to the
contrary, the programmer will own the copyright. 65 Similarly,
it appears that where an employee develops a program at his
own expense and on his own time then he will own the
copyright even if the employer uses the program that he
166
developed.
(d) Advantages of Copyright Protection
There are several advantages to protection under the copyright
system. First, the Copyright Act gives the copyright holder a
right in rem, a right against all the world, to prevent
appropriation of the labours of one author by another. This,
like patent law, allows one to enforce rights against strangers,
persons you might not have other dealings with. This is an
important advantage over contractual and trade secret
protection which appear to protect only against wrong-doing
67
between specific parties.1
A second advantage of copyright protection is the absence
of the need to register the work. The work is protected by
164. Patchett v. Sterling (1955), 72 R.P.C. 50 per Lord Simonds dealing

with a patent case declared "it is an implied term in the contract of service
of any workman that what he produces by the strength of his arm or the

skill of his hand or the exercise of his inventive faculty shall become the
property of his employer". These words were, of course, spoken in an age
very different from the "information age" of the present. See W. R. Cornish,
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights,
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 1981) at 216.
165. See, for example, Northern Office Micro Computer Pty. v. Rosenstein,

(1982) 8 F.S.R. 124, 1981, (4) S.A. 123 (S.C. S.A.). This case was generally
approved of by Reed J. in Spirale and by Hughes J. in Computermat. See

also Thrustcode Ltd. v. W. W. Computing Ltd., (1983), F.S.R. 502 (Ch.D.)
at 507.
166. See, for example, Babolat Mailot Witt S. A. v. Pachot, (1984), E.C.C.
282 (Paris C.A.) not yet commented upon in Canada in this context.
167. See a possible exception in the case of trade secret in limitations that
have been placed on the defence of bona fide purchasor for value without
notice, discussed later.
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copyright once the conditions, above, have been satisfied. This
is a major advantage of copyright protection over patent
protection. As was mentioned earlier, patent protection only
subsists on the successful application for a patent, usually 24
months after the application was filed. Copyright, like trade
secret protection, arises instantly on the creation of the work.
(e) Disadvantagesof Copyright Protection
The primary disadvantage to copyright protection is the fact
that copyright protects only the form of expression of an idea
and not the idea itself. There are so many possible forms that
a given computer program can take to solve a particular
problem, using the same idea, that is it readily apparent that
it is not the form of the idea's expression that is important
but rather the idea, the method or logic, that provides for the
solution. The time and effort spent on the development of new
techniques in programming are not protected. So long as the
competitor's version is not "substantially similar" in form, then
use of the idea is not a violation of copyright.
The Copyright Act itself provides for certain allowable
limitations on the creator's copyright. Section 17(2)(a) provides
that "any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private
study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary" is
not an infringement. This provides a possible limit to the extent
of copyright protection. It is noted that "fair dealing" does not
likely extend to commercial dealings as appears to be indicated
by s. 17(4). s. 17(2)(d) provides that "short passages", if suitably
acknowledged, do not infringe in school use, so long as "not
more than two of such passages from works by the same author
are published. . . within five years". Section 17(2)(f) provides
that recitation in public "of any reasonable extract' is not an
infringement. Therefore, there might be defences available to
an alleged infringer that would not be available if the program
were protected by patent law.
Another serious limitation to the possible protection offered
under copyright law is due to s.46 of the Copyright Act which
provides that works which are industrial designs are not
protected under the Copyright Act. Rule 11168 provides

168. Industrial Design Rules, 1978, c.964 under s.19 Industrial Design Act
R.S.C. 1970, c.1-8.
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A design shall be deemed to be used as a model or pattern
to be multiplied by any industrial process within the meaning
of s.46 Copyright Act, (a) where the design is reproduced
or is intended to be reproduced in more than 50 single
articles...
The Act defines an industrial design as anything reproduced
in an industrial process in more than 50 copies. The test is
one of intention. If at the time of creation the creator intended
to produce more than 50 copies of the work then it. might be
only possible to protect the work under the Industrial Design
Act. This Act provides broader protection but for a much more
limited term of 5 years protection with a possible extension
of another 5 years.
While there are no formalities for copyright protection to
vest in a work (ie. no need to register), to obtain industrial
design protection one must register the work within one year.
Many other technical formalities must also be satisfied to have
any security in the industrial design protection. As a result it
is not a preferred method of protection.
In Canada, the Copyright Act 169 was enacted in 1924 and
has only seen minor amendments since then. Unfortunately,
much of the language in the Act has had the effect of fixing
technology as at the date the Act was first passed. 70 As is
seen in the exemptions above the Copyright Act was originally
intended for works which are creative in the "artistic" rather
than "practical" or "utilitarian" sense. The modern view appears
to be that the merit, if any, of a work is quite irrelevant to
the question of copyright protection. 17 1 Unfortunately, old ideas
do not leave us as fast as the times have changed and so cases
still exist which attempt to require some degree of "artistic"
creative value. An example is Case no. 7-0-143/80172 where the
judge found that a computer program did not have the
necessary "intellectual-aesthetic content" associated with works
169. R.S.C. 1970, c.C-30 as am.
170. CanadianAdmiralsupra,where the Act did not provide for the situation
where television broadcasts were rediffused through other than "radio
transmission" through the "ether".
171. D. P. Anderson & Co. Ltd. v. The Lieber Code Co., (1917), 2 K.B.
469 (K.B. Div.) where a code, each word of which was meaningless, was
held to be protected by copyright as an "original literary work".
172. District Court, Mannheim, 1981, Der Betriebsberater (BB), p. 1543 June
13, 1981.
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traditionally protected by copyright. Heidrich 73 points out that
s.2(2) of the German Copyright Act does not make this a
requirement of copyright protection.
A further problem is one of fundamental conceptual
difficulty. The typical use of a computer program will involve
the loading of the program, which has been stored in some
form, into the computer. In effect the computer makes a copy
of the loaded program in order to use it most effectively.
Concern has been raised that this copying might be an
infringing use. This reproduction is not generally available for
human perception and so it has been commented that it might
17 4
not be reproduction as understood by the Copyright Act.
Similarly the W.I.P.O. 175 Committee made the following
comment in this regard:
... it is, . . ., possible that copyright law can provide a
remedy in this case since it is probable that the use of a
program always involves its copying into the computer
memory, but courts may not regard such internal
reproduction as sufficient for the purposes of copyright

law. 176
It would be very unpractical to have a situation whereby
literally millions of copyright violations might occur each day
and, in fact, there would be no other method to make use of
the work. Such a situation was rejected by the majority in Apple
Computer Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v.
Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and Michael Suss177 and this
reasoning was adopted in Canada in I.B.M. v. Spirale.178 In
the United States, part of the amendments to their Copyright
Act has provided an explicit right to make an archival copy
of the program. 79 While this does not directly address the issue,
173. U. Heidrich, Portection of Computer Programs Under German
Copyright Law (1983), 2 C.L.R. 41 at 44.
174. Witford Committee, Report of the Committee to Consider the Law on
Copyright and Designs: Copyright and Designs Law, Cmnd. 6732 at 129.
175. World Intellectual Property Organization.
176. (1977), Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software.
Industrial Property 259 at 261. See LB.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d)
187 (F.C.T.D.) where Reed J. uses this reproduction or translation as an

alternative basis for finding copyright in source code and object code.
177. (1984), 11 F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).
178. (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
179. s. 117(2) 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act, infra, at 00. Discussed
later.
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it does, perhaps, indicate that such is a reasonable use. The
issue in Canada might be decided on the basis of an implied
authority to make such internal copies only for the use of the
computer program.
The preceeding discussion has alluded to another problem
area. While a program written in source code might be read
by a computer programmer and might even make some sense
to a lay person, the same program in its object code version
is virtually impossible to read. 80 The mere fact that it is not
readable or intelligible ought not to be a problem as was held
in the Lieber Code' 8' case. The problem is that the object code
is designed and intended to be read by a machine and not by
human beings. 82 As a result it might be outside the scope of
83
the protection that might exist under the Copyright Act. 1
This problem has been resolved in the United States by
amendments to their Act which basically provides that it is
irrelevant that one might have to use a machine in an
intermediary position in order for a human to read the work.
We unfortunately do not have such provisions in our Act. The
case might be made, if this arises as an issue, that since the
law of copyright protects a computer program in one form,
say the written program listing of the source code, then it ought
to also protect the program in another translated form. It is
noted that one of the author's rights under the Copyright Act
1
is the right to adapt or translate the work. 84
A further related problem looks to the scope of protection
180. Note however that Lockhart J., in his concurring decision, in Apple
Computer Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Computer Edge
Pty. Ltd. and Michael Suss, (1984), I1 F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia)

appears at p. 523 to have decided, on an alternative basis for his decision,
that object code could be read by skilled humans. I submit Fox J. provided
the better view by deciding on a broader basis rather than trying to patch
up an obsolete Copyright Act.
181. (1917), 2 K.B. 469 (K.B. Div.).

182. For a more detailed view of this position see the dissent of Sheppard
J. in Apple Computer Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v.
Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and Suss, (1984), 11 F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court

of Australia), particularly at 538-539.
183. This issue was assessed in favour of copyright in both Apple Computers,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation(1983), 2 C.L.R. 335 (U.S. C.A. Third
Circuit) and I. B.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C.P. R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
184. s.3(l)(a) Copyright Act This argument has been adopted by Reed J.
in I.B.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
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under the Act. As the Act was apparently enacted to encourage
creative work of the "artistic" kind, there has sometimes been
a tendency to imply that coverage does therefore not extend
to works which are creative in a "practical" or "utilitarian"
sense. Again, the Lieber Code case should put to rest any
attempt to read such additional requirements in to the
Copyright Act. However, this issue is still raised in the odd
85
case. 1
In the United States, the Court in Apple Computer Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corporation86 directly addressed this issue.
Operating under a revised Copyright Act, the court found that
the fact that the object code was not in a human readable form
did not preclude copyright protection. The Apple case really
only affirmed the rule in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic
International,Inc.8 7 which overturned Data Cash Systems, Inc.
v. JS & A Group Inc. 88 The District court in Data Cash had
found that there was no copyright in the complainant's ROM,
and so the defendant was able to make a direct copy of the
ROM chip and market a competing chess game.
(f) Copyright in the United States
As in the case of patent law, the development of the law of
copyright has had, and can be expected to have, a significant
effect on the direction of Canadian copyright law. The United
States has gone through somewhat more of the analysis stage
and has had a number of major amendments to their Copyright
Act. Starting about two decades ago, the Copyright Office had
been registering copyrights for computer programs. The Office
expressed concern about the validity of this policy. 89 Their
primary concern was the copyrightability of object code. Source
code, as mentioned earlier, is directed towards a human reader
185. It was argued by the defendants in Apple Computer Inc. and Apple
Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. and Suss. (1984),
II F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).
186. (1983), 2 C.L.R. 335 (U.S. C.A. Third Circuit).
187. 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Circuit 1982) See also Stern Electronics, Inc. v.
Kaufman 669 F.2d 852 (2nd Circuit 1982), Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Artic International,Inc. No. 82-1607 (7th Circuit April 11, 1983), Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Dirkschneider543 F.Supp 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
188. 480 F.Supp 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979) affirmed on another ground 628 F.2d
1038 (7th Circuit 1980).
189. Office of the Register of Copyrights, Announcement SML-47, Copyright

Office Circular 31D 1965.
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as opposed to a machine reader and is therefore perceptable
by a human.
As early as technology developed mechanisms to store and
retrieve information this debate developed. From the days of
the player piano as in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co.' 90 it has continued. The White-Smith case inhibited the
protection of unperceptable forms of information without
specific amendment and exception.' 9'
A very major change in American copyright law occurred
with the 1976 Copyright Act. 92 The White-Smith rule was
overturned in favour of protection for works which are
perceptable "with the aid of machine or device". Several recent
cases have held that this Act now provides copyright protection
93
to object code. 1
The second aspect of the problem remains. Object code is
not intended to be perceived by a human being but by a
machine, so is not a literary work within its traditional meaning.
"Its function is to substitute for manual labour. It is designed
to be a mechanical apparatus which runs a machine." 94
Basically this has brought us back to the issue of
characterization of the computer program. If the "machine
control" aspect is emphasized, then the problem appears. If
the program is merely seen as a form of writing, then the
problem disappears.
CONTU continued to press for a functional rather than
formal view of computer programs. 9 5 As a result of the
recommendations made by CONTU 196 the Copyright Act was
amended in 1980. This amendment is of particular interest to
this entire topic and so will be reproduced in length.
190. 209 U.S. 2 (1908) (U.S. S.C.).
191. For example, phonographic records were not copyright protectable until
the amendment in 1971 Act of Oct. 15, 1971; Pub.L. No. 92140; Stat. 2541,
amending Act of Mar. 4, 1909, c.320; 35 Stat. 1975.
192. 17 U.S.C.s.102(a).
193. Williams Electric Inc. v. Artic International Inc. 685 F.2d 870 (3rd

Circuit U.S. C.A. 1983) and affirmed by Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Inc. (1983) 2 C.L.R. 335 (3rd Circuit U.S. C.A.).
194. Davidson, supra, at 361.
195. That is looking at the unique circumstances of the computer
programming industry, computer programs ought to be protected whether
they fit into one of the old categories or not.
196. CONTU Final Report July 31, 1978.
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s.101.

Definitions... A computer program is a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.
s.117 Nothwithstanding the provisions of section 106
(exclusive right's of copyright holder) it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program
to make or authorize the making of another copy of
adaptation of that computer program provided
1. That such new copy or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program
in conjunctioned with a machine and that it is used in no
other manner, or
2. That the new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event
the continued possession of the program should cease to
be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions
of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred,
along with the copy from which such copies were prepared,
only as part of the lease, sale or transfer of all rights in
the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred
197
only with the authorization of the copyright owner.s
This Act recognizes the reality of the need to make a backup
or archival copy in order to protect valuable programs or data.
It also recognizes and resolves the potential argument that the
internal copying of the program is an infringement by expressly
providing that such internal "adaptations" are not an
infringement where necessary for the use of the program.
Finally, the Act provides statutory recognition and force of
the reality of modern licencing practices. Since most programs
are sold under a licence agreement, the licencor would wish
to get all "archival" copies back if the licence should terminate.
The Act gives this arrangement statutory effect. Finally and
most importantly, the Act ensured that if object code was not
included in the 1976 Act, it was certainly included in the 1980
amendments.
It was still possible, up to the 1980 amendments, to make
the argument that object code was a utilitarian device and was,
therefore, not the proper subject of copyright protection. In
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group'9 8 the District
197. 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act; Act of Dec. 12, 1980; Pub.L.
No. 96-517, s.10; 94 Stat. 3028 (as codified in 17 U.S.C. ss.101,1 17.
198. 480 F.Supp 1063 (N.D. Illinois 1979).
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Court held that a direct copy of the plaintiff's ROM chip was
not copyright protected since the object code contained therin
was not in a form which one can see or read with the naked
eye but was a machine part. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the District Court decision on another ground. 199 There is a
requirement of notification under U.S. copyright law 200 and
neither the object code stored in the ROM, nor the gameboard,
packaging nor accompanying instructions contained the
required notice.
The District Court was just applying the rule in White-Smith
in rejecting the protection because it was not intelligible to a
human. The court also relied on the characterization of the
program as part of the machine to reject protection. The Data
Cash case has been subsequently considered in several cases
and has been rejected as the proper interpretation of the
protection available under the 1976 Act.
In Tandy Corporationv. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. 121
the plaintiff complained that the defendant had copied his
"input-output routine". Proof of this was shown by the fact
that only the name, "Radio Shack" or "Tandy" had been
removed from the program listing. It appears that in all other
respects the programs were identical. The program was stored
in a ROM chip. The District Court expressly distinguished
Data Cash and observed that the Illinois Court of Appeals
had noted neither side had actually argued the issue. 20 2
The first Court of Appeal decision to reject the Data Cash
argument was Williams Electric Inc. v. Artic International
Inc.203 where it found the argument to be artificial and contrary
to the 1976 Act. The Court of Appeal found an infringement
of the "Pac-man" and "Galaxian" program copyrights. There
was substantial copying of the sequence of program steps. Note
that the claim to copyright in all possible video display images
20 4
was rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
199.628 F.2d 1038 (7th Circuit 1980) (U.S. C.A.).

200. This condition does not exist in Canada.
201. 524 F.Supp 171 (N.D. California 1981).
202. Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic InternationalInc. 547 F.Supp 999
at 1012-13 (N.D. Illinois 1982) also disassociated itself from the Data Cash

decision.
203. 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Circuit 1982) (U.S. C.A.).
204. (1983), 2 C.L.R. 135 (U.S. S.C.) June 1983 J. 26068.
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The Williams Electronics decision was applied in the
subsequent case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corporation.2 5 This was a case where Apple claimed an interim
injunction to restrain Franklin's alleged infringement of 14
computer programs. 20 6 Franklin moved to dismiss 11 of the
counts on procedural grounds. At trial, Apple showed the
Franklin programs were virtually identical to the Apple
programs. 207 Franklin admitted the copying and relied in
defence on the argument that the operating system was not
capable of protection under the Copyright Act. The Court of
Appeal reviewed the state of the law on this issue and agreed
with its earlier decision in Williams Electronics. It had been
suggested that Williams Electronics depended on the
"communicative" aspect of the video game. The program was
designed to communicate with a human, whereas it was claimed
the Apple programs were designed to communicate with the
machine. This was rejected. The Court held that the categories
of literary work is not closed and is broader than the common
law definition of literary works. 208 As a result, a computer
program, whether in object or source code form, is a literary
work within the meaning of the U.S. Copyright Act.
Franklin claimed that s. 102(b) of the Copyright Act expressly
prevented copyright protection in any "method of operation"
and hence the operating system ought not be protected. The
Court found that Apple did not seek to copyright the method
but only the unique instruction set. An operating system is not,
per se, precluded from copyright protection.
Franklin claimed that Apple was attempting to gain a
monopoly on the idea for the operating system. The Court
found difficulty in drawing the line between ideas and the
expression of the ideas. This, it was said, had to be a pragmatic
decision based on the facts of each case. Consideration was
205. 2 C.L.R. 335 (3rd Circuit 1983) (U.S. C.A.) August 30, 1983.
206. (1) Autostart ROM, (2) Applesoft, (3) Floating-Point Basic, (4) Apple
Integer Basic, (5) DOS 3.3, (6) Master Create, (7) Copy, (8) Copy A, (9)
Copy OBJO, (10) Chain, (11) Hello, (12) Boot 13, (13) Apple 13-Sector Boot
Rom, and (14) Apple 16-Sector Boot Rom.
207. For example the only change in the Autostart ROM was 8 bytes of
memory to display "ACE 100" rather than "APPLE 1I". Similarly the
Franklin DOS 3.3 only changed 16 bytes out of 9,00 bytes.
208. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corporation 329
F.Supp 517 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
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given to preserving the balance between competition and
protection.
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon20 9 provides an
example of the method of analysis that the court might use
in a case of an infringement claim. Here, the plaintiff
manufacturer of "Pac-man" video game claimed that the
21 0
defendants infringed on both the audio visual component
and in the object code stored in the ROM. The analysis outline
follows:
(1) Whether Infringement of the Audio Visuals?
(a) Was there access to the
Defendants? In this case, yes.

copyrighted

work

by

the

(b) Was there "Substantial Similarity" between the works?
(i) No copyright is a mere idea - limit to protection.
(ii) TEST: Would the ordinary observer think that the
defendant copied the plaintiff's audio visual display?
This test was not satisfied by the defendant's "Cute-see" audio
visuals.
(2) Whether Infringement of the Computer Program?
(a) Can the audio visual display and the program be considered
separately?
TEST: The skill, ingenuity and effort required to design the
computer program is quite different from the process of
conceiving and designing the audio visual display.
(b) Is the computer program protected by copyright?
Yes, the Computer Software Act 1980211 covers:
1. the human readable source code, and
2. the machine readable object code.
It does not matter in which form the object code is stored (ie.
ROM, Floppy Diskettes or Magnetic Tape)s.
It does not matter that electric current passes through the
212
"Firmware".
209. (1983), 2 C.L.R. 105, 564 F.Supp 741 (N.D. I1 1983) June 1, 1983.
210. This case appears to have been decided just prior to the decision of
the U.S. S.C. in Midway v. Artic (1983), 2 C.L.R. 135.
211. Pub.L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
212. The ROM chip, The argument which focuses on the placement or

movement of electrons appear to be a refinement of the argument against
protecting utilitarian devices.
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The chip only serves as a repository
instructions in object code.
(c) Was there access to the
Defendants? In this case, yes.

for the

copyrighted

work

computer
by

the

(d) Was there "Substantial Similarity between the works?
(i) No copyright in a mere idea - limit to protection.
(ii) TEST: Would the ordinary observer think that the
defendant copied the plaintiffs audio visual display?
Yes, out of the 16,000 bytes available Pac-man used 13,382
steps. In total the defendants' steps were common with 89%
of the Pac-man program, considering both the data and
instruction sets. When just the instruction set was considered,
then 97% of the steps were common. Also, most of the
enhancements to the "Cute-see' game were contained in the
unused top locations of the chip. This supports an inference
of copying and "patching".
A number of observations were made by the court that might
be of assistance in future litigation.
(A) The computer program is a distinct creation from the
2 3
function that it might provide. 1
(B) It is quite possible to design a game that would infringe
the audio visual copyright but would use an entirely different,
21 4
non-infringing, computer program.
(C) It is virtually impossible that two programmers working
2 15
independently would write so nearly identical programs.
It had been argued that computer programs in the firmware
form were not capable of copyright protection. The Court
rejected this argument in favour of a more practical and less
technology-bound solution. Congress has now gone even
further in a less related area with the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984216 This Act creates a new form of

213. supra, at 21.
214. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman 669 F.2d 852 at 885 (2nd Circuit
1982). NOTE that here, in the instant case, the reverse happened. An
infringing program was used to produce a non-infringing audio visual work.
215. supra, at 33.
216. Enacted November 8, 1984.
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intellectual property to protect the large research and
21 7
development effort in the design of semiconductor chips.
In summary, in the United States, copyright protection is
available for computer programs whether in the source code
or object code form and regardless whether stored in the form
of firmware, magnetic diskettes or magnetic tape. It must be
noted that the author or copyright holder must provide
notification of the copyright claim. Canadian courts have
shown great respect for the decisions of the American courts. 218
As Canada's domestic Computer Law continues to evolve, it
may be expected that the reasoning of the courts in the United
States will continue to receive high respect in Canadian courts.
(g) Copyright in Australia
After an adverse decision at trial 219 the case of Apple Computer
Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Computer Edge
Ptv. Ltd. and Michael Suss 220 has proved the strongest
authority in the Commonwealth, to date, for the existence of
copyright in computer programs. As a result of the importance
of this case 22' it will be dealt with in some detail, below.
The dispute centered around the Apple II and the defendant's
Apple II compatible, the WOMBAT microcomputer. The
proceedings include heads of claim under both the Trade
Practicesact and the Copyright Act. The programs in question
were Apple's "Autostart" 21 2 and "Applesoft" 21 3 programs which
were stored in the ROMs in the Apple II and similar programs
stored in EPROMs in the WOMBAT.

217. See B. Eischen, U.S. Legislation Protects Semiconductor Chips From
Piracy (1985), 2 C.C.L.R. 45 for a comment on this Act.

218. See I.B.M. v. Spirale(1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
219. Reported in (1984),

10 F.S.R. 246 (Federal Court of Australia); For

a comment see B. Eischen, (1984). 1 C.C.L.R. 75; or J. F. Mann, (1984),
1C.C.L.R. 105.
220. (1984), 11 F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).
221. Reed J. in I.B.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.) relied
heavily on this decision and also on the South African decision in Northern
Office Micro Computers Pty. v. Rosenstein, (1982), 8 F.S.R. 124 (S.C.S.A.),

in the discussion about copyright protection in South Africa, to find copyright
may exist in computer programs as "literary" works.
222. Written by Stephen Wozniak in 1977.
223. A modified version of Mircosoft's BASIC, modified in 1977.
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Apple argued, firstly, that its source code was a new and
original literary work, secondly, that the object derived from
the source code was also a new and original literary work, and
thirdly, in the alternative, that the object code was an
adaptation or translation of a copyrighted work (being the
source code). The defendants argued, firstly, that neither the
source code nor the object code were either original or literary
works. In the alternative the defendants claimed there was no
reproduction, or if so, then it was not a reproduction in material
form. The defendants also argued that a work, to be capable
of copyright protection, must provide some information or
enjoyment to a human directly. This was basically a variation
on the argument for some aesthetic purpose discussed above.
Fox J. began by stating that he would not look at the case
of the specific programs in front of him but rather would decide
the issue of the existence of copyright in computer programs
from a broader perspective. He found no difficulty in finding
that the source code version 224 was a literary work and therefore
protected under the Copyright Act. Turning then to the object
code, Fox J. considered it to be a translation of the source
code and so within the monopoly rights granted under the
Copyright Act to the copyright holder. He said the Court must
consider "translation" in a wider sense when dealing with
modern technology. At p. 496 he said:
object codes contained in the Apple ROMs are a
straightforward electrical translation into a material form of
the source codes, and it would be entirely within ordinary
understanding to say that they are translations of the source
code.
The printouts before the Court of what was contained in
the Apple ROMs and the WOMBAT EPROMs were
"substantially the same indicating that the sequences of
impulses are the same". 225 In particular the initials of the author
imbedded in the code showed copying. Fox J., therefore,
granted the quia timet injunction sought by Apple. The Court
did not consider how the pattern of electrical charges was stored

224. Which incidentally was not copied by the defendants. Sheppard J. dealt
with this issue most directly.

225. per Fox J., at 494.
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in the Apple ROMs and the WOMBAT EPROMs and whether
or not that pattern of charges was substantially similar.
Lockhart J., in a concurring opinion, also easily found the
source code to be a literary work. His approach to the object
code also evidenced a broad view. At p. 522 he said:
Courts have generally construed copyright legislation
mindful of changes in ideas and advances in technology.
No authority is cited for this proposition. Similarly at p.
532 he said:
In my opinion copyright legislation should be construed
liberally and with a view to the furtherance of justice. In
particular, such legislation should be interpreted to keep pace
with technological innovation. But this does not mean that
the language of copyright legislation should be strained to
bring within its scope subject matter which, although perhaps
deserving of protection, is not conformable with the
principles developed by the Courts over many years of
experience. An approach of this kind defeats the ends of
justice.
Using this approach Lockhart J. framed the meaning of
"translation" in the Copyright Act. At p. 523 he said:
Although the word generally would be used, in the context
of copyright law, to suggest translation from one humanly
intelligible language to another such language, I do not think
that its meaning should be necessarily confined to that sense.
Programs in source code may be read and understood by
persons trained in the art of computer science. Programs
in that form can, to all intents and purposes, be stored on
disks or tapes for later retrieval and use. This is done by
the computer "assembling" the source code into electrical
impulses and storing those impulses on the disk or tape.
When required at some later time, the computer reads those
stored impulses, disassembles them and precisely reproduces
the program in source code.
To be understood by the computer, the program in source
code must undergo the transformation mentioned earlier via
the "assembler". Having passed through the assembler the
program is stored in the CUP as a sequence of electrical
impulses. This sequence is, however, capable of being directly
reduced to a written form namely, object code.
In these ways, the transposition of the source code into
object code by the Apple I1 computer is not an irreversable
process. It is possible to have the source code, or at least
the mnemonic parts of the source code, reproduced at any
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time. Further, the object code into which the source code
has been translated can be reproduced in written form and
examined by a human being to see whether or not it is a
faithful version of the source code.
The fact that a program in object code is the result of
the computer's interpretation of the program in source code,
and in that sense is a mechanical result without the
intervention of a human being, does not in my view prevent
the object code answering the description of a translation
of the source code.
Lockhart J. rejected the aesthetic test at p. 522. Yet later
in his judgment, he appears to have relied to some degree on
the proposition that a skilled human could read the object code
version.
Sheppard J. concurred in the decision that source code was
protected as a literary work. 226 However, he dissented on the
question of translation. He saw the issue as whether or not
the object code in the WOMBAT was a reproduction of a
literary work, a reproduction or adaptation of a literary work,
or a mere reproduction of a reproduction which would not
carry copyright protection. At p. 538 he said:
It is to be observed that it will not assist the appellants to
show that the programs when converted into object code
became reproductions of the programs in source code. That
is because there is no infringement if what is done by the
alleged infringer is to make a reproduction of a reproduction.
Sheppard J., then, said at pp. 538-539:
In my opinion the programs in object code are not literary
works. Fixed as they are in ROMS, they are unable to be
seen in that code. True, it is, someone could write them out
so as to show them symbolically in binary notation or
hexadecimal notation. The computer itself can show them
symbolically in hexadecimal notation. But all of that is
irrelevant. The important point is that it is only the machine
itself, that is, the microprocessor, which can "understand"
or "see", and thus deal with, the object code.
It is to be emphasised that the appellants need to persuade
the Court that the ROMS with the program fixed in them
are literary works because it was the ROMS which the
manufacture of the WOMBAT computer copied. Unless that
copying constituted a reproduction of a literary work (or
of an adapation thereof to which I have later to come), there
226. per Sheppard J., at 537.
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will be no infringement. I recognise that it is trite law that
copyright subsists in the order of the words and not in ideas.
It is the form, not the idea, which is of paramount
importance. But if what is alleged to constitute a literary
work (here the programs in object code) cannot be seen even
with the aid of screening or printing devices attached to the
computer, they cannot in my opinion, amount to a literary
work.
Sheppard J. disagreed completely with the broad approach
of the majority in dealing with the meaning of "translation"
in the Copyright Act. His concern was that a form that cannot
be seen cannot constitute a literary work as contemplated by
the draftsmen of the Copyright Act.
The contrasting opinions of the Court have set out, at a
minimum, the range of positions that a Canadian appellate level
court might take on the issue.
Shortly 227 after the decision of the Court of Appeal was
handed down the Australian Parliament amended the
Copyright Act 228 to provide specific protection for computer
programs. 229 As a first step the definition of "literary work"
has been expressly modified to include reference to computer
programs. The Act provides:
A literary work includes:
(a) a table, or compilation, expressed in words, figures or
symbols (whether or not in visible form); and
(b) a computer program or compilation of computer
programs.
The definition of "adapation" is similarly amended and
would appear to contemplate object code as a adaptation of
source code. "Material form", a term that the Court of Appeal
did not have difficulty with, was also defined so as to include
information stored on a magnetic medium.
As in the United States, the Australian Act provides a specific
right to make a back-up copy of a computer program. This
is part of the fair dealing provisions. The Act goes further and
"makes it an offence to transmit a copy of a computer program

227. Enactment June 7, 1984.
228. Copyright Amendment Act 1984.
229. See B. Eischen, (1985) 2 C.C.L.R. 9 for a short note on this amendment

and a commentary on some potential problems.
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if it is received and recorded so as to result in the creation
230
of an infringing copy" of the computer program.
(h) Copyright in South Africa
For all that might be said about South Africa on many other
issues, they were the first legal system in the Commonwealth
which had a decided case on the issue of copyrightability of
computer programs. In Northern Office Micro Computers Pty
v. Rosenstein231 a company trading and dealing in computers
hired X to prepare programs for medical applications (such
as billing systems, etc.). X started and then left. The company
hired Rosenstein to complete the job. Rosenstein quit and then
claimed the copyright in himself.
From the evidence the judge found that the programs were
a "literary work" entitled to protection under the Copyright
Act 1978. Rosenstein had also expended sufficient effort or
skill to give the programs a new and original character from
the program he took over from X. The analysis of the copyright
issue was:
(A) Was the work reduced to a material form?
Here, it was stored in an unintelligible form on a floppy
diskette. There was no doubt that a printout is a reduction
232
into a material form. The court relied on the Lieber Code

case to eliminate the need for some "meaning in language" as
a requirement of copyright protection. The court found that
once the program had been recorded onto the diskette it had
been reduced into a tangible form.
(B) Sufficient effort or skill expended to give the program a
new and unique character?
It was probable that a program which takes months of research
and development is one with a new and original character,
based on the evidence in front of the court.
The result was that Rosenstein, hired by the company, had
the copyright in the work. However, as will be discussed later,
the law of trade secrets came to the company's rescue and
prevented Rosenstein from exploiting his copyright.
230. Id. at 10.
231. 1981, (4) S.A. 123, (1982) 8 F.S.R. 124 (S.C. S.A.).

232. Id.
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It is not clear whether the South African Copyright Act has
a section similar to s. 12(3) of the Canadian Act. s. 12(3) provides
that where a person develops a copyrightable work under a
contract of service, the copyright shall vest in the employer.
233
Justice Hughes, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computermat,
noted that Rosenstein decision, referring to it as "a learned
and comprehensive judgment". The Rosenstein decision was
not applicable to the Computermat case since the South African
legislation was different from Canada's legislation. In LB.M.
v. Spirale234 however, Reed J. did rely on the reasoning in

Rosenstein to find that copyright primafacie existed in I.B.M.'s
BIOS program.
(i) Copyright in Englandand the EE C.
England has started to come to grips with the entire problem
of computer program copyrightability in the case of Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. ALCA Electronics. 235 Both parties
manufacture and distribute video games. The plaintiff
programmed EPROMS to drive a game called "Frogger". The
defendant developed a very similar game and the action resulted
with the plaintiff claiming a copyright in the EPROM version
of the computer program.
The plaintiff got an Anton Pillar 236 order at first instance
and the defendant appealed on the basis that he ought not
to be required to disclose all the names, addresses and locations
of all alleged infringing games. In a related action, of more
significance to the present discussion Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Richards237 the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction on
the basis of alleged copyright infringement in the same game.
The defendant, here, claimed that no such right existed in
computer programs in English law. The court found that prima
facie the plaintiff had established that the development of the
program was such as would constitute a literary work within
the meaning of the Copyright Act 1956.238 This copyright
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

(1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 26 (Ont. H.C.).
(1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
(1982),9 F.S.R. 516(C.A.).
See discussion of these orders later.
(1983), 9 F.S.R. 73 (Ch D).
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, chapter 74.
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applied to the "assembly code program". The machine code
derived from this is either a reproduction or adaptation of the
"assembly code program" and so is also protected. Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Richards has been applied subsequently as
the proper basis for proceeding in an application for an
W. W.
interlocutory injunction in Thrustcode Ltd. v.
239
forward
plaintiff
brought
this
case
the
Ltd.
In
Computing
no real evidence of copying so Vice-Chancellor Sir Robert
Megarry was unable to find the plaintiffs had serious prospects
of succeeding at trial. As a result, the motion was dismissed.
In Systematica Ltd. v. London Computer Centre Ltd.240 the
suppliers of a "TTY" computer program claimed copyright
infringement by the defendant, D2, who had purchased a
"TTY" program for Dl. D1 subsequently resold a copy of a
"TTY" program to a third person, after removing the plaintiff's
copyright legend from it. This program appeared to be an
infringement though it later turned out that other "TTY"
programs sold by Dl were completely different programs but
performed very similar functions. An Anton Pillar order was
granted, though not in as broad terms as the plaintiff sought.
An earlier case seems to implicitly find that computer
programs might be protected by copyright. It is noted that this
case did not directly address the issue whether or not computer
programs were eligible for copyright protection. In Ocli Optical
Coatings Ltd. v. Spectron Optical Coatings Ltd. 24 1 employees
from the plaintiff company left to work for the defendant
company. The plaintiff alleged improper use of its confidential
computer programs and documents. At trial an Anton Pillar
order was granted with the exception that it did not require
the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of all persons
to whom the programs had been disclosed. The reason for
denying this information was that it would result in the
defendants having to give self incriminating answers which
might lead to charges being laid.
The Court of Appeal discussed the possibility of charges
being laid under the Copyright Act and under the Theft Act.

239. (1983), 10 F.S.R. 502 (Ch. D.).
240. (1983), 9 F.S.R. 313 (Ch. D.).
241. (1980), 6 F.S.R. 227 (C.A.).
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242
In Rank Film Distributors Ltd v. Video Information Centre
the possibility of proceedings under the Copyright Act was
regarded as sufficient ground for allowing a defendant to refuse
to answer questions. The court held that here there was no
real risk or reasonable ground to apprehend a prosecution
under the Copyright Act for infringing the plaintiff's
"copyright" in the computer programs. The reason being that
evidence showed no one had ever been prosecuted under the
Copyright Act s. 21.
Even in the Court of Appeal, the actions have proceeded
on the basis that copyright was assumed to exist in computer
programs. In Format Communications Mfg. Ltd. v. ITT

(United Kindom) Ltd.243 the Court of Appeal was considering

the ability to discover the source listing of a disputed computer
program. The plaintiff claimed breach of confidence and breach
of copyright in their "Mark III" message switching system. The
Court does not even address the issue but decided on the basis
of the presumed existence of copyright.
The situation in Germany is somewhat more developed
though without any real advance in certainty. The position of
the Federal Ministry of Justice is that the present Act does
provide copyright protection for computer programs. 244 As was
mentioned previously, copyright protection was initially denied
245 It
on the basis of a lack of "intellectual-aesthetic content".
appears that two other district courts have found in favour
of copyright protection for computer programs. 246 At least one
247
appeal court has found in favour of copyright protection.
Heidrich 238 discusses the decision of the Munich District Court
in the "VISICALC" case. The court decided in favour of
copyright protection under ss.97,1,2(1) no. 1,7; 16,17 Copyright
Act, and art.2(l) Universal Copyright Convention. The
copyright "will have to be acknowledged if the set task allows
242. (1980), 6 F.S.R. 242 (C.A.).
243. (1983), F.S.R. 473 (C.A.).
244. 1982 G.R.U.R. (German Association for Industrial Property and
Copyright), at 620.

245. Case

no. 7-0-143/80,

District

Court,

Mannheim,

1981,

Betriebsberater (BB) at 1543.
246. 1982 G.R.U.R. International, at 489.
247. Case no. 6 U 150/8 1; 1983 Expertmenbrief Wirtschaftskrimialitet,

at 44.
248. Heidrich, supra, at 44.
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several solutions and the choice allows the program author a
wide variety of ideas...

The creative intellectual content of

the computer programs is expressed in the choice, collection,
review, arrangement and classification of the material...".249

The program was considered as a linguistic work and it was
held irrelevant that the program can not be "read" except only
by special means.
The court appears to have characterized the program as a
form of writing rather than see it as part of a machine process.
It is interesting to note that there does not appear to be any
provision in the German Copyright Act similar to the U.S.
1976 Act provisions, yet the court had no difficulty dealing
with the argument that the program could only be "read"
through the use of a machine. While German jurisprudence
might be of minimal interest to a Canadian court, the
characterizations the German cases disclose, and the methods
the court uses to deal with these arguments might be of
assistance in the Canadian context.
France has also seen the development of copyright as the
mechanism used to protect computer programs. In Babolat
Mailot Witt S.A., v. Pachot250 the Paris Court of Appeal dealt

with a case where an employee had removed computer
programs from his company's place of business so that they
could not be copied. This was in response to the employee's
dismissal. The employee was acquitted of a charge of theft of
the programs and brought action in wrongful dismissal. The
Court held (as set out in the F.S.R. headnote):
The compilation of a computer program is an original
intellectual work which goes beyond the automatic
compulsion of logic. An employee who in his own time and
without any help or payment from his employer, compiles
programs for his employer's use, which compilation was not
part of his duties, owns the copyright in them.
See also Le Monde Sarl v. Microfor Inc. 25 1 where the Paris

Court of Appeal held that the right to make an abstract or
index of abstracts is part of the right of the copyright holder.
As a consequence a Canadian Company wishing to set up a
249. Heidrich, supra,at 46.

250. (1984), E.C.C. 282, (1985), 12 F.S.R. 35 (C.A.).
251. (1981), E.C.C. 489 (C.A.).
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database of French materials was prevented from using the fair
252
use exception to prepare mere indicies of copyrighted works.
(j) Copyright in Canada
Canada has had a number of cases granting preliminary or
interim injunctions on the basis that the plaintiff was able to
make out a prima facie case for the copyright protection of
their computer programs. Some are part of the video game
litigation that has spilled over into Canada from the United
States. The reasoning in the video game cases has left much
uncertainty about the eventual status of copyright protection
of computer programs in Canada.

253
In Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Coinex Video Games Inc.

the plaintiff alleged infringement of the "Donkey Kong" and
"Donkey Kong Junior" copyrights and sought an Anton Pillar
order against the 47 defendants. 254 Like the first English Sega
case, the court found a prima facie infringement without
specifying or apparently considering whether or not copyright
might actually exist in the program.
In Bally Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Coinex Video Games
Inc. 255

the

plaintiff

sought

an

interlocutory

injunction

restraining alleged infringement of the copyright in "Ms. Pacman", "Super Pac-man" and "Galaga". As in the Ninendo case
the court appears to have assumed that copyright exists in the
computer programs.
The same result is apparant in Midway Manufacturing Co.
v. Bernstein.256 Again, the claim was for an interlocutory
injunction and an Anton Piller order on the ground of an
alleged infringement of an alleged copyright in three video
games. 25 7 The games in question were "Galaxian", "Pac-man"
and "Rally X".
252. See N. M. Hunnings, Copyright in Information, (1983), European
Business Law 531 for an assessment of this decision.
253. (1983), 69 C.P.R. (2d) 122 (Fed. C.A.).
254. Manufacturers, distributors and operators of allegedly infringing
programs "Crazy Kong" and the like.
255. (1983), 71 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
256. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 112 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
257. The income earned by the video game industry has resulted in
considerable interest in the status of the legal protection available for
computer programs.
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In Spacefile Ltd. v. Smart Computing Systems Ltd., 258 the

plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the
infringement of its alleged copyright in the plaintiff's software.
The defendant was a former employee of the plaintiff and had
taken the plaintiff's confidential information, in the form of
source code, in its SBS 80 program. The defendant then sold
an almost identical product, called MAC-PAC, at a
substantially lower price. Justice Steele noted that the plaintiff
had been competitively prejudiced since it would be less able
to recover its development cost and time. Since the other
elements required were also available, the injunction was
granted.
These cases are certainly not a suitable basis on which to
speculate whether or not computer programs might be capable
of copyright protection in Canada. The Nintendo case appears
to have been decided ex parte both at trial and appeal and
so the argument might not have been put to the court. Neither
Bernstein nor Bally provides any reasoning why we might
assume copyright might, in fact, be a possible vehicle for the
protection of computer programs. Spacefile appears to use
reasoning more appropriate to a trade secret theory. This lack
of reasoning is not inappropriate at an interlocutory stage in
proceedings. However, these cases provide little guidance from
which to predict the future of Canadian computer program
protection under a copyright theory. The non-video game
litigation has provided some greater degree of certainty. These
cases are discussed below. Recall that it is the policy of the
Copyright Office that computer programs might be protected
by copyright and so they will accept any registration of a
259
computer program.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computermat Inc., 260 the
plaintiff, Apple Computer, sought an interlocutory injunction
restraining the defendants from "importing, distributing and
selling" computers and computer components alleged to
infringe Apple's registered copyrights in its AUTOSTART
ROM and APPLESOFT programs. The defendants were
258. (1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 281 (Ont. H.C.); Leave to Appeal Denied
November 22, 1983. For a comment see G. E. Fisk, (1983), 1 C.C.L.R. 27.
259. Recall the earlier discussion about the problems of registration.
260. (1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 26, (1983), 23 A.C.W.S. (2d) 44 (Ont. H.C.);
For a comment see G. E. Fisk, (1983), I C.C.L.R. 14.
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distributors and retailer of computer equipment. In particular,
the defendant carried the "GOLDEN II" (also known as OPUS
11" in Quebec) which was advertised as "fully Apple II
compatible" which was alleged to be the source of the violation.
The defendant argued particularly that APPLESOFT, as an
operating system, and all the programs generally, were not
subject to copyright.
In this case the interlocutory injunction was refused as Apple
had not proved damages would not be an appropriate remedy.
Also the balance of convenience favoured the defendants as
they would not be able to survive financially under an interim
injunction. 26 1 Contrast this with LB.M. v. Spirale262 where the
plaintiff computer giant would suffer "death by 1000 cuts" if
the infringement were permitted to continue. This was the first
Canadian decision which started to make an effort to assess
the suitability of copyright protection for computer programs.
However, as the case was really decided on the criteria for an
interim injunction, all of the comments about the possibility
of copyright in computer programs are obiter dicta. It was also
the first Canadian case not related to the video game
263
industry.
In Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Fountainhead Amusement
Corp. Ltd. 2 64 Cattanach J. appears to have relied solely on the
presumption of copyright upon registration and the defendant's
admission of copying as the basis for his order.
In I.B.M. v. Spirales,265 Madam Justice Reed granted an
interim injunction restraining Spirale from selling a personal
computer 266, describing it as a "blatant" copy of I.B.M.'s
personal computer. Madam Justice Reed found that the
261.

See also Atari Inc. v. Video Amusements of Canada Ltd. et al. (1982),

19 A.C.W.S. (2d) 4 (F.C.T.D.) where the one party was of such substance
that irreparable harm was unlikely and the other party (defendant) would
give a security deposit instead of suffer the injunction.
262. (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.) discussed below.
263. In the United States it had been suggested that there might be a
distinction between the video game cases and other computer protection cases.
This argument was rejected in Apple Computer Corporation v. Franklin
Computer Inc. 2 C.L.R. 335 (3rd Circuit 1983) (U.S.C.A.) August 30, 1983.
264. (1984), 79 C.P.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.T.D.).
265. (1984), 80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T.D.).
266. This had been imported from Taiwan and was marketed as the
"COPAM Intelligent PC-301 ".
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copyright existed in I.B.M.'s software and the decision is
significant enough for this reason alone. However, Madam
Justice Reed's holding is also important because it is the first
generally thorough 267 analysis of the suitability of copyright
protection for computer programs. In doing so Madam Justice
Reed did not really break new ground but rather applied in
the cases discussed earlier to abstract the principles she relied
upon. It is observed that Commonwealth and American
authorities will likely continue to influence the development
of Canada's domestic Computer Law. The logic of Madam
Justice Reed's decision may be useful as a key to understanding
the framework in which copyright protection might develop
in Canada.
Madam Justice Reed used generally the following steps in
her analysis of whether or not, on aprimafaciebasis, copyright
might exist in computer programs:
(1) The CopyrightAct
Section 4 of the Copyright Act 268 provides that

...

copyright

shall subsist ... in every original literary, dramatic, musical
and artistic work ...... It would seem that a computer program

would fall within the "literary work" concept for copyright
protection.
(2) Interpretationof the Copyright Act
The court interpreted the Act in a practical manner mindful
of changes in ideas and advances in technology. 269 Thus, the
fact that a computer program is not literature is not a bar
to copyright.
(3) Is a Computer Program Within the Scope of the Copyright
Act?
Source code and object code were considered separately to a
degree.

267. Note that Madam Justice Reed relied very heavily on the majority in
Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd. (1984), II F.S.R. 481
(Federal Court of Australia) and Northern Office Micro Computer Pty. v.
Rosenstein (1982), 8 F.S.R. 124 (S.C.C.A.), for the framework for her
analysis.
268. R.S.C. 1970, c.C-30.
269. This approach to interpretation came chiefly from Lockhart J. in
Computer Edge, (1984) 11 F.S. R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).

The Creator and the Benefits of Creation 619

(a) Source Code
It seemed clear that source code would meet the test of
"expression of thought in print or writing". Madame Justice
Reed relied on Rosenstein to illustrate that a work need not
be "literature" to be a "literary work" within the meaning of
s.4 of the Copyright Act.
(b) Object Code
It was argued that object code, particularly in ROM form as
was the case with I.B.M.'s BIOS programs, was part of the
device itself and so was not protected by copyright as a
mechanism or apparatus. Madam Justice Reed considered the
I.B.M. BIOS program. The issue was whether one ought to
focus on the ROM chip, a utilitarian device, or on the program
information. She used the analogy of a cassette to a tape
recorder. The tape may contain magnetically encoded
copyrighted material which is used in the device to allow one
to ascertain the copyrighted work. The fact that the chip could
be removed and another inserted appeared to make it less part
of the apparatus. This analysis is, with respect, potentially
dangerous.
Several popular micro computers are supplied with memory
chips that are soldered in place for better electrical connection.
Since these would not be as readily exchangeable, does this
mean that object code stored on the chip would not be
copyrightable? It is submitted that the "ease of exchange"
distinction does not assist the analysis and might only serve
to confuse an already complex area of law. The problem is
that by focusing on the "container" for the information one
might lose sight of the more basic issue: that is, is the form
of expression of the ideas which controls the process deserving
of copyright protection as a literary work. The copyright is
claimed in the unique form of the instruction set stored in the
ROM chip and not in the chip itself.
A second problem is whether or not object code, which is
not designed to communicate with a human being in any direct
form, has to meet some aesthetic benefit test to qualify for
copyright protection. Madam Justice Reed relied on Apple
Computer Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty. Ltd. v.
Computer Edge Pty. Ltd.270 to state that copyright protection
270. (1984), 11 F.S.R. 481 (Federal Court of Australia).
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has no requirement of aesthetic appeal. It is solely concerned
with the form of expression of ideas. It is not concerned with
the use made of that form of expression.
Madam Justice Reed pointed out that in both the case of source
code and object code, I.B.M.'s BIOS program was printed in
the Technical Manual.
(4) Requirement of Fixation
Rosenstein and Apple v. Computer Edge were cited as authority
for the proposition that a computer program may be fixed in
the form of electric charges and, thus, comply with the
requirements of CanadianAdmiral Co. v. Rediffusion.27 1 Since,
however, the court relied on the fact that the object code was
in a written form, these comments may have less authority.
(5) The Reproduction or TranslationIssue
The court appears to have relied on the following analysis,
perhaps since the strongest case for the existence of copyright
occured in the written form of the programs in the Technical
Manual. Section 3 gives the copyright holder the sole right
to "reproduce the work... in any material form whatever..."
and so a conversion to source code and then to object code
would merely be a reproduction of the work permitted under
the Act. Alternatively, the court might have seen the source
code and object code versions as merely translations.
This analysis is an alternative basis on which copyright
protection might be found in the more difficult case of object
code, where a court struggles with the problem of whether or
not the work requires to be humanly perceptable.
Madam Justice Reed's analysis does appear to indicate a
willingness to find copyright in both source code and object
code. Strictly speaking, it might be that the decision was based
on the fact that there was a written form of both versions of
the program in question. However it has provided the start
of the conceptual framework within which the future of
copyright protection for computer programs will be more
closely defined.
In summary, copyright has certain advantages over patent
protection and might become one viable protection mechanism

271. (1954), 20 C.P.R. 75 (S.C.C.).
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for certain blatant types of "piracy'. 272 Copyright is suitable,
as a legal protective method for those cases where the "pirate"
merely copies the copyrighted program. This appears to be the
most significant form of "piracy" in terms of the volume of
illicit copies involved. However, copyright protection is not at
all suitable where a competitor acquires not the form of
expression of the computer program (presumably protected by
copyright), but rather the concept, the algorithm, the creative
leap which makes one program more attractive than another.
The competitor may, so far as the Copyright Act is concerned,
use that creativity with impunity and implement the ideas and
algorithm in another form. This might easily be done through
the use of another programming language or perhaps even
though the use of significantly different routines in the same
programming language. Copyright is not the appropriate form
of protection for this particular problem as the Copyright Act
was not intended to protect more than the form of expression
of an idea.
Cases since Spirale have offered little additional to Madam
Justice Reed's reasoning. In F & I Retail Systems Ltd. v.
Thermo-Guard Automotive Products Canada Ltd. 27 3
Montgomery J. held, very broadly, that "copyright exists in
the computer systems", relying on Spacefile for this
proposition. In La Societe d'Informatique R.D.G. Inc. v.
Dynabec Ltee 274 Justice Hannon, after hearing certain expert
evidence on the process involved in writing computer programs,
held that source code was protected as a literary work. Object
code, he said, derived from "a treatment, an abstract or a
summary of the software packages expressed in literate terms".
Hannon J. found support for his decision in Spacefile, supra,
Apple v. Franklin, supra, and especially Apple v. Computer
Edge, supra. Hannon J. used the same broad approach to
interpretation seen in Computer Edge but also relied upon the
InterpretationAct 275 , which provides for a fair, large and liberal
272. See C. Webber, Computer Crime: What Has Not Been Considered
(1984), 2 C.C.L.R. 49 where the author questions the purpose of reform
of the Criminal Code in respect of such "piracy".
273. (1984), l C.P.R. (3d) 297 (Ont. H.C.).
274. Unreported August 14, 1984, (Que. S.C.); For a comment see B. Eischen,
(1984), 1C.C.L.R. 217.
275. R.S.C. 1970, C.1-23.
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construction to be placed on federal enactments. As a
consequence of his decision, on the copyright issue, Hannon
J. granted an interlocutory injunction.
In Canavest House Ltd. v. Lett,276 as in Dynabec, a former

employer attempted to restrain his former employees from
infringing the copyright alleged to exist in its software. Lett
was a case somewhat similar to Rosenstein, supra, except here
Lett was characterized as an employee rather than as an
independant contractor or consultant. Lett had been hired,
without a formal employment agreement, to design and
implement programs to assist in financial investment decision
making. Lett admitted he did not have ownership of the
copyright but claimed that it was a term of his employment
agreement that gave him a right to a copy. Callon J. held that
the programs in question were literary works protected by
copyright.
He relied on the Lieber Code, supra, Pitman v. Hine,27 7 and
Spirale, supra, to find that the programs were a form of
language which could be protected by copyright. An
interlocutory injunction issued. However, the defendant was
entitled to keep his research and working notes under s.17(2)
Copyright Act, the fair dealing provision which deals with
sketches, plans, models or studies. Since the injunction had
issued the plaintiffs were protected. It would be too great a
burden to deprive the defendant of the skill and expertise that
the notes represented. Callon J. said:
One would expect that research notes and copies of previous
programs would indeed assist the programmer in creating
completely new programs. They are, in a sense, what a
hammer and a saw are to a carpenter.
In Apple Computer Inc. v. Macintosh Computers Ltd.278 the

uncertain state of copyright protection in Canadian Courts was
highlighted. In that case, Cullen J. denied the application for
an interim injunction since the Court was not satisfied that
276. Unreported November 29, 1984 (Ont. H.C.); For a comment see J.
Kreindler, (1985), 2 C.C.L.R. 95.
277. (1884), 1 T.L.R. 39 (Q.B.), a case which found telegraph code to be
copyprotected.
278. Unreported January 17, 1985 (F.C.T.D.) For a review of this case and
other current developments, see J. F. Mann, (1985) 2 C.C.L.R. 79.
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there was a strong case for the existence of copyright in
2 80
computer programs. 27 9 While this decision has been criticised,
I sumbit that it appears Cullen J. was only applying the higher
standard of proof required by the Courts before extraordinary
relief is granted that was set out by the House of Lords in
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.281 Some justices
dealing with cases before Macintosh would appear, with
respect, to have been satisfied by a much lower standard than
282
American Cyanamid would appear to provide.
There are no Canadian Appellate level decisions on the
suitability of copyright protection for computer programs but
the weight of the decisions to date, scanty as it is, appears
to lean towards the viability of this theory of protection for
computer programs. This trend is also supported by the
international case law 283 indicating that copyright might exist
in the non-human readable object code. Some of these
authorities are based on Copyright Acts generally similar to
Canada's Copyright Act but not so similar to provide a
confident basis on which to predict the development of this
theory of the protection of computer programs. The situation
in the United States offers much greater promise for copyright
protection, especially with decisions such as Apple Computer
Corporation v. Franklin Computer Inc.284 It must be
remembered that the Americans have had the advantage of
amendments to their Copyright Act which has ended the
279. In dispute were Apple's AUTOSTART and APPLESOFT programs
and the defendant's programs. The evidence appears to indicate that of 12,288
bytes of Apple's programs, only II differed in the defendant's programs.
280. See G. E. Fisk, (1985), 2 C.C.L.R. 85 who argues that the requirement
to make out a strong case for copyright is higher than normally required
in interlocutory proceedings.
281. (1975), A.C. 396(H.L.).
282. For a current review of the law relating to Anton Piller Orders and
other such extraordinary relief, see G. Takach, Exploring the Outer Limits,
(1985), 23 Alta. L.R.
283. United States: By specific enactment; South Africa: Northern Office
Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd. v. Rosenstein, (1982), 9 F.S.R. 124 (S.C.S.A.);
England: Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. ALCA Electronics, (1982), 9 F.S.R. 516

(C.A.); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Richards 9 F.S.R. 73 (Ch D); Systematica
Ltd. v. London Computer Centre Ltd., (1983), 9 F.S.R. 313 (Ch D); Australia:
Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd., (1984),

11 F.S.R. 481

(Federal Court of Australia); France: Babolat Maillot Witt S. A. v. Pachot,
(1984), E.C.C. 282 (Paris C.A.).
284. Id.
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specific technology limitations of our own Act. All the
Canadian cases to date have been decided at the interlocutory
stage where the plaintiff need only prove a prima facie case
that copyright exists. Most of these cases have relied upon the
presumption of copyright on the registration of the program
with the copyright department However, as can be seen in the
Australian Court of Appeal, there are serious issues to be
determined before copyright is finally determined to extend to
computer programs in both source and object code versions.
(k) White Paper on Copyright
As mentioned earlier the present Copyright Act was enacted
at a time when computers were not even a gleam in the eye
of science fiction writers much less the draftsmen of the Act.
Over the last sixty years there have been numerous studies and
reviews of the Act but no substantial reform has been carried
out. The latest in the long line of proposed reforms is the White
Paper "From Gutenberg to Teildon" (1984). This paper
proposes truly revolutionary changes in the Copyright Act in
respect of computer programs. It is not the purpose of the
author's present paper to examine the proposals in this White
Paper in detail. 285 However, some general observations follow
below.
The White Paper would recognize copyright in source code
as a literary work. Somehow the draftsmen see object code
as very distinct and detachable from source code. It is proposed
that object code will only be protected for a period of five
years. If this were law today then the copyrights upheld by
the majority in Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge would
not have been protected under Canadian law if they had been
written here. Since the United States makes no such arbitrary
distinction and does not expropriate the creativity of the
copyright holder after five years one might speculate that
Canada could lose a significant portion of its software
development industry if the proposed White Paper were
enacted.Of course, the universal copyright convention would
mitigate this disaster to some degree.

285. For a more detailed review and excellent critique see B. Eischen,
Proposed Revisions to Canadas Copyright Act (1984), 1 C.C.L.R. 157.
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A publication of a machine readable form of a computer
program would include a sale, lease, licnese, trade, offer to
sell, license or trade of that program. It is proposed that all
such published works be marked with a "c". This is the symbol
that is required under the Universal Copyright Convention. A
date and the name of the owner of the copyright is also to
be provided. It appears that these markings would be relevant
in an application for an additional period of protection, say,
on a modification or update, although it does not appear clear
whether or not only the update would qualify for the additional
protection.
One must question the entire concept behind this White
Paper. Many works are copyright protected and yet no
oppressive monopoly has developed by authors of more
conventional literary works. Why is it assumed that this would
occur in the software industry if copyright protection was
formally and, presumably intelligently, available for computer
programs? If the case law developes at the appellate level along
the lines suggested by the majority in Apple v. Computer Edge,
supra, then some of the underlying assumptions behind this
White paper have become obselete. This paper addresses the
policy issues behind proposed reforms in a later section. Suffice
it to say at this point: what overriding public interest does the
state have to wish to expropriate the intellectual property of
Canada's creative software developers in this manner?
VIII. Common Law Protectionof Computer Programs
1. Protectionin Equity
The law of Equity developed out of the King's inherent right
to do justice in any dispute between his subjects. In time the
Equity courts, exercising this jurisdiction, developed a number
of doctrines which provided flexible discretionary remedies
otherwise unavailable under the common law. In 1873 and
1875286 the two branches of English law, common law and
equity, were combined and are now available through one
court.
Several equitable doctrines and several equitable remedies
286. The Judicature Act, 1873 and the Judicature Act, 1875 fused the
procedure of both systems.
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are of direct interest to the subject matter of the present
discussion. In particular, the law of trade secrets, the law of
trusts, and the law of confidence. The theoretical basis for the
particular uses of the doctrines that will be discussed is much
the same for all of these doctrines. The equitable maxims,
"Equity looks on that as done that ought to be done" and
"Equity imputes an intension to fulfill an obligation" are an
indication of the underlying principle that a person who puts
himself in such a position that others rely on him, ought to
fulfill the trust or confidence that others have on him. The
court of equity is very concerned with conscience. If you are
in a position where others have placed trust or confidence in
you then you may be bound by that trust or confidence.
28 7
2. Trade Secret Protection

(a) Introduction
The law of trade secrets is based on a relationship between
two or more parties in which there is an express or implied
obligation of confidentiality as pertains to certain information.
The action for breach of confidence finds early roots in such
famous cases as Prince Albert v. Strange286 and Morison v.
Moat.289 Unlike the law of patent or copyright, the law of trade

secret acts in personam, that is between the parties, and not
against all the world. There are two such relationships that
will be the focus of this analysis: (1) Employee/Employer and
(2) Vendor/Consumer.
In Canada, trade secret law, like the law of trusts and most
of the law of equity, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the provincial governments under s.92(13) B.N.A. Act 29° by
analogy with MacDonald v. Vapor Canada.291 It has already
been shown that the law of copyright does not overlap with
the law of trade secrets or equitable doctrines of confidence,
even though their protection might overlap. In the United
287. An earlier version of this section was published in (1984), 1 C.C.L.R.
219 (Part One) which dealt with the law, and (1984), 1 C.C.L.R. 231 (Part
Two) which dealt with a detailed analysis of several license agreements and
confidentiality clauses.
288. 18 L.J. Ch. 120 (1849).
289. 20L.J. Ch. 513(1851).
290. Constitution Act, 1867.
291. (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
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States, the law of trade secrets, as with other areas of law,
has developed along somewhat different lines from the law in
England and Canada. Constitutionally, in the United States,
there is presently some debate whether the federal copyright
292
provisions preempt the availability of trade secret protection.
This consideration is not applicable in Canada.
(b) Elements of a Trade Secret
There are many definitions of a trade secret corresponding to
the very extensive protection this branch of law provides.
Basically, trade secret law protects ideas, unlike copyright or
patent law. Here, the "know how" itself can be protected. This
very much broader protection has resulted in making trade
secret protection, in conjunction with contractual provisions,
the widest form of legal protection used to protect computer
programs. 293 A widely used definition is that of the United
States Restatement of Torts which indicates a trade secret may
consist of:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it.
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret...

so

that, except by use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information. An exact definition
of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be
considered in determining whether given information is one's
trade secret are (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved in this business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy
of the information; (4) the value of the information to him
in developing the information;.

.

. (6) the ease or difficulty

with which the information
could be property acquired and
294
duplicated by others.
The law of trade secrets has not seen such an attempt at
codification in England or Canada and so appears to be
292. See discussion of this issue from the Computer Conference out of Wayne
State University, LAW:FORUM.
293. Palmer & Resendes, supra, at 92 discussing Miller's 1974 and 1977
surveys The CONTU Software Protection Survey (1978), 18 Jurimetrics J.
354.
294. Reinstatement of Torts s. 757, comment b (1939).
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somewhat more flexible though courts generally take into
account the same considerations. The underlying theme of trade
secret protection was summed up by Lord Denning in Seager
v. Copydex, Ltd.295 where he quotes Roskill J. in Cranleigh
296
Precision Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Bryant.
the essence of this branch of law, whatever the origin of
it might be, is that a person who has obtained information
in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard for
activities detrimental to the person who made the
confidential communication, and springboard it remains
even when all the features have ben published or can be
ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public
Lord Denning then sums it up:
The law on this subject does not depend on any implied
contract. It depends on the broad principle of equity that
he who has received information in confidence shall not take
unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the
prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent.
The principle is clear enough when the whole of the
information is private. The difficulty arises when the
information is in part public and in part private... When
the information is mixed... then the recipiant must take
special care to use only the material which is in the public
domain.
Information to qualify for trade secret protection need not
be novel or original. Most software does not contain the degree
of novelty required for patent protection. In fact, most software
consists of different arrangements of well-known programming
techniques. So long as the arrangement gives the program a
297
competitive edge it will qualify for trade secret protection.
The fact that programs exercising the same functions "vary in
speed, accuracy, cost, flexibility, ease of use, and above all,
commercial feasibility ' '298 will have the "unique logic and
coherence" 299 to qualify for trade secret protection.
295. (1967), 2 All E.R. 415 (C.A.) at 417.
296. (1956), 3 All E.R. at 301,302.
297 Telex v. LB.M. 367 F.Supp 258 at 323 (N.D. Okla. 1973), affirmed
on the trade secret issue 510 F.2d 894 (10th Circuit) certioraridismissed 423
U.S. 802(1975)(U.S.S.C.).
298. Davidson, supra, at 396.
299. Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc. 338 F.Supp 1229 (E.D.
Mich. 1971).
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The elements of the action for breach of confidence were
stated by Justice Megarry in Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers)
Ltd.

300

First, the information itself, in the words of Lord Greene
M.R. in the Saltman case on page 215, must 'have the
necessary quality of confidence about it'. Secondly, that
information must have been imparted in circumstances
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must
be an unauthorized use of the information to the detriment
of the party communicating it.
Of course, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
elements necessary to sustain the action. It would appear that
while the normal civil standard would apply, the Court seeks
evidence which is clear and unequivocal. 30' These elements will
be examined in the context of the development or use of
computer programs.
(A) Quality of Confidence
This requirement means that the material is not in the public
domain. A computer program, to qualify for trade secret
protection, must contain concepts that, when the program is
considered as a whole, has qualities that are outside the area
of public knowledge. 30 3 The developer of the program must
not be disclosed to the public in some way. For example, the
"Freeware" discussed earlier has been released to the public
domain without any checks, protection or controls. It would
not qualify for trade secret protection. 303
30 4
The case of 0. Mustad & Son v. Allcock & Co. Ltd.
provides some concern if patent protection is sought. On
publication of the specifications the trade secret protection is
300. (1969), R.P.C. 41 at47.
301. See, for example, Chevron Standard Ltd v. Home Oil Co. Ltd (1982),
3 W.W.R. 427, 35 A.R. 550 (Alta. C.A.); and West Coast Claim Savers
Inc. v. Glaswegian Enterprises Inc. (1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 200 (B.C. S.C.).
302. Talbot v. General Television Corporation Pty. Ltd., (1980), V.R. 224

(Australia).
303. For example, where a competing product was developed using
information available to the public: Half Court Tennis Pty. Ltd. v. Seymour
(1980), 513 F.L.R. 240 (Queensland S.C.); O'Brien v. Komesaroff (1982),
56 A.L.J.R. (Australian H.C.) and Molnar Lithographic Supplies Ltd. v.
Sikatory (1974), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 197 (Ont. C.A.).
304. Decided June 18, 20 1928 and Reported in (1963), 3 All E.R. 416.
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Iost. 305 However, this requirement for secrecy is not total.
Limited publication might still qualify for trade secret
30 6
protection. In Cranleigh Precision EngineeringLtd. v. Bryant
the plaintiff had hired the defendant as a managing director
and applied for a patent of one of the defendant's inventions
through the agency of the defendant. The patent agents told
the defendant of a rival patent. The defendant did not tell the
other directors but stripped the plaintiff of tools and supplies,
quit and went to work for the competitor. The defendant then
acquired the rival patent.
In response to the plaintiff's claim of trade secret protection,
the defendant answered that since the rival patent was made
public it was no longer secret. The court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to claim confidential advances over the rival
patent 307 and granted an injunction to restrain the defendant
or competitor from using these trade secrets.
The court distinguished 0. Mustad's rule: if a master
published the secret to the whole world then the servant is no
longer bound by his promise not to publish the same secret.
Here, however, it was a third party, outside this relationship
of confidence, who published the patent. An implied term of
the employment agreement was found requiring no release of
confidential information and the publication did not release
the defendant from his duty to the plaintiff. Any other result
30 8
would be rewarding the defendant for his dishonesty.
30 9
A Canadian case, Polyresins Ltd. v. Stein-Hall Ltd.
305. See also Franchi v. Franchi(1967), R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (ch. D.)
where the court found that applying for a patent begins a process which
would inevitably lead to disclosure of the patented information to the
plaintiff's competitors.

306. (1964), 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.).
307. Enhancements over the patented design that would have taken time
and effort to duplicate.
308. Cranleigh has been criticized on this distinction. It has been argued
that the fact of publication through issuance of a patent, destroys secrecy
regardless who publishes the program. See Braithwaite, Trade Secrets: The
Springboard Upsprung (1979), 42 Mod. L. Rev. 94 at 95-96; English Law
Commission, Law Commission No. 110, Breach of Confidence (1981), Cmd.
8388, part 111 para 4:29; T. S. Bishop, Legal Protection of Computer
Programs in the United Kingdom (1983), 5 Northwestern J. of International
L. & Bus. 269 at 281. The distinction, it is argued, is that in Cranleigh the
duty arose not from trade secret law but from his duty as a fiduciary to
the company by virtue of the position as managing director.
309. (1971), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (Ont. H.C.).
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provides further refinement of the meaning of the secret and
confidential requirement. This case involved an employee's
misuse of certain formulae and industrial processes by assisting
a competitor to develop a rival product. The court looked to
the circumstances of the discovery of the new process. It was
done under a research project, in a very competitive industry.
Justice Galligan stated
it appears obvious to me that when private corporations
involved in highly competitive commercial enterprises carry
out product research and development projects, they are
doing so for their own private benefit to improve their
products so that their competitive position in the industry
is improved or maintained. Processes resulting from such
research which give them new products or which improve
existing ones for the purpose of maintaining or improving
their competitive
position in the market generally must be
31 0
trade secrets.
In circumstances where the employees know or ought to
know that the discovery gives the employer a competitive edge,
it appears the necessary quality of confidence will be implied.
Further considerations in determining if the necessary quality
of confidence exist were noted in Ansell Rubber Co. Pty. Ltd.
v. Allied Rubber Industries Ltd.31 1 A large circulation of the
program might make it unreasonable to expect that secrecy
can be obtained. In such cases where a wide distribution of
a product is anticipated, licence agreements are commonly used
to create a contractual duty of confidence. 31 2 There is presently
considerable debate whether, in fact, such broadly available
programs 31 3 have the necessary quality of confidence that is
a precondition to trade secret protection. 31 4
There are cases which have found the existence of the quality
of confidence despite a very large distribution of the product.
310. Id. at 154.
311. (1967), V.R. 37 (Australia).
312. Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co. (1948), (1963)
3 All E.R. 413, 65 R.P.D. & T.M. 203 (C.A.) illustrates that the duty can

originate under a contract.
313. Such as, for example, many of the programs for micro computers
LOTUS 123, WORDSTAR, etc.
314. Bishop, supra, at 285, suggests that the situation under such "multiple
license agreements" results in a question of degree in determining whether
disclosure has destroyed the quality of confidence.
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In Data General Corporation v. Digital Computer Controls,
Inc. 31 5 maintenance diagrams which were available to
approximately 6,000 people were protected since adequate
protective measures were taken to protect the confidential
nature of the diagrams. The court stated "Dissemination is not
significant if in confidence". 3 16 This follows a similar finding
in Board of Trade v. Christie31 7 a decision of the United States
Supreme Court. Here, it was sought to protect quotations of
grain futures which were communicated in confidence to many
of the Board's clients. The court stated
The plaintiff does not lose its rights by communicating the
results to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to
itself under a contract not to make it public, and strangers
to the trust will be restrained from getting at the knowledge
by inducing a breach of trust, and using knowledge obtained
3 t8
by such a breach
The proposition that relative, rather than absolute secrecy,
is sufficient to maintain trade secret protection has further
support. In Vulcan Dentinning Co. v. Assam 319 the court held
that a process was confidential dispite the fact that it was known
by two foreign companies. 320 This case was cited with approval
in Franchi v. Franchi32' where Justice Cross, in a dictum,
observed
Clearly a claim that the disclosure of some information
would be a breach of confidence is not to be defeated simply
by proving that there are other people in the world who
know the facts in question besides the man as to whom it
is said that his disclosure would be a breach of confidence
322
and those to whom he has disclosed them.

315. 357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975).
316. Id.at 114.
317. 198 U.S. 236 (1905) (U.S.S.C.).

318. Id.at 250-25 1.
319. 185 A.D. 399 (N.Y. Appeal Div. 1918).
320. See also Morris Ltd. v. Gilman (B.S. T.) Lid. (1943), 60 R.P.D. & T.M.
Cas 20 (Ch. D.) information also known by people in Germany; and Exchange
Telegraph Ltd. v. Central News Lid., (1897) 2 Ch. 48 where it was sufficient
that a significant group remained (after disclosure to a large interested group)
unacquainted with the information and yet would have an interest in
obtaining the information.
321. (1967), R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (Ch. D.).

322. Id.at 152.
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If the present practice of licencing computer programs with
superadded conditions of confidentiality are found to be valid
contracts 323 then the broad distribution of such material under
contractual relationships which express a requirement of
confidence might still be capable of trade secret protection.
(b) Obligation of Confidence
There must be a relationship between the parties which
expressly or impliedly creates an obligation of confidence. This
duty of confidence may be created by a contractual relation
and this is, in fact, the most common method used to expressly
state the limits of the confidence. Different considerations arise
in the case of employee/employer relationships and vendor/
client relationships and so these will be treated separately
below.
(i) The Employee/ Employer Relationship
It has long been an implied term in the employment agreement
that the employee has a duty of fidelity to the employer. 324
This contractual obligation of fidelity may prevent a skilled
employee from giving his assistance to a competitor despite
the fact that the assistance is provided on the employee's own
time and despite the fact no confidential information might
have been disclosed to the employee in confidence. Basically,
the employee can not put himself into a position where he can
injure the employer, 235 such as by competing with the employer
or by assisting a competitor. Hivac Ltd. v. Park Royal Scientific
Instruments Ltd.326 is an example of this.
Five of Hivac's employees, in their off hours, assisted a
competitor to get established. There was no proof of use of
any confidential information. The court found that it was
inevitable that some confidential information would be used
by the workmen. It was unrealistic to expect them to
compartmentalize their minds. The court then went on to
discuss the limits on restrictions that might be put on an
employee.
323. There are problems of adhesion and consideration in many of these

cases.
324. See Lord Greene M. R. in Robb v. Green, (1895) 2 Q.B. 315 at 320.
325.

Wessex Dairies,Ltd. v. Smith, (1935) 2 K.B. 80.

326. (1946), I Ch. D 169 (Ch. D).
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The law does not want to impose restrictions on a manual
worker the effect of which would prevent him from utilizing
his spare time to his own advantage. However, where the
employee is of a different character 327 one may find a different
obligation. It would be deplorable if an employee could,
consistent with his duties to the employer, knowingly, secretly
and deliberately set himself up to use his spare time in activities
which inflict great harm on the employer. Here, there was no
express term imposing a duty of confidence on the employees
in their employment contract. The court found such a term
328
to be implied.
Hivac has sometimes been cited for the proposition that work
done by an employee in his own time at his own expense
belongs to the employer. Yet this would result in the illogical
situation where a director of a company is permitted to compete
with the company while an employee can not. 329 This extension
of Hivac makes even less sense where the work developed by
the employee is unrelated to the work of the employer. The
law relating to ownership of patentable inventions may be more
appropriate. Blanco White 330 writes:
It may be noted that a director of a company is necessarily
in a fiduciary relationship to the company, and will not
ordinarily be entitled to make use for his own profit of
knowledge acquire by him when acting as director. In this
respect, his duty to hand inventions over to his company
is probably higher than that of a mere employee, however
senior.
Hivac is often distinguished by the fact it was a wartime
case and also that the extension of the principle does not flow
necessarily from the judgment.

327. The court uses the example of a law clerk.
328. As was also the case in Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd. v. Bryant,
(1964), 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.). See, however, Chevron Standard Ltd. v. Home
Oil Co. Ltd. (1982), 3 W.W.R. 427, 35 A.R. 550 (Alta. C.A.) which noted
that such a confidentiality obligation was not a covenant restricting postemployment competition with the employer.
329. See T. E. Cain, Company Law (10th London: Stevens & Sons 1972
at 267; V. Powell-Smith, The Law and Practice Relating to Company
Directors,(London: Butterworths, 1969) at 139.
330. T. A. Blanco White, Patents For Inventions (4th) London: Stevens &
Sons, 1974) at 352.
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The obligation of an ex-employee to his ex-employer is more
restricted. Justice Brightman, in United Sterling Corporation
Ltd. v. Felton and Mannion33' discusses the range of these
duties
A man may work for a competitor of his former employer
save so far as he is restrained by a valid restrictive covenant.
Apart from a restrictive covenant, the ex-employee may be
under an obligation not to make use of or disclose
information imparted to him in confidence by his former
employer... it is not clear whether this obligation is based
on an implied term of his contract of employment which
exists after the employment has ended, or whether it is based
on principles of equity independently of contract...
There is no fundamental impossiblity... in implying in
a contract of employment, in suitable circumstances, an
obligation on the employee not to abuse, after his
employment has ended, confidences imparted during the
course of his employment.
Here no confidential information had been given to the
employee in question so the action could not be maintained.
This may be contrasted with Kent Drug Ltd. v. Kronson332
where employees appear not to have used confidential
information in developing a competing computerized drug
information system. Huband J. A., speaking for the Court, said
at p. 266:
In the W. J. Christie v. Greer333 decision this court
commented on the freedom of an "ordinary employee" to
compete with a former employer. It seems to me that the
following quotation is applicable to the Kronsons in the
present case:
There is nothing to prevent an ordinary employee from
terminating his employment, and normally that employee
is free to compete with his former employer. The right to
compete freely may be constrained by contract. It would
be improper, too, for an employee to purloin trade secrets
3 34
or confidential information, including customer lists.
The scope of this duty not to disclose trade secrets or
confidential information is limited by public policy
331. (1974), R.P.C. 162. (1973)d F.S.R. 409 (Ch. D) at 167.
332. (1983), 78 C.P.R. (2d) 260 (Man. C.A.).
333. (1981), 59 C.P.R. (2d) 127, 121, D.L.R. (3d) 472, (1981), 4 W.W.R.
34 (Man. C.A.).
334. At 133 C.P.R.
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considerations in favour of not overly limiting the possibility
of an ex-employee to practice his skill in the field of his
choosing. As a result a distinction is drawn between (a)
information which can be regarded as a
separate part of the employee's stock of knowledge, which
a man of ordinary honesty and intelligence would recognize
of the employer and not his own to do
to be the property
335
as he likes with
and (b) general information
inevitably acquired by an employee in the ordinary course
of his employment as part of the sum total of his experience
with that employer, not distinguished by any particular badge
away
of confidence, which the employee will inevitably carry
336
in his head as part of his general stock of knowledge
This distinction is often difficult to draw. 337 A common

practice is the execution of a separate agreement with an
employee which specifies which information is regarded as
confidential by the employer. This will result in three
advantages. First, the employee will be on notice that some
aspects of his work are sensitive and ought not to be disclosed.
Secondly, an express term provides more certainty of the
existence of the confidential relation and makes it somewhat
easier to prove, later, at trial. Finally, the express agreement
provides certainty, if properly drafted, of the extent of the
confidential relationship, and what information is included.
However, as noted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
in Moore International (Canada) Ltd. v. Carter338 and the
Albert Court of Appeal in Chevron Standard Ltd. v. Home
Oil Co. Ltd.339 , merely signing such an agreement will not

preclude post-employment competition by the employee.

335. Printers & Finishers Ltd. v. Holloway, (1965), 1 W.L.R. 1 (1964), 3 All
E.R. 731 at 735.
336. United Sterling CorporationLtd. v. Felton and Marrian,(1974), R.P.C.
162 at 172.
337. O'Leary J., in Monarch Messenger Services Ltd. v. Houlding (1984),
56 A.R. 147 (Alta. Q.B.) examined this distinction and found that special

knowledge was acquired.
338. (1984), 1C.P.R. (3d) 171.
339. (1982), 3 W.W.R. 427, 35 A.R. 550.
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(i) ContractualConfidentiality Clauses

There are a number of disadvantages in relying on an implied
duty of confidence or fidelity. First, there is no absolute
certainty that any given court will imply the duty in the
particular fact situation. Secondly, if such a duty is implied,
then the scope of its reach will be uncertain. Both these factors
can be eliminated by the execution of an agreement between
the employee and the employer. Such agreement ought to
provide some increased certainty of these factors. A number
of locally used contracts will be analyzed in an effort to
ascertain the extent to which these benefits are achieved.
The contracts or clauses shown relate to a variety of
employment or psuedo-employment situations. Contracts A
and B deal with the typical employee/employer relationship.
Contract C deals with an independent contractor hired to do
specific work for the employer. Contracts D(I) and D(2) deal
with joint venture agreements involving computer software.
Contracts E(l) and E(2) deal with duties of confidence that
the employer places on himself and on his employees through
the acquisition of another's program materials. It is noted that
in this latter case, there is no contractual relationship between
the outsider and the employee. Either the employer relies on
the implied duty or has executed an agreement, similar to
Contracts A or B, with the employee, to provide the protection
he has undertaken to give to the outsider.
ContractA:
Whereas Employee, in connection with his employment, has
or will become familiar with X's activities and may in the
course of his employment make inventions and
improvements pertaining to these activities;
And Whereas Employee is or desires to be employed by
X in a capacity in which Employee may receive or contribute
to confidential information, which information may or may
not be patentable;
And Whereas X develops, directly or indirectly, and uses
such confidential information, which it may wish to protect
either by patents or by keeping it confidential;
Now, Therefore, in consideration of Employee's
employment, this agreement being a condition thereof and
ancillary thereto and not purporting to set forth the terms
of such employment, it is agreed as follows:
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1. Unless Employee shall first secure X's written consent,
Employee shall not disclose at any time, either during or
subsequent to said employment, any secret or confidential
information, whether patentable or not, of X of which the
Employee becomes informed during said employment,
whether or not developed by Employee, except as required
in Employee's duties to X.
2. Employee shall disclose promptly to X or its nominees
any and all inventions, discoveries and improvements,
whether patentable or not, conceived or made by Employee
during the period of employment and related to X's
activities...
These obligations shall continue beyond the termination
of employment with respect to inventions, discoveries and
improvements, whether patentable or not, conceived or
made by Employee during the period of employment, and
relating to X's activities, and shall be binding upon
Employee's assigns, executors, administrators and other
legal representatives.
3. Upon termination of said employment, Employee shall
promptly deliver to X all drawings, blueprints, manuals,
letters, notes, reports, and copies thereof, and all other
materials of a secret or confidential nature relating to X's
business and which are in the possession or under the
340
control of employee
A number of comments are appropriate in regard to these
clauses. The recitals certainly establish the informative effect,
in indicating that (a) a relationship exists in which the employee
will have access to the employer's secrets, and (b) the secrets
are of value to the employer. The final paragraph in the recitals
indicates that this is a collateral contract to the main contract
of employment and that the consideration is the fact of being
employed. This agreement might not, therefore, be effective if
executed by someone who is already employed. In such a case,
a separate consideration might be wise.
Clause 1. lists the basic duty of nondisclosure that would
otherwise be implied in the employee/employer relationship.
Clause 2. requires disclosure of developments to the employer.
Here, it is uncertain what period of time is covered. The clause
might cover only the time the employee is actually working
for the employer each day or might cover any and every
development within the time from the starting day to the
340. Source withheld by request.
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finishing day of the employment. A second limitation is placed
on the developments that must be disclosed. Only those
developments that relate to the employer's activities must be
disclosed. It might be argued that an employee who
independently developed an unrelated invention in his own time
would have no obligation to disclose this to the employer.
Finally, the clause makes the disclosure provision binding on
the employee's estate. This is an expansion of the protection
available under trade secret law. Trade secret is fundamentally
based on the relationship between the individuals and so when
the employee dies, the obligation would end.
Clause 3. provides for delivery up of certain materials, of
a confidential or secret nature, to the employer on termination
of the employment. While this is a good idea, the materials
which have the "secret or confidential nature" are not specified.
It would be far better to specify which materials are expressly
considered to have such a confidential nature. This would avoid
any possible dispute about these materials. A general delivery
clause would then provide the general, but weaker, protection
for other unlisted materials.
Contract B:
Whereas the parties to this agreement have agreed that the
contractor shall undertake a study...
Now Therefore the parties agree as follows:.
3. The contractor agrees that all communications between
X, his employees, agents or assigns and the contractor which
occur during the term of this agreement or any extension
thereof shall be treated as confidential both during and
following the term of this agreement, and the contractor shall
obtain the prior written approval of X before divulging such
communications or other data or information obtained from
X, his employees, agents or assigns during the term of this
agreement or any extension thereof.
5. The contractor agrees that all copyright, patents, or trade
secrets in any of the work performed
as a result of this
34 1
agreement... is the property of X.
This agreement purports to extend to all information received
by the contractor and deem it confidential. Public policy might
limit the effect of clause 3. to the specific information, rather
341. Source withheld on request.
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than the general information, acquired during the course of
the work, as in United Sterling. Clause 5. clears up the problems
that the employer in Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty)
Ltd.3 42 faced in not having the copyright in the program. Here,
it appears the employer has the copyright as well as the use
rights. The clause would appear to cover computer programs
whether protected by copyright, patent or trade secret law.
In such a case, where a computer programmer is paid to
prepare a specific program for the hirer or employer, a
confidential relationship might be implied. The hirer or
employer will likely have to supply the programmer with
confidential details of the workings of his business. The
programmer will have to supply his special skills. Thus both
343
parties will stand in a confidential relationship with the other.
This agreement starts to expressly define these mutual
obligations, but only from one side. Contracts D(l) and D(2),
dealing with two joint venture agreements, shows more
development of this theme.
Contract C:
1. In consideration of my employment with X in a capacity
in which I may make new contributions, new improvements
and inventions of value to X and in consideration of the
sum of one ($1.00) dollar, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, I agree as follows:
1 hereby assign and agree to assign to X... all my rights
to inventions relating to the business or interests of X or
resulting from tasks assigned to me that I may make, alone
or jointly with others, during the period of my employment.
I agree to promptly and fully disclose such inventions and
possible inventions to X...
I agree that I will not, except as required in the conduct
of X's business or as authorized in writing by X during the
term of my employment and thereafter, publish or disclose
or authorize anyone else to publish or disclose any secret
or confidential knowledge concerning any inventions or other
matter relating to X's business which I might acquire by
reason of my employment by X.
This agreement shall be binding on my heirs, executors,
administrators and other legal representatives.
342. (1982), 8 F.S.R. 124 (S.C.S.A.).
343. Gary M. Cohen, Computer Programs - Does the Law Provide an
Adequate Protective Mechanism? (1982), Australian Law J. 219 at 231.
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2. 1 represent that the inventions described in the attached
papers comprise all the unpatented inventions which I have
made or conceived prior to my employment by X that I desire
to have excluded from the terms and conditions of this
agreement.
(Notice given to employees)
During his employment, an employee may acquire records,
data and information through his own efforts and from the
efforts or disclosures of other employees which he should
under no circumstances disclose to outsiders, and which
should not be used after the termination of his employment.
There are other types of information which the employee
may acquire which can be disclosed or used without
by experts the
detriment to X. X may have no objection,
344
employee to obtain permission in each case.
This contract has been set up as a collateral contract in
consideration of $1.00 and employment. Unless the $1.00 is
actually paid, this portion of the clause is meaningless. The
consideration of employment might be valid consideration so
that the agreement, itself, exists if executed on the hiring of
the employee. Clause 1. covers much the same ground as
contract A, above. Clause 2. adds an interesting variation. It
requires the employee to expressly exclude those discoveries
which the employee wishes to retain. This might be argued to
put the onus on the employee to restrict the claims he might
later be able to make and so would have a practical effect of
placing the employer in a stronger position. Clause 1. has the
same potential problems in the definition of the period covered
and limits the scope of the employer's right to developments
to those "related to" his business or "tasks" assigned to the
employee. This limits the effect of the onus in Clause 2.
ContractD(1):
In consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements
herein set forth, the parties agree as follows:
During the term of this agreement or thereafter:
1. Any information concerning programs, products,
contracts, business information or procedures (but not
limited to computer software, electronic device
specifications, cost estimates and potential clients)
belonging to X and obtained by Y during the term of this
344. Source withheld by request.
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agreement shall be treated always as confidential, and shall
not be disclosed or made known to any other person, except
with prior approval.
2. Similarly, any information concerning programs,
products, business information or procedures (but not
limited to computer software, electronic device
specifications, cost estimates and potential clients)
belonging to Y and obtained by X during the term of this
agreement shall be treated always as confidential, and345shall
not be disclosed or made known to any other persons.
This joint venture agreement basically repeats the general
rule in regard to trade secret protection, but does have the
advantage of specifying certain items which are specifically
covered. Here, computer programs would be expressly covered
under this agreement. Where specific information will be
disclosed by one party to the other and that information is
capable of being described, it would be advantageous to include
it specifically as one of the materials protected.
It is noted that such a joint venture business arrangement
might also imply a duty of confidence even if one is not
expressly included in the agreement. In Coco v. A. N. Clark
(Engineers) Ltd. 346 Justice Megarry stated that a confidential
relationship might arise "where information of commercial or
industrial value is given on a businesslike basis and with some
347
avowed common object in mind.
Contract D(2):
4.01 The Participants shall promptly and without charge
make available to the Authority the Prior Technical
Information...
4.02 Subject to Articles 4.03 to 4.07 inclusive, the Authority
shall keep confidential all Prior Technical Information and
all other technical information made available to it by the
Participants.
4.03 The Authority is entitled to disclose Prior Technical
Information to its agents and contractors, and to Alberta
Government agencies and departments, provided that each
of said recipients agrees in writing to keep such technical
information confidential. Alberta Government agencies and

345. Source withheld by request.
346. (1969), R.P.C. 41.
347. Id. at 48.
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departments shall be entitled to disclose on a confidential
need-to-know basis Prior Technical Information in
conjunction with any part of the Project Technical
Information to others to the extent necessary for the design,
engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of the
facilities of said agencies and departments using the Project
Technical Information, and such others shall be entitled to
use such technical information but only to assist in the
design, engineering, construction, operation and maintenance of said facilities.
4.04 The Participants hereby grant to the Authority an
immunity from suit by each of them or their respective
affiliates for disclosing Prior Technical Information in
conjunction with any part of Project Technical Information
to any potential licensee on a limited non-confidential "looksee" basis to enable said potential licensee to decide whether
to enter negotiations for a license under this Technology
Agreement.
4.05 The Authority is entitled to disclose Prior Technical
Information in conjunction with any part of Project
Technical Information to its Licensees, provided that each
such Licensee agrees beforehand in writing to keep such
technical information confidential ....
7.02 The Authority shall keep confidential all Project
Technical Information, except as
is required to be disclosed
in patenting Project Inventions.3 48
This is a short excerpt from a "Technology Agreement" between
two or more joint venturers. It clearly establishes the
importance of confidence as the agreement is fundamentally
a vehicle for the exchange of the parties information for the
purpose of jointly creating new 'know-how'. The agreement
specifies the information each party brings to the agreement,
how it is to be dealt with and how the jointly developed
information will be dealt with. This specificity ought to be of
assistance in case a breach of confidence action must be
brought. The agreement provides for the circumstances under
which disclosure might be made. These factors would tend to
make the agreement the basis for a better joint working
relationship as each party would be better aware of its and
the other's rights and obligations.
This agreement shows the results of years of experience in
dealing with confidential information in these circumstances.
348. Elma K. Spady Part Three, New Frontiers in Resource Technology A Legal Overview, (1980) 19 Alta. L. R. 16 at 23, 24.
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Additional terms and information can be seen in (1980) 19 Alta.
L.R. 1 at 20 to 33.349
Contract E(J):
The Software House, its employees and associates undertake
not to divulge or communicate to any person, firm or
company any confidential information howsoever acquired
without first obtaining the written
which refers to the Client
350
consent of the Client.
This clause considers the relationship from another
perspective. The employer might have undertaken a duty of
confidence toward someone else's computer programs (as in
the joint venture clause above). This clause purports to establish
the duty, but like most of the clauses, does not specify what
materials the duty might apply to. In fairness, this clause could
be coupled with another clause which would describe the scope
of the confidential information protected.
Contract E(2):
All information or data passed by the Client to the Software
House shall be treated as confidential by the Software House
divulged to any third party without
and shall not knowingly 35
the Client's prior consent '
Morgan points out that this clause is not as strict as E(1)
in "(a) limiting the confidentiality to information expressly
passed, (b) in expecting unknowing breach of confidence, and
(c) in not stipulating that any consent to a waiver of this clause
352
should be in writing"
These clauses or contracts might assist in establishing the
confidential relationship and, in some cases, assist in
determining the scope of that relationship. Paczy v. Haendler
& Natermann G.m.b.H.353 is an excellent illustration of the
point that this clause or agreement must be considered within
the context of the entire agreement. Here, an express agreement
provided for the disclosure of confidential information and
349. Sections deal with prior and current patent rights, warranties and
representations and the licensing rights of the parties.
350. Richard Morgan, Computer Contracts (London: Oyez Publishing Ltd.,
1979) at 60.
351. Id. at 61.
352. Id.
353. (1979), 5 F.S.R. 420 (Ch. D).
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imposed a duty to keep that information confidential even after
the expiry of the agreement. Problems arose when the
defendant continued using the information without paying the
royalties after a dispute had occurred. The contract contained
an arbitration clause to handle "any dispute arising out of"
the agreement. The plaintiff sued for breach of confidence. The
proceedings were stayed since the claim for misuse of
confidential information fell within the terms of the arbitration
clause. The plaintiff would have to resolve his dispute in front
of the arbitrator.
(ii) The Vendor/ Client Relationship
There is generally no implied relationship of confidence where
one party sells or licences, at arms length, to another. As a
result, a duty of confidence must arise out of the contractual
relation or some other relationship between the parties. It is
the external client that most technical protection schemes are
designed to deal with. Trade secret protection assists such
technical protection by supplementing its effect with legal
protection. The technical protection can be characterized as
establishing the quality of confidence or secrecy necessary
before trade secret protection can exist. It is important,
especially when dealing with the external client, to ensure that
adequate internal controls are in place.
One mechanism commonly used in the computer industry
is the issuance of licences to use software rather than the sale
of the software. A licence might entitle a client to a preferential
rate on updates of the program and provides the vendor with
a continuing source of income. The major, non-economic,
advantage of such a licencing arrangement is the ability to
maintain legal control over the use of the software. 354 Gilburne
and Johnston have reviewed the restraints that are typically
355
imposed on clients receiving copies of software.
(i) Prohibition on copying other than for archival or backup
purposes;
354. There might be problems of anit-trust or restraint on alienation if
conditions are put on a sale of the software.
355. Miles R. Gilburne & Ronald L. Johnston, Trade Secret Protection For
Software Generally and in The Mass Market (1982), III Computer/Law J
211 at 225.

646 The Dalhousie Law Journal

(ii) No disclosure except to the customer's employees in the
course of their employment as necessary to utilize the
software;
(iii) Requirement that employees of the customer receiving
access to the software sign confidentiality agreements directly
enforceable by licensor;
356
(iv) Limitation on the use to single central processing unit;
(v) Restriction on the processing of third party data;
(vi) Requirement that the customer notify the licensor of
unauthorized use or disclosure, and requirement that the
customer take legal action against third party who gains
access to software and is using it on an unauthorized basis
as a result of the customer having failed to comply with the
contractual restriction; and
(vii) Requirement that distributors of software obtain license
agreements from customers containing nondisclosure
357
restriction.
A number of locally used licence agreements are outlined
below. They show different approaches to gaining different
levels of trade secret protection through the contract. It is noted
that all of these agreements of clauses are designed for a small
specialized market as opposed to the mass market. It is often
easier to maintain the secret or confidential character of the
information when one deals with a smaller number of clients.
ContractA:
This software product, including the documentation manual,
is copyrighted by X. You may not copy or otherwise
reproduce any part of this software except as expressly
permitted in this license.
The ABC software package is licensed to non-profit
educational institutions for educational, promotional,
research and development purposes within the institution.
It is not licensed for commercial use, including preparation
for a fee of material for any third party.
The holder of this license is permitted to make one or
more back-up copies of the diskette solely for protection
against loss or damage to the original, provided that all
copyright notices and other proprietary legends are
reproduced on such copies. The license holder may not
distribute copies of the software to others. 358
356. A "CPU" is another term used to describe the elemental computer.
357. Gilburne & Johnston, supra, at 225.
358. Source withheld by request.
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This package purports to be protected by copyright and has
minimal emphasis, if any, on nondisclosure of the programs
to others. As a result, one would have to look to the
circumstances of the relationship between the vendor and the
clients to see if it might be possible to imply a duty of
confidence. Certainly the documentation would be protected
by copyright. Unfortunately, at this time, it can not be firmly
stated whether the computer program would be protected by
copyright.
Contract B:
The Licenced Program is licenced for use on computer model
Z-l and serial no. 0000 installed at 000 - 000.
2.(a) Subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement,
X hereby grants to Customer a non-exclusive licence to use
the Licenced Program on Customer's computer specified on
the face of this Program Product Sub-Licence...
(b) The licence granted herein is restricted to use by
Customer solely for its own internal operation to process
its own data... and not for processing the data of others
for hire. Customer shall also have the right to use the
Licenced Materials to instruct its staff in the operation of
the Licenced Program, but shall not have the right to copy
the Licenced Materials.
(c) Customer is authorized to use the Licenced Program on
a back-up computer when the Designated Computer is
inoperable, until operable status is restored and processing
on the back-up computer is completed.
3. Upon payment by Customer of the Licence Fee... X shall
make available to customer one copy of the Licenced
Materials. Any additional copies of the Licenced Materials
as are reasonably necessary for the use of the Licenced
Program shall be provided by X to Customer at X's current
charges.
6.(a) The term of the licence granted hereunder shall
commence upon the payment by Customer of the Licence
Fee specified... and shall extend for a period of 10 years
unless terminated earlier as provided under this agreement.
13.(d) It is recognized by the parties that the confidentiality
of Licenced Program and Materials is of great and central
importance to the business of X. The parties therefore, agree
that if Customer shall breach any term contained in Schedule
A, attached hereto, then X shall have the right, at its election,
to terminate this agreement forthwith without notice.
14.(a) Upon termination of this agreement...
Customer
shall return the Licenced Program and Materials and any

648 The Dalhousie Law Journal

copies thereof to X and shall certify, under the hand of a
duly authorized officer of Customer, that the original and
all copies of the Licenced Program and Materials have been
given up to X, all records or copies of the Licenced Program
or Materials in computer memory have been destroyed, and
that no copies of any part of the Licenced Program or
Materials, in any form, remain in the possession or control
of Customer.
Schedule A
(b) Customer, as a result of this licence, will have access
to then become familiar with various trade secrets and
confidential information consisting of computer software,
algorithms, formulas, patterns, programs, software processes
and compilations of information and other trade secrets of
the Developer. 359. . . Customer agrees not to remove from
any copies of the Licenced Program, any statements
appearing therein concerning copyright and proprietary
rights. The Customer further agrees to take such other
reasonable steps as Developer or X may request from time
to time in order to protect Developer's rights and X's rights
in the software. The customer may not sell, lease, transfer,
assign, licence, or disclose the contents of the Licenced
Program to any third party without prior written permission
from X.360
This agreement goes much farther than Contract A in
specifying the client's rights in using the software. It also
provides a mechanism for termination of the agreement. It is
submitted that the termination procedure assists in giving this
agreement the legal character of a licence where Contract A
might have the legal character of a sale. Also, this agreement
specifically establishes the importance of secrecy or confidence
and then specifies some of the materials to which this
confidence attaches.
Contract C:
4. X agrees that future release of software licenced under
this agreement will be available to Customer, with Customer
agreeing to pay the cost of the diskette, postage and handling,
and 20% of the then current licence fee...
5. Customer understands that unauthorized reproduction of
copies of the software and/or unauthorized transfer of any
359. X holds a licence from the developer and this is a sub-licence agreement,
pursuant to the terms of the licence agreement.

360. Source withheld by request.
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copy may be a serious crime, as well as subjecting Customer
to damages and attorney fees. Customer, may not transfer
any copy of software to another person without prior written
approval of X.
8. A licence may be terminated at any time, provided that
the licence shall not be considered terminated until the
Customer either 36
returns
or certifies the destruction of the
1
licenced software.
This set of clauses appear to provide very uncertain
protection. The vendor discusses a "serious crime" but it is not
indicated what constitutes such a "serious crime". The provision
dealing with attorney fees is likely descriptive and so not
binding on the parties. From the drafting it would appear that
"unauthorized reproduction" of the original licenced software
might not constitute the "serious crime".
The agreement does not attempt in any serious way to
establish that the computer programs are considered secret and
confidential and of value to the licencee. As a result a court
would have a difficult time finding that a duty of confidence
existed as a result of this agreement. If so, then the vendor
is left with very uncertain copyright protection.
Contract D:
The Licensee hereby agrees:
(i) that the Package is the sole property of the Licensor and
that the Licensee will take all reasonable precautions to
maintain the confidentiality of the Package, its programs and
documentation;
(ii) that it will not assign, transfer, mortgage pledge or sublet
any ot its rights or obligations under this agreement;
(iii) to make no copies or duplicate the Package or any part
or parts thereof by any means or for any purpose whatever
(except as may be necessary for normal security storage)
without the prior consent in writing of the Licensor;
(iv) to use the Package solely at the installation described
in the Schedule hereto;
(v) to instruct all its staff from time to time having access
to the Package not to copy or duplicate the Package or any
part or parts thereof or to make any disclosure relating
thereto to any third party;
(vi) to effect and maintain adequate security measures to
safeguard the Package from theft or access by any person
361. Source withheld by request.
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other than employees of the Licensee in the normal course
of their employment;
(vii) in any event that any of the programs comprising the
Package or any part or parts the associated documentation
should come into the hands of a third party through the
Licensee or any employee or former employee of the
Licensee, the licensee shall forthwith pay to the Licensor the
price for the entire Package ruling for the time being as would
such third party for a License to use the
be charged
362
Package.
This series of clauses put a considerable onus on the Licensee
of the software to instruct its staff on the confidential nature
of the software. It also makes the Licencee liable for the cost
of the copied programs. This latter provision might have the
effect of ensuring that the Licencee is more vigilant in its
protection of the software but it is also likely that it might
discourage disclosure of any unauthorized copying. On the
whole it is quite a secure series of clauses and provides the
certainty of the existence of the duty of confidence as well as
some specificity as to its scope.
It should be relatively easy to obtain such licence agreements
from most larger users of computing resources who will
understand the concern to protect the rights in the computer
programs. However, the advent of the micro computer market
and mass marketed software has created problems. Some mass
marketed software contains an obvious notice, on the sealed
package, that breaking the seal is deemed acceptance of the
terms of the licence agreement. Some software distribution
houses have each customer execute a nondisclosure agreement.
Some software suppliers provide for a right to obtain updates
on the registration of the software and acceptance of the licence
agreement.
As was discussed earlier, cases such as Board of Trade v.
Christie363 and Data General Corporationv. Digital Computer
Controls, Inc. 364 provide that trade secret protection ought not
be related to the size of the market but rather to the measures
taken to protect the secret or confidential nature of the computer
programs.
362. Morgan, supra,at 63.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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A final caution: since these duties of confidence arise under
contracts it is not clear if they will also likely fall when the
contract falls. It may be that the contract merely raises the
knowledge which binds the person's conscience and so the legal
effect of the contract may be irrelevant. However, to be safe,
it is doubly important in such cases to ensure that the contract
is valid and that its early termination does not prejudice any
rights in the computer programs.
It is noted that software licencing agreements will differ in
one significant way from other trade secret licencing agreements.
In the licencing of trade secrets to some party, it is implicit
that the secret information will be passed from the holder to
the other party for the purposes of the agreement. With software
licences, on the other hand, the holder of the secrets, generally,
does not want the secrets to pass to the user. This, coupled
with availability of the program only in object code, ought to
make it somewhat easier to maintain the degree of secrecy
required.
(C) Disclosure Resulting in Detriment
Even if there is a quality of confidentiality in the computer
programs and there is a duty not to disclose it appears that
the program rights holder will have to show a detriment as
a result of the disclosure. This detriment will consist, in most
cases, of the threatened loss of trade secret protection for the
computer programs through public disclosure. Loss of the
competitive edge will be another, major, source of injury to
the program rights holder. Additional types of detriment that
might be shown are loss of market and therefore loss of the
ability to recover the research and development investment.
On the whole, it does not appear to be difficult to show
the requisite detriment to establish trade secret protection. In
Seager v.Copydex Ltd.365 Lord Denning M.R., in an obiter
dicta, indicates that the requirement might not be necessary.
However, this dicta does not appear to have been followed
36 6
in any significant way.

365. (1967), 2 All E.R. 415 (C.A.).
366. See for example, Ridgewood Resources Ltd. v. Henuset (1981), Alta.
D. 1014-01 March 16, 1981 (Alta. Q.B.) where an alternative reason the

plaintiff's action failed was failing to prove such detriment.
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(3) Advantages of Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret protection protects the ideas and not just the form
of expression of ideas, as in the case of copyright, or the physical
manifestation of the idea, as with patent protection. As such,
the scope of trade secret protection is directed towards the major
concern of the software developer. It will protect the creative
leap or creative combination that makes the developer's program
unique and successful. It protects against improper disclosure
through the enforcement of the duty of confidence on the user.
Another advantage of trade secret over copyright is the test
for infringement. Since copyright law only protects the form
of expression, the court must find a copy to be "substantially
similar", yet in trade secret law one must show that the
underlying concept or other confidential information was
367
appropriated, regardless of the form in which this was done.

Trade secret protection, in combination with contractual
protection, is a flexible mechanism of protection. It is also the
most widely used mechanism of protection in the software
development industry.
(4) Disadvantages of Trade Secret Protection
While trade secret protection is most widely used, it also
has limitations. These arise from its origins in the law of equity.
Equitable remedies act in personam, between the parties
involved. The law of trade secrets acts by binding a person's
conscience so that that person is ordered, in equity, not to
disclose another's trade secrets. The protection of trade secret
law extends only so far as a Court of Equity can bind a person's
conscience.
A person's conscience will be bound if that person is under
a duty or obligation of confidence in relation to some subject
matter. That duty of confidence affects the employee working
for the software developer and it may affect the client of the
vendor of software under a properly drafted licence agreement.
This duty does not affect those persons who, in good faith,
acquire the software from a rogue employee or client without
any notice of the breach of confidence. While this defence of
Bona Fide Purchasor for Value Without Notice exists, its
367. Davidson, supra, at 399.
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operation has been limited or ignored in several major trade
secret cases where it was raised.
At present it is uncertain to what extent the defence is
available.
On one side are cases such as Cooksley & Anor v. Johnson
& Sons 3 68 where Justice Edwards, in an obiter dicta, states:
Information, on the other hand, is as a general rule public
property. The affairs of life could not be carried on if it
were incumbent upon every person to whom information has
been communicated to enquire before he acted upon it
whether or not there are facts which give the other person
a right of property in that information. No cases has ever
gone, nor do we think that any case is likely ever to go,
369
to this length.
Since this comment, the world has undergone radical changes
and in our present information age many cases have gone to
this length and beyond.
Polyresins Ltd. v. Stein-Hall Ltd. 370 shows the typical
operation of the trade secret protection and the limits to this
defence. Here, the defendant company lured employees away
from the plaintiff company and those employees were aware
of the plaintiffs trade secrets. The court found that the individual
defendants had clearly breached their duty of confidence to
the plaintiff and so injunctions were issued to restrain further
breach. As with the defendant company, who was not affected
by the duty of confidence, Justice Galligan stated:
It is my opinion that an injunction will lie against a third
person who has acquired information to which he is not
entitled even assuming he does not have notice of a breach
of duty on the part of the person who imparted it to him:
Fox on CanadianPatent Law, 4th ed. (1969), p. 619; Printers
and FinishersLtd. v. Holloway, [1965] R.P.C. 239. 3 11
Stevenson Jordon & Harrison v. MacDonald & Evans372 is
another illustration of the modern tendency of the courts to
limit the availability of this defence. Here, the employee quit
and provided the defendant publishers with a book he had
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

(1905), 25 N.Z.L.R. 834 (N.Z. C.A.).
Id. at 852.
(1971), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (Ont. H.C.).
Id. at 159.
(1951), R.P.D.T.M. Cases 190 (K.B.).
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written in the course of his employment. The book contained
confidential information relating to the plaintiff's systems of
operation. The defendants did not know the material was
subject to duty of confidence at the time they acquired it and
so they claimed the defence of bona fide purchasor for value
without notice to the claim for an injunction.
The plaintiff expressly disclaimed that the defendant was
under a duty to know of the employee's duty of confidence
to the plaintiff. The court relied on Lord Cottenham's judgment
in Prince Albert v. Strange373 to support the proposition that
later knowledge of the breach is sufficient to bind the defendant.
374
Justice Lloyd-Jacob stated:
The wrong to be restrained is not the entry into the contract
to publish, but the act of publishing, and an innocent mind
at the time of the former cannot overcome the consequences
375
of full knowledge at or before the time of the latter.
Similarly, Vice Chancellor Turner's judgment in Morison v.
Moat 376 was not seen as inconsistent with the court's
jurisdiction to prevent disclosure if proceedings are commenced
377
in time.
A third party may not be successful in bringing the bona
fide purchasor defence if the circumstances were such that he
ought to have inquired as to the confidentiality of the
378
information dealt off to him.
The Stevenson case is analgous to a common situation that
might arise with employee computer programmers. They are
hired, in part, to complete some work. The employee quits and
approaches another firm to produce the work that was
substantially completed for the former employer. This case
provides some arguable authority for the issue of an injunction
against the other firm before they actually publish the
confidential materials.
373. (1849), I Mac.& G. 25.
374. See also Fraser v. Evans, (1969), 1 All E.R. 415 Lord Denning M.R.

at 417 or London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A.C. 201 Lord
Herschell at 215.
375. Id. at 195.
376. (1851),9 Hare241 at 263.
377. The Morison case provided the rule that a purchasor for value without
notice of the obligation might be in a different position than a volunteer.
378. Jack Prothore, Misuse of Confidential Information, (1978) 16 Alta. L.R.
256 at 278 discussing Chevron v. Tlapek (1967) 26 0. & G. R. at 317.
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A case from the Supreme Court of New South Wales Equity
Division, Wheatly v. Bell, 379 dealt squarely with the defence
of bona fide purchasor for value without notice.38 0 In that case
the plaintiffs had originated an idea for a franchise scheme.
It was a good idea. The plaintiffs started setting the scheme
into place. They disclosed the scheme to defendant X who had
appeared interested in participating in the plan. The defendant
X appeared disinterested and discussions ceased. In reality
defendant X took the plan and started to implement it in
Sydney, Australia. The defendant X carried on the scheme in
an identical fashion to that that the plaintiffs had disclosed
to him. It was clear that defendant X could be restrained, under
the law of trade secret, from disclosing and using the plaintiffs
scheme.
However, defendant X had disclosed the scheme to other
defendants. Those defendants claimed the defence of bona fide
purchasor for value without notice. There was no doubt that
the idea was the idea originated by the plaintiffs. Chief Justice
Helsham, sitting in the Equity Court, said:
There is a real question as to whether the injunction should
go against the innocent defendants... defendants, in effect,
claim that they are persons who should be likened to bona
fide purchasors for value without notice. It is said that
persons in that position are, in this field of confidentiality,
free to make use of information which has come to them
innocently; that they are in no way tainted with the breach
of trust or quasi breach of trust that affects the person from
whom they obtained the information, and that, therefore,
there is no equity in the plaintiffs to obtain any relief of
any sort against the innocent recipients of information, albeit
that it comes through the hands of a person who is guilty
of imparting it in breach of the duty of confidentiality that
that imparter owes to the giver of the information.
I am satisfied that the analogy which has been drawn in
some of the American cases and by some of the text writers,
of the situation of the innocent defendants to a bona fide
purchasor for value without notice, is not the correct way

379. (1984), F.S.R. 16, This case is reviewed by Sam Ricketson, Recent
Developments in the Australian Law of Breach of Confidence (1984), I 1. P.J.

66.
380. See also J. Stuckey, The Liability of Innocent Third Parties Implicated
in Anothers Breach of Confidence (1981), 4 U.N.S.W.L.J. 73.
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of approaching the question of whether the injunction should
38 1
go in the present circumstances or not.
The Learned Chief Justice Helsham observed that there was
a distinction between the traditional use of the defence and
its application to the misappropriation of confidential ideas.
He continued:
The defence of bona fide purchasor for value is an equitable
defence in relation to property rights. . . But I believe that
there are no property rights associated with the type of equity
involved here; it is equity to restrain a person from acting
in breach of confidence which is owed to another...382
The Learned Chief Justice Helsham looked to Lord Denning
M. R.'s decision in Fraser v. Evans383 to find that the Court
has ajurisdiction:
The jurisdiction is based not so much on property or on
contract as on duty to be of good faith. No person is
permitted to divulge to the world information which he has
received in good confidence, unless he has just cause or
excuse for doing so. Even if he comes by it innocently,
nevertheless once he gets to know it was originally given
in confidence, he can be restrained from breaking that
confidence.384
Butler v. Board of Trade385 was distinguished on the basis
that appeared that the confidential information in that case
had lost its character of confidence. Therefore, an intercocutory
injunction was granted against the innocent defendants.
386
Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd. v. Rosenstein
has been discussed from the context of copyright protection
previously. The case also considered the use of trade secret
to enforce an obligation of confidence on the contractor
employee who completed a computer program for the
employer. The court found that the employee, in these
circumstances, was the owner of copyright in the work.
However, the program gave the employer a competitive edge

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

at 21, 22.
at 22.
(1969), 1Q.B. 349.
at 361.
(1971), Ch. 680, per Goff J. at 690.
1981, (4) S.A. 123, (1982) 8 F.S.R. 124 (S.C.S.A.).
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and was found to be a trade secret of the employer. As a result,
the copyright holder was enjoined from copying or permitting
others to copy the programs. This case serves to illustrate the
potential difficulties that might face an employer who does not
expressly provide for ownership of the rights to a program.
Yet the case also shows that when the contractual relationship
might be defective, trade secret protection might still provide
a legal solution.
Trade secret law would not prevent a person from acquiring
a program available on the open market and discovering its
unique logic through reverse engineering. 387 It is not clear if
the fact that one party was able to reverse engineer the
computer program will affect the effectiveness of trade secret
protection against another party who acquired the secrets
through breach of confidence. 388 In the United States, at least,
if the secret is readily disclosed from an item out on the open
market there may be no trade secret protection. 389 This
limitation is based on the theory that the secret gives the secret
holder a competitive edge in the market and the extent to which
competitors must go to duplicate these secrets is a measure
of the quality of this competitive edge.
In the United States this has led to the "Head Start" Doctrine
so that infringers of another's trade secrets will be enjoined
from using those secrets for a period of time as long as it would
have taken them to independently develop it.390 This limitation
might be contrasted with permanent injunctions commonly
granted in the commonwealth cases. In both judicial systems
the court considers the conduct of the infringer...

defendants

who have wilfully attempted to profit through violation of a
confidential relationship need not be placed in as good a
position as other, honest competitors. 39 1The trend in the United
States appears to be that once the other, honest competitors
387. Reverse engineering describes a process in which an item is examined
in order to discover the mehtods by which it was created or designed.
388. Gilburne & Johnson, supra, at 233.
389. For Example Colony Corporation of America v. Crown Glass Patent
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), Jan. 21, 1982 at A-13 (Ill. Appeal Court
Dec. 16, 1981).
390. Data General Corporationv. Digital Computer Controls, Inc. 297 A.2d
433 (Del. Ch. 1971), affirmed 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972).
391. Analog Corporation v. Data Translation, Inc. 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass.
1976).
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would have made the discovery, then the trade secrecy is gone
and that might be the limit of the injunction ordered. The courts
may award the plaintiff damages as well so that the defendant
is not advantaged by not having to incur the research and
development expenses. 392 However, the defendant, if he seeks
to limit the operation of the injunction, has the onus of proving
393
that he could, in fact, have reverse engineered the program.
The "spring board" doctrine has been recognized in
commonwealth cases. In Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers)
Ltd.394 where Justice Megarry defined the operation of this
doctrine in English law. This was later qualified by Lord
395
Denning M. R. in Potters-Ballotini Ltd. v. Weston-Baker
where he indicated that although a man must not use
confidential information as a springboard to get a head start
over others, nevertheless that springboard does not last forever.
The recognition of this doctrine as limited in time is also seen
in Harrison v. Project & Design Co. (Redcar) Ltd. 396 It appears
clear that the injunctive relief available in commonwealth cases,
as influenced by the Potters-Ballotinilimitation, will be limited
to the time that the "springboard" or "head start" is effective.
Trade secret law is fundamentally a creature of equity and
so its protection is always at the discretion of the court. As
a result such equitable defences as the plaintiff's unclean hands
or delay are available to the defendant. This is exemplified in
the case of International Scientific Communications Inc. v.
Pattison.397 Here a U.S. company hired the defendant as their
agent in England and Europe to solicit advertising for the
publication. The defendant compiled a list of advertisers and
subsequently used this list in launching his own competing
publication.
The court found that this was a breach of confidence and
that the list embodied enough labour of composition, existence
of the trade and practical utility to fall within the class of
confidential trade information. The court then found there had

392. Id. at 808.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Rego Displays,Inc. v. Fournier379 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1977).
(1969), R.P.C. 41.
(1977), R.P.C. 202 (C.A.).
(1978), 4 F.S.R. 81 (Ch. D) at 87.
(1979), 5 F.S.R. 429 (Ch. D).
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been a breach of confidence by the defendant. However the
plaintiff's delay in prosecuting the action was such as to
constitute licensing of the defendant's competition. The plaintiff
had knowledge of the competition almost one year before they
took action against it in a serious way. This case would seem
to indicate that someone seeking trade secret protection ought
to act in a reasonably prompt manner to take action to end
the infringement or migh face the defence of acquiescence.
Another major concern with trade secret protection is the
reliance on contractual means to create the duty of confidence.
If the secrets are disclosed to the public by the rights holder 398
then the information may be public knowledge and might not
be capable of trade secret protection. In such a case, the
contractual terms will only give a remedy against the parties
to the contract. Persons outside the contract will not be bound
by its terms.
A further disadvantage in relying on trade secret law is that
there will be a continuing cost to maintain some adequate
security mechanisms to provide the quality of confidence in
the computer programs. 399 There is no such continuing cost
incurred under a copyright protection scheme. On the other
hand, the existence of the protective mechanism will provide
the rights holder with much greater control over the programs.
It should be easier to detect any misuse of the programs and
therefore have the information about improper use. While a
copyright system might cost nothing to maintain, it will be
expensive to maintain some form of information network to
discover whether infringement is actually taking place.
A further exception to the obligation of confidence has arisen
in Initial Services Ltd. v. Putteril400 and was approved in
British Steel Corp. v. Granada Television Ltd.40 and has been

398. Such as through advertising, publication in trade journals, lax protective
measures or disclosure without the duty of confidence.
399. An example of the type of continuing obligations that might be involved
is given by J. S. Whitebrook and U. Tosi in Protecting Computerland's
Fragile Trade Secrets (1982), California Lawyer 43 at 46.
400. (1968), 1 Q.B. 396, (1967), 3 All E.R. 145 (C.A.) per Lord Denning
M.R.
401. (1981), A.C. 1096, (1980), 3 W.L.R. 774, (1981), 1 All E.R. 417 (H.L.).
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refined in subsequent cases 40 2 that there "is no confidence as
to the disclosure of iniquity". 40 3 While this will generally not

be an issue in the type of disputes reviewed in this analysis,
it does indicate that the law of trade secrets and confidence
have the limitations naturally found in a discretionary system
of law. Yet, perhaps ironically, it is precisely that discretionary
aspect of the law which has permitted it to remain flexible and
keep pace with the changes occuring in the very rapidly evolving
high technology industries.
3. Trust Law
The law of trusts, like the law of trade secrets, is an equitable
innovation and so many of the comments relevant to trade
secret law will also be relevant to a discussion of trust law.
The law of trusts is based on the recognition that there may
be legal interests and equitable interests in some object that
is capable of being trust property. 40 4 The law of trusts, like
most equitable creations, is very flexible and might find
application in the protection of computer programs. In some
cases the relationship between the parties will be such that a
remedy might be appropriate under this branch of law. But
first, what is a trust?
Generally, a trust can be defined as:
A trust is an equitable obligation on one (who is called a
trustee) to deal with property over which he has control
(which is called the trust property), for the benefit of persons
(who are called the beneficiaries), of whom he may himself
be one, and anyone of whom may enforce the obligation,
or for a charitable purpose, which may be enforced at the
402. See Lion Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans (1984), 2 All E.R. 417 (C.A.)

dealing with disclosure of deficiencies in the "intoximeter" used by police
in measuring levels of intoxication.

403. per Lord Fraser at p. 479 All E.R.
404. Note, however, that the courts of Chancery and the modern courts
administering the law of trusts have not felt bound by the need to have

both a legal and an equitable interest in the subject matter of the trust as
a prerequisite to the ability to create a valid trust. This is of importance
since a traditional analysis would reject a trust theory for any property in
which such dual interests are difficult to visualize. However, in Fletcher v.
Fletcher (1844), 4 Hare 67, 67 E.R. 564 the court recognized a trust in a

chose in action, and in many cases to be sketched out later, courts have
imposed trust remedies for misuse of information acquired while under a
fiduciary obligation.
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instance of the Attorney-General, or for some other purpose
permitted by law though unenforceable.
There is a fiduciary relationship 4 5 between the trustee and
the beneficiary. The beneficiary appears to have both in rem
and in personam rights notwithstanding the equitable origins
40 6
of the trust.
There are many different types of trusts that might be
tangentially applicable to the present study but this discussion
will be limited to the constructive trust.
(a) Constructive Trusts
A constructive trust is one which arises by operation of law
irrespective of the intention of the parties. The trust fastens
onto the trust property and requires that it be dealt with in
a specific manner. There are basically three approaches to
40 7
constructive trusts of interest in this study.
(i) American Approach
In the United States the constructive trust is a remedial device
based on the law of restitution. The person with title to the
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to the
plaintiff on the ground of unjust enrichment. This is outside
the traditional concepts in Canadian trust law which does not
impose a duty to convey but rather a duty to hold on trust
for the plaintiff.
(ii) Anglo-Substantive Approach
This is the traditional approach to the constructive trust and
looks to the substantive law of trusts for its roots. There are
two elements essential to a claim under this head. First, the
trustee must have the property vested in himself (ie. it has not
passed to a third party) and, secondly, there must be a fiduciary
relationship between the plaintiff and the trustee.

405. This is a relationship of very high confidence.
406. See Baker v. Archer-Shee (1927), A.C. 844 (H.L.) - Where a fixed sum
due to be paid to the beneficiary was characterized as a right in the property
for the purposes of the English Income Tax Act.
407. Suggested by Eileen Gillese, Professor of Law, University of Western
Ontario.
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(iii) New Model
Canadian courts have mixed the two concepts to find a unique
type of constructive trust. At present it is a very flexible and
also very uncertain remedy. It does appear clear that there must
be at least three conditions satisfied before this type of
408
constructive trust might exist.

(1) An enrichment of one
(2) A corresponding deprivation of the other
(3) An absence of any juristic reason for the deprivation
(4) The circumstances are such that it would be unjust to allow
the first one to retain the benefit
(5) A casual connection between the enrichment and
deprivation.
(b) Constructive Trusts: Substantive Approach
A fiduciary is in a relationship of confidence and is bound
by the rule in Keech v. Stanford40 9 that a fiduciary can not
make a profit for himself through the medium of his
relationship even where the person for whom he acts might
not be able to benefit. The rule was outlined by Mr. Justice
Rand in a dissenting judgment in the case of Midcon Oil
Symbol & Gas Ltd. v. New Dominion Oil Co. Ltd. and
Thomas410 where he states:
The doctrine as to purchases by trustees, assignees,and
persons having a confidential character, stands much more
upon general principle than upon the circumstances of any
individual case. It rests upon this; that the purchase is not
permitted in any case, however honest the circumstances; the
general interest of justice requiring it to be destroyed in every
instance; as no court is equal to the examination and
ascertainment of the truth in much the greater number of
cases.
And latter in the same case Mr. Justice Rand continued:
The rule of equity which insists on those, who by the use
of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to account
for that profit in no case depends on fraud or absence of
bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as
408. Becker v. Pettkus (1980), 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.) based on Moses v.
MacFerlan(1760).
409. (1726), Sel. Cas. Ch. 61, 25 E.R. 223.

410. (1958), S.C.R. 314 (S.C.C.) at 337.
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whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to
the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to
obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or whether
he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the
plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged
or benefited by his action. The liability arises from the mere
fact of 11a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been
4
made.
The classes that might be bound by this rule include trustees
of an express trust, 4 12 executors or administrators, 4 3 or
agents, 41 4 solicitors, 41 5 directors, officers and promotors of a
corporation, 41 6 joint venturers 41 7 and sometimes other groups.
However, employees, even sometimes senior employees, are
generally not fiduciaries with respect to their employer. 4 18 The
significance of this action is that if a person in such a fiduciary
411. supra, at 338 Mr. Justice Hope, Alberta Supreme Court, Trial Division
quoted this passage with approval in Beauchamp v. Muller (1977), 2 A.R.
474. It is noted that Mr. Justice Rand states the rule somewhat more strictly
than it has been held to be given such cases as Holder v. Holder, (1968),
Ch. 353, 1 All E.R. 665 (C.A.) where the court found that the defendant
was not acting in a fiduciary capacity at the relevant time. Further, the
plaintiff's acquiescence had barred him any relief.
412. Wright v. Morgan, (1926), A.C. 788 (JC PC) See also in Canada Crocker
& Croquip Ltd. v. Tornroos, (1957), S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.).
413. Holder v. Holder, (1968), Ch. 353 (C.A.) See also in Canada National
Trust Co. Ltd. v. Osadchuk, (1943), S.C.R. 89 (S.C.C.).
414. Reading v. The King, (1949), 2 K.B. 232 (C.A.) affirmed (1951) A.C.
507 (H.L.).
415. Boardman v. Phipps,(1967), 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.).
416. This is alos known as the "corporate opportunity doctrine". Regal
(Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, (1942), 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.); Industrial
Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, (1972), 2 All E.R. 162; B. Love
Ltd. v. Bulk Steel & Salvage Ltd. (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) I (Ont. H.C.); W.
J. Christie v. Greer, (1981), 4 W.W.R. 34; Alberts v. Mountjoy (1977), 36
C.P.R. (2d) 97 (Ont. H.C.); Berkey Photo (Canada) Ltd. v. Ohlig (1984),
76 C.P.R. (2d) 121 (Ont. H.C.).
417. McLeod v. I All E.R. 378 (H.L.). See also in Canada Peso Silver Mines
Ltd. v. Cropper, (1966), S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.), or CanadianAero Service Ltd.
v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 (S.C.C. Sweezey (1944), S.C.R. 111

(S.C.C.).
418. See Chervon Standard Ltd. v. Home Oil Co. Ltd., (1982), 3 W.W.R.
427, 35 A.R. 550 (Alta. C.A.) a senior employee, a geologist, was not a
fiduciary; Kent Drug Ltd. v. Kronson (1983), 78 C.P.R. (2d) 260 (Man. C.A.)
two employees described as "directors" were not fiduciaries; However, in
Mansard Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Tilley Consultants Pty. Ltd. (1981),
W.A.R. 161 (West Australian S.C.) a company manager was a fiduciary.
See Berkey Photo (Canada) Ltd. v. Ohlig (1983), 76 C.P.R. (2d) 121 (Ont.
H.C.) for a review of other cases at 135-136.
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relationship absconds with the computer program then an
action in trust might be brought as well as an action in trade
secret law. It offers the court two theories under which relief
might be granted. This is because the fiduciary is already in
the relationship of confidence and so if the computer programs
have the quality of confidence (ie. not public) then a trade secret
action might be maintained. An advantage of the trust remedy
41 9
is that the court might characterize the program as property
and therefore give the injured party a constructive trust (a
property right) in the computer programs. The injured party
would then be entitled to property remedies such as all the
sums earned during the wrongful use of the programs.
420
Pre-Cam Exploration & Development Ltd. v. McTavish
provides an illustration of the use of this doctrine. The
defendant was hired to inspect certain mineral claims staked
by a company who wanted the plaintiff to do the exploration
work. The defendant took readings and was able to determine
from them that the mineralized zone was partly outside the
claimed area. The defendant staked the claim to this area
himself after quitting his employment for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to transfer the
claims to the owner of the other claims. The Supreme Court
of Canada held that the information acquired by the defendant
was highly confidential and the purpose of acquiring the
information was obvious, so as to acquire connecting claims.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could acquire these
outside claims against the interest of the original claim holder.
The court found it was a term of the defendant's contract of
employment that he could not use information obtained for
his own advantage.
The court imposed a constructive trust because "of the mere
use of confidential information for private advantage against
the interest of the person who made the acquisition of the
information possible". 42' It appears as though the court might
have found that the information was trust property and through
the uncited application of the Keech v. Standford rule made
the defendant hold the trust property and all that derived from
419. See the next section for a discussion of the contentious issue whether
or not information might be property.

420. (1966), S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.).
421. Id. at 555.
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the use of the trust property for the benefit of the original
claim holder.
It will not matter if the defendant is no longer in a fiduciary
position at the time of the hearing so long as he was a fiduciary
422
at the critical time, the time of the profit making.
(c) Constructive Trust: New Model
This approach might be used to maintain the trust action in
circumstances where it is not possible to characterize the
relationship as a fiduciary relationship. It is a newly evolving
area of law and might be looked on as a last resort until more
certainty is established as to the use of this remedy.
IX. Remedies Available to Enforce Protection
There are basically two types of remedies available for breach
of either patent, copyright, trade secret or contractual
protection of computer programs. These are damages or an
injunction. Different considerations apply to an award of
damages or the issue of an injunction. These differences relate,
first, to the fact that the remedies accomplish different tasks
and, second, to the fact that the injunction is an equitable
remedy and damages are of common law origin.
1. Injunctive Relief
An injuction is an order of the court directing a party to do
or to refrain from doing a specified act. The general rule is
that, in equity, an injunction is only available where damages
are an inadequate remedy. Breach of an injunction is a
contempt of court and could result in a charge of civil
423
contempt 243 or criminal contempt.
There are a number of types of injunctions which all serve
different pruposes. Briefly stated, these are:
Permanent or Final Injunction - This order binds the party
for the life of the party.
422. See for example, Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Strumborg (1976), 2
W.W.R. I (Alta. S.C.T.D.) affg (1978) Alta. D. S.C./App. Div. App 10813
April 19, 1978 (Atla. S.C.A.D.).
423. Enforced through the payment of a fine.
424. Enforced through committal to a prison term as in Tilco Plastics Ltd.
v. Skuriat (1966) (Ont. H.C.).

666 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Interlucutory Injunction - This is an order that is granted
before or during a trial of the main issue. This is very commonly
sought in these type of cases since it will usually be intended
to prevent further possibility of infringement.
Quia Timet Injunction - This is an injunction that is granted
4 25
to restrain an anticipated harm. It is very rarely issued.
Prohibitory Injunction - This is the most common form
of an injunction. It is a court order restraining the party from
doing some specified act.
Mandatory Injunction - This type of injunction orders the
party to do some positive act.
The Mareva and Anton Piller order are a combination of
a prohibitory and mandatory injunction. These are very
powerful orders and will be discussed in more detail below.
Injunctions issued by a court exercising an equitable
jurisdiction are discretionary remedies. A court will weight the
conduct of both parties and the harm involved before it will
grant such a serious order.
A permanent injunction might be available where (1)
damages are an inadequate remedy 426 (2) the equities of the
parties are in favour of the issue, and (3) the basic conditions
showing infringement of the appropriate rights have been
satisfied. Additional considerations arise when an interim or
interlocutory injunction is sought. Since this injunction is
sought before or during the trial of the main action, it is not
yet known if the plaintiff will be entitled to a permanent
injunction. As a result this is an extraordinary remedy and the
plaintiff must show:
427
1. Aprimafacie case for the final injunction

425. Such an injunction was granted in Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer
Edge Pty. Ltd. and Suss, (1984), 11 Fleet Street Reports 481 (Federal Court
of Australia).

426. Damages may be inadequate where (i) one could not prove damages,
(ii) the defendant had very poor records, or (iii) the defendant might not
be able to survive to pay damages. See LB.M. v. Spirale, Id.
427. See L B.M. v. Spirale (1984), 80 C. P. R. (2d) 187 (F.C.T. D.) for an example
of how this might be done.
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2. That without the injunction he will suffer both substantial
428
and irreparable loss

3. That on the balance of convenience the injunction should
429
be granted
4. An undertaking in damages is usually required to make up
for any loss in the event it is later held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to the final injunction.
(a) Anton Piller Orders
An Anton Piller order is an exceptional remedy that allows
the plaintiff to go into the defendant's premises or place of
business and seize specific materials and orders the defendant
to deliver up specified materials. 430 In EMI Records Ltd. v.
Kudhai 43 1 the English Court of Appeals held that an Anton
Piller order could be made ex parte against a representative
class provided that there was a prima facie common interest
or link between the members of the class and that any member
of that class could, subsequent to the order issuing come
forward and show why it should not apply to him.
The order is named for the type of order granted in the case
of Anton Piller K.G. v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd.432 This
has come to be a common request in computer program
protection actions. It was discussed in the Canadian case of
Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Coinex Video Games Inc. 433 The

Federal Court of Appeal reviewed the conditions under which
an Anton Piller order will be issued. These are as stated by
434
Lord Justice Ormrod
428. The court appears to consider the relative size of the contestants in
making this determination and their respective financial strength. In Apple
Computers, Inc. v. Computermat (1983), 75 C.P.R. (2d) 281 this was
considered. Note however LB.M. v. Spirale, Id. where the computer giant

I.B.M., was not refused an interim injunction on the basis that without it
I.B.M. would face "death by 1000 cuts".
429. The courts appear to consider the market effect of the grant of the
injunction: See LB.M. v. Spirale, Id.
430. This type of order is not only available in intellectual property disputes.
See Emanuel v. Emanuel (1982), 12 Family Law 62 for application in a
domestic conflict.
431. (1985), 12 F.S.R. 36 (C.A.).
432. (1976), 1 Ch D 55.
433. (1983), 69 C.P.R. (2d) 122 (Fed. C.A.).
434. In the Anton Pillercase at 62.
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First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case.
Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, must be very
serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must be clear
evidence that the defendants have in their possession
incriminating documents or things and that there is a real
possibility that they may destroy such material before any
application inter pates can be made.
The remedy is very exceptional and is only issued in the
proper case where all these preconditions are met. 435 An Anton
Piller order will not be granted where it is only being used
to find out what claims the plaintiff must make in a subsequent
statement of claim.4 36 K-Flex Systems Ltd. v. Bi-Line Conveyor
System Ltd.4 37 outlines that a standard of reasonable frankness
is required in the applicant's disclosure for an ex parte Anton
Piller type order. A negative judicial reaction has developed
where too liberal use has been made of this extraordinary
remedy without the exceptional circumstances to support its
4 39
use.4 38 In Thermex Ltd. v. Schott Industrial Glass Ltd.
Justice Browne-Wilkinson stated
As time goes on and the granting of Anton Piller orders
becomes more and more frequent, there is a tendency to
forget how serious an intervention they are in the privacy
and rights of defendants. 440 One is also inclined to forget
the stringency of the requirements as laid down by the Court
of Appeal (in Anton Piller K. G. v. ManufacturingProcessed

Ltd. (1976) 1 ch.

55)441

435. Chin-Can Communications Corporationv. Chinese Video Centre Ltd.,
(1983), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 184, 19 A.C.W.S. (2d) 2 (F.C.T.D.) where only an

interim injunction was issued because all of the elements above were not
shown.
436. See Hytrac Conveyors Ltd. v. Conveyors International Ltd., (1983), 9

F.S.R. 63 (C.A.) leave to appeal to House of Lords refused.
437. (1984), 1 C.P.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. H.C.).
438. See Systematica Ltd. v. London Computer Centre Ltd., (1983) 9 F.S.R.

313 (Ch D) where the judge expresses concern at p. 316.
439. (1981), F.S.R. 289.

440. In GeneralNutrition Ltd. v. Pattni, (1984), 11 F.S.R. - documents seized
could only be used for the purposes of the order and could not be handed
over to the police.
441. This comment was quoted with approval in Midway Manufacturing
Co. v. Bernstein (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 112 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) at 118.
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An example of the form of an Anton Piller type order can
be seen in Hazel Grove Music Company Ltd. v. Elster
Enterprises,442 a case of copyright infringement
That each of the Defendants do forthwith:
(i) Deliver up to the Plaintiffs' Solicitors any relevant
documentation in their respective power possession custody
or control and within the jurisdiction of this Court
PROVIDED THAT it shall not be a breach of this injunction
not to deliver up any document which the person serving
this Order agrees in writing need not be delivered up.
(ii) Delivery up to the Plantiffs' Solicitors any cabinet or
drawer in their respective power possession custody or
control and within the jurisdiction of this Court which the
person serving this Order reasonably believes or suspects may
contain relevant documentation the contents of which he is
unable to inspect by reason of the said drawer or cabinet
being locked or otherwise.
(iii) Deliver up any key or other thing necessary to open
such drawer or cabinet. 443
Examples of Anton Piller orders relating to the computer
industry may be found in Gates v. Sw ft 4 4 4 and in Nintendo
of America, Inc. v. Coinex Video Games Inc. 445 Chin-Can
Communications Corp. v. Chinese Video Centre446 is a case
involving a claim of copyright infringement. An industrial
design case is Bardeau Ltd. v. Crown Food Services Equipment
447

Ltd.

The practice of using an Anton Piller type injunction appears
to be well entrenched in Canada 44 and has received
considerable acceptance in the Commonwealth. In Thorm EMI
Video Programmes Ltd. v. Kitching and Busby4 4 9 the New
Zealand High Court considered the circumstances under which

442. (1983), 9 F.S.R. 379 (Ch D).

443. at 379.
444.
445.
446.
447.

(1981),
(1983),
(1983),
(1983),

7 F.S.R. 57 (Ch D) copyright infringement.
69 C.P.R. (2d) 122 (Fed. C.A.).
70 C.P.R. (2d) 184 (F.C. T.D.).
66 C.P.R. (2d) 183 (Ont. H.C.) An undertaking in damages was

required.
448. For an excellent review of the Anton Pillr order in Canada see G.
Takach, Exploring the Outer Limits (1985), 23 Alta. L.R.
449. (1984), 11 F.S.R. 342.
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the order was available. The English Courts continue to refine
4 50
the law applicable to this extraordinary remedy
(b) Mareva Injunctions
A Mareva injunction is an exceptional order that is available
to prevent a party from disposing of assets or removing them
from the jurisdiction and is an exception to the general rule
that such orders will not be made in an interlocutory injunction.
It may be available on an exparte basis. 45' To qualify for such
an injunction the claimant must show:
1. A strong primafacie case on the merits.
2. A full and frank disclosure of all material facts.
3. Particulars of the claim with points both for and against
the defendant.
4. Grounds for believing the defendant has assets in the
jurisdiction, and identification with precision.
5. Grounds for believing there is a genuine risk that the assets
being removed before the judgment or award is satisfied.
452
6. An undertaking in damages.
45 3
Chitel v. Rothbart reviews the current requirements of the
Mareva injunction. This must be read in conjunction with
Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Fiegleman454 where the
Supreme Court reviewed the availability of this injunction. The
Court held that a Mareva injunction was, as a matter of law,
available in Manitoba, but, under the particular circumstances
the injunction should be set aside.
Estey J., speaking for the Court, said:
The gist of the Mareva action is the right to freeze exigible
assets when found in the jurisdiction, wherever the defendant
may reside, providing, of course, there is a cause between
450. See, for example, WEA Records Ltd. v. Visions Channel 4 Ltd., (1983),
2 All E. R. 589 (C.A.) dealing with the nature of information before the judge;
and Wardale Fabrics Ltd. v. G. Myristis Ltd., (1984), 11 F.S.R. 263 (Ch.
D.) dealing with the effect of the order while in force and penalty for breach.
451. Bank Mellat v. Nikpour, (1983), 10 F.S.R. 79 (C.A.) provides
observations on applications for the grant of an ex parte Mareva or Anton

Piller injunction. A
452. Nimemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrisgesellschaft mbH & Co.
KG, (1984), 1 All E.R. 398 (C.A.) would apply the general test: whenever
it appears to the Court just and convenient to do so.
453. (1983), 69 C.P.R. (2d) 62 (Ont. C.A.).
454. Unreported January 31, 1985 Supreme Court of Canada.
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the plaintiff and the defendant which is justiciable in the
Courts of England. However, unless there is a genuine risk
of disappearance of the assets, either inside or outside the
jurisdiction, the injunction will not issue. This generally
summarizes the position in this country.. .455
This injunction is not yet common in computer program
protection cases but has found some application in the
456 It
restrictive covenant and covenant not to compete cases.
should not be granted where its effect would be substantially
to interfere with a third party's freedom of action generally,
457
or his freedom to trade.
2. Damages
Damages may be awarded where, in the circumstances, the
requirements of an injunction are not satisfied under Lord
Cairns Act 1858 now enacted in s.32(1 1)(b) of the Judicature
Act

458

or may be awarded in addition to injunctive relief. The

quantum of the damages awarded will vary with the severity
of the infringement and its effect on the claimant's ability to
compete or continue to sell the program. In Seager v.
Copydex 45 9 the damages in effect were the amount of the sale
price the invention would have brought to inventor. Lord
Denning M. R. awarded damages in lieu of an injunction in
the particular circumstances of the case. This appears to have
been due to the plaintiff's unsophistication 440 and possible
complications arising out of the defendant's acquisition of a
patent on the plaintiff's idea.
The basis for the assessment of damages was the subject of
Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2)16 1. Lord Denning M. R. held
that damages were to be assessed at the value of the information
which the defendant wrongfully acquired. This is analgous to
455. A brief overview of this decision may be found in W. Monopoli, Recent
Decision Limits 'Mareva'Injunction,National March 1985 at 23.
456. As in Sask- Workware Inc. v. Ollinik, (1983), 1 W.W.R. 631 (Sask. Q.B.).
457. Galaxia Maritime S.A. v. Mineralimportexport,(1982), 1 All E.R. 796
(C.A.); and Nelson Burns & Co. v. Gratham Industries Ld. (1981), 59 C.P.R.
(2d) 113 (Ont. H.C.).
458. R.S.A. 1980, c.J-l.

459. Id. in the trade secret discussions.
460. He was unrepresented by council.
461. (1969), 2 All E.R. 718 (C.A.).
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conversion since the idea, once damages were paid, became
the property of the defendant.
The value of the confidential information depends on the
nature of the information. If there was no inventive step,
something not very special, but the sort of information you
could get if you hired a consultant, then the measure of damages
would be the fee a consultant would charge for it.
If, however, there was an inventive step, something that was
very special, then its value is much higher. The measure of
damages is the price of willing buyer, desirous of obtaining
the information, would pay for it. This is not merely a
consultant's fee.
In this case, there was a real inventive step. The court
considered the plaintiff's loss due to the defendant's competition
and found, in these circumstances, that the plaintiff would have
received a royalty payment for the idea. The value of that
royalty payment was capitalized and the result was, when the
damages were paid, that the defendant purchased the idea
outright.
Lord Justice Winn, in a concurring judgment, added that
where there were damages awarded on a tortious basis and
there was any doubt about two possible versions of assessment,
then the general principle OMNIA PRAESUMUNTUR
CONTRA SPOLIA TOREM 462 should apply.
X. Propertyin Information?
The development of information as a valuable commercial
commodity has led to some debate about finding property
rights in information. One view is that
information ought to be free. Programs should be published
in source code. Hackers should be able to get at problems
and fix them with a minimum of paperwork and fuss and
permissions463

462. "All things are presumed against a despoiler or wrongdoer." Black's
Law Dictionary (5th ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1979) at 980 and
Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary (9th ed. London: Butterworths & Co.,
1977).
463. On The Road: Hackercon and COMDEX, BYTE March 1985 at 313
relating to hacker's viewpoint at the hacker's convention at Fort Cronkhite,

California.
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Others write about the dangers of private rights in
information leading to monopolies on information and the need
for a state role in the control of information. 464 Ultimately we,
as a society, will have to determine whether or not we wish
to encourage creativity in the sciences as we do in the arts
and, if so, what method is used to provide real and flexible
encouragement for such creativity.
The advantage of a property right of some kind in
information would be the availability of property remedies to
enforce that right. Thus, information could be traced through
the hands of a wrongdoer and into the hands of an innocent
third party. This was seen in the limitation of the defence of
bona fide purchasor for value without notice in some of the
trade secret cases.
On the other hand, information is quite unlike our
conventional understanding of property. It is a thing which
one person can share with others and yet not lose. In fact,
very many people can acquire the information and yet the
original "owner" still has it. The commercial value of the
information may, in some circumstances, go up the more people

have

it.465

Information is also something which, once given, cannot be
taken back. As a result, typical property remedies such as
detinue or replevin would not make sense since the original
"owner" still has the information and it is impossible for the
new "holder" to give it up. 4 6 6 The method used to prevent
increased dissemination of information is to seek an injunction
fixing the new "holder's" conscience and enforceable with the
threat of a contempt of court conviction.
None the less, there is some case authority to suggest that
there might be a qualified property right in information of a
specific type. These have already been seen in the area of trade
467
secret law and trust law in cases such as Normalec v. Britton.
Here the plaintiff company sold electrical goods throughout
Yorkshire. The defendant, an employee of the plaintiff, quit

464. See for example, Grant Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric
Models and Property Rights to Information (1981), 27 McGill L. Rev. 47.

465. Advertising information might be an example.
466. Barring some fantastic scheme in the field of psychology or psychiatry.
467. (1983), 9 F.S.R. 318 (Ch D).
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and set up a rival business taking over 55% of the plaintiff's
sales through his deception.
The plaintiff claimed breach of a fiduciary duty in enticing
customers away from the plaintiff, use of confidential
information for gain and breach of a restrictive covenant. 46
The court relied on the rule in Keech v. Sandford469 that no
person standing in a fiduciary position is entitled to make a
profit in circumstances where his duty and interest conflict.
Here the defendant was using information that was
wrongfully derived from the plaintiff. The court stated that,
in equity, the whole of the defendant's business belonged to
the plaintiff. The defendant was ordered to disgourge. 470 The
information was improperly used and so the plaintiff was
entitled to the property right of the benefits of the information,
not just a mere accounting which one might expect when
dealing with in personam rights.
An Ontario Court of Appeal decision has expressly found
that certain types of information is property and is, therefore,
capable of being stolen. In R v. Stewart47' a self-employed
consultant was contracted by someone associated with a union
seeking to form a bargaining unit in a large hotel complex
employing approximately 600 people. The union needed the
names and addresses of the employees in order to solicit support
for their cause. This information was considered strictly
confidential by the management of the hotel and was stored
in the hotel's computer. The computer and the printout of
personnel files was protected by the hotel's security system.
Stewart contacted a security worker at the hotel and offered
to pay him $2.00 for each employee name and address that
the worker could provide. Stewart suggested that the worker
acquire the confidential information without removing or
affecting the hotel's records. The security worker turned in

472
Stewart who was charged with the charge of counselling theft.

468. This contract was not drawn by a solicitor but was characterized by
the court as INTER RUSTICOS, resulting in problems of interpretation.
469. (1726), 2 W. & T. L. C. 648 as restated in Bray v. Ford, (1896), A.C.
44 (H.L.) and Phippsv. Boardman, (1967), 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.).
470. Id. at 323.
471. (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. C.A.) See also the comments by Paul
M. Amos (1984), 1 I.P. J. 77 and G. F. Henderson (1983), I C.C.L.R. 17.
472. s.283(l) Criminal Code in Part VII of the Code entitled "Offences
Against Rights of Property".
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The issue before the court was whether confidential information
could be the subject of theft.
The trial judge correctly concluded that there must be
property in a thing if it can be the subject of theft. He found
that there was no property in confidential information.
The Court of Appeal addressed itself to the issue whether,
in these circumstances, there was a property right in the
confidential information. Justice Houlden found that
While clearly not all information is property, I see no reason
why confidential information that has been gathered through
the expenditure of time, effort and money by a commercial
enterprise for the purpose of its business should not be
regarded as property and hence entitled to the protection
of the criminal law
He relied on certain cases from civil law 473 to support the
proposition. In fact these authorities are largely obiter dicta
comments of numerous courts finding property in information
in certain circumstances. 474 Boardman v. Phipps4 75 is the most
recent significant authority to deal with this issue. There the
lawyers of a trust had obtained confidential information
concerning a company in which the trust had large holdings.
The lawyers used this information to make themselves a
considerable profit. All of the five House of Lords judges
considered the issue.
Justice Houlden summarized their decisions:
Viscount Dilhorne, who dissented, appears to have been of
the opinion that some information and knowledge can
properly be regarded as property. However, he concluded
that the particular information was not trust property since
the trust had no intention of acting on it and, thus, the
information was of no value to the trust (see pp. 89-90).
Lord Cohen was of the view that information was not
473. As constrasted with criminal law. NOTE: Copyright, Patent, Trade
Secret, Trust and Contract law are all part of the civil law.
474. Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Gregory & Co., (1896),

1 Q.B. 147

- property in quotations from the London Stock Exchange; Exchange
Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Central News, Ltd., (1897), 2 Ch. 48 - property in
information relating to horse races; The Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. v.
Howard (1906), 22 T.L.R. 375; Board of Trade v. Christie (1905), 198 U.S.

236 (U.S.S.C.) - property in grain quotations (This case is discussed in the
trade secret section); Hung v. New York Cotton Exchange 205 U.S. 322
(U.S.S.C.).
475. (1967), A.C. 46(H.L.).
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property in the strict sense of the word (see p. 102). Lord
Hodson expressly dissented from the view that information
was not property; he was of the opinion that the confidential
information acquired by the solicitors was properly regarded
as property of the trust (see p. 107). Lord Guest was also
firmly of the view that the information was trust property
(see p. 115). Lord Upjohn, who with Viscount Dilhorne
dissented, was equally firm in the view that information was
not property (see pp. 127-29).476
479
Boardman shows the split in legal circles on this issue.
Justice Houlden found that the civil authorities mentioned
were sufficient to support a property right in certain types of
information. He reasoned that if something could be property
for the purposes of civil law, then it was also property for the
purposes of criminal law.
Justice Cory agreed with Justice Houlden, recognizing the
importance of information labouriously gathered to business
in today's world. Justice Lacouriere dissented taking the
traditional view of confidential information as enforceable only
if there was a relationship of confidence. Such protection arises
out of the obligation of good faith or on a fiduciary
478
relationship.
At present one cannot rely on a property right in information
as a method of protecting computer programs. Whether such
rights will be found to exist in certain types of confidential
information is yet to be seen. 479 However, it seems clear that
the information contained on a computer program would fall
within Justice Houlden's definition.
It has been suggested that

The foundation of proprietary rights is the expenditure of
labour and money... Therefore, where the commerical value
of an entity, whether tangible or intangible, has been brought
about by the expenditure of time, effort, labour or money,

476. Id. at 23.

477. For a current review and perspective on the American law in this area,
see United States Golf Association v. St. Andrews Systems, Data-Max, Inc.
749 F.2d 1028 (1984 3rd Circuit).
478. Grant Hammond. Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property
Rights to Information (1981), 27 McGill L. Rev. 47.
479. Of course, the information might have to be developed to some
meaningful degree. See Fraser v. Thames Television Ltd., (1983) 2 All E.R.
101 (Ch.D.).
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the person who created that commercial value
has a
480
proprietary right to its commercial exploitation.
Perhaps it is time for us, as a society, to re-evaluate our
understanding of these concepts and try to recognize those
activities that we wish to protect and encourage as we move
into a new age where information and information processes
become increasingly important.
XI. The Policy Background
Reform in the law is necessary in order to recognize the realities
of the new, more complex world in which we live. Some form
of legal protection may now be evolving. 48' But mere reform,
for the sake of appearing to make some effort, is not enough.
It is submitted that any legislative scheme that is put into place
must recognize the volatile nature and explosive growth in the
high technology industries. Canada's ability to compete in the
international market, and, therefore, the long term economic
prosperity of our nation, depends on the nature of the
protection that is provided.
There are basically two viewpoints about the direction that
a protective mechanism could take. These viewpoints,
characterized in an extreme form, which are discussed further
below, diverge in their basic philosophical approach to man
and his interactions with other men in a society. Quite naturally,
then, these approaches reflect a profound debate which is
presently underway in our entire society.
1. The DecentralistApproach
This approach sees the development of a better world through
individuals taking more responsibility for their own actions and
decisions. This basic perspective affects the way in which
transactions are to be dealt with. The decentralist would prefer
for individuals to pursue their own problems and the legal
480. D. F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles (1978),

94 L. Q. Rev. 103 at 119.

481. See for example Protection of Trade Secrets, Institute of Law Research
and Reform, Edmonton, Alberta Report No. 1 February 1984 which
advocates a state role through a "Trade Secrets Protection Act", Grant
Hammond, the main inspiration behind the Institute Reported, offers a
summary of the perceived advantages in Reform of the Law of Trade Secrets
(1985), 2 C.C.L.R. 48.
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system would provide the basic framework in which this could
be done. The debate is well summarizd by Bertrand Russell:
The greater part of human impulses may be divided into
two classes, those which are possessive and those which are
constructive or creative. Property is the direct expression of
possessiveness; science and art are among the most direct
expressions of creativeness. Possessiveness is either defensive
or agressive; it seeks either to retain something against a
robber, or to acquire something from a present holder. In
either case, an attitude of hostility to others is of its essence.
The whole realm of possessive impulses, and of the use
of force to which they give rise, stands in need of control
by a public neutral authority, in the interests of liberty no
less than that of justice. Within a nation, this public authority
will naturally be the state; in relations between nations, if
the present anarchy is to cease, it will have to be some
international parliament. But the motive underlying the
public control of men's possessive impulses should always
be the increase of liberty, both by prevention of private
tyranny, and by the liberation of creative impulses. If public
control is not to do more harm than good, it must be so
exercised as to leave the utmost freedom of private initiative
in all ways that do not involve the use of private force. In
this respect, all governments have failed egregiously, and
there is no evidence that they are improving.
The creative impulses, unlike those that are possessive, are
directed to ends in which one man's gain is not another man's
loss. The man who makes a scientific discovery or writes
a poem is enriching others at the same time as himself. Any
increase in knowledge or good-will is a gain to all who are
affected by it, not only to the acutal possessor. Force can
not create such things, though it can destroy them; no
principle of distributive justice applies to them, since the gain
of each is the gain of all. For these reasons, the creative
part of a man's activity ought to be as free as possible from
all public control, in order that it may remain spontaneous
and full of vigor. The only function of the state in regard
to this part of the individual life should be to do everything
possible towards providing outlets and opportunities.4 82
This passage illustrates the recognition that all human
progress has been made by the creative people among us. This,
it is submitted, is true both in the sciences and in the humanities.
482. Bertrand Russell, Individual Liberty and Public Control (1917),
Reprinted in "Highlights From 125 Years of The Atlantic" 1977 Edited by
Louise Desaulniers, The Atlantic Monthly Co. at 271.
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The focus of the decentralist view would be to encourage that
natural and constructive creativity, which benefits all members
of society. The type of legal protection under this orientation
would likely set out the type of interests that one might have
in a trade secret, for example, and what remedies might be
available to pursue someone who interfered with those interests
in an unjustified way. The parties involved, the software
producers, marketers, distributors and consumers could, as
much as possible determine the rules of the game they want
to play. The legislation would have provided certainty as to
the existence and scope of the elements which can be protected
in a legal manner.
2. The CentralistApproach
The centralist, on the other hand, raises classical utilitarian
arguments in an effort to control the existence and exchange
of rights and obligations between the parties. The goal, here,
is a perception of "the public good". Not all men are born
with the ability to be creative. Ought not the weak be allowed
to share in the benefits of the creator's work? Under a typical
scheme a central regulatory authority would monitor and
control activities in the computer programmming industry. This
central agency would likely develop policy based on its analysis
of the industry's activities and move to intervene in the
computer programming industry where it was deemed to be
for the public good.
The centralist view could result from either federal 483 or
provincial 484 actions in this area. For the sake of example the
following discussion will assume a federal centralist scheme.
The centralist scheme might be likely to involve the state in
any abuse of computer programs. This would likely be done
under a Criminal Code amendment 485 or under a separate
483. The White Paper on Copyright Reform and the Proposed Amendments
to the Criminal Code are examples of federal action.
484. The Institute Report on Trade Secrets is an example of provincial action.
485. Note that this paper does not address the problems appearing in the
existing proposals. However, for a brief introduction to the present proposal
for reform of the Criminal Code see J. L. Finley, Proposed Amendments
to the Criminal Code to Include Provisionsfor Computer Crimes (1983),
1 C.C.L.R. 1 and J.L. Finley, R. Conway Problems With the 'Property'
Concept in Computer Crime Legislation (1984), 1 C.C.L.R. 182.
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enactment with similar effect. The state is now the policeman
486
in disputes between the parties.
It is submitted, that this orientation is partially backwards
and fails to recognize the most basic nature of the problem.
The problem may be that B has taken a copy of A's creative
work and A wants to have his work restored to him so far
as is possible. A criminal provision will never solve A's problem
since the focus is on the punishment and rehabilitation of B
rather than on the loss that A has suffered. 487 It is noted that,
on the other hand, the centralist enforcement provisions might
provide some deterrent effect against unauthorized tampering
or misuse of data.
A second problem with the centralist solution is that it will
tend to create a bureaucracy studying and managing the
problems related to computer abuse. This in itself would not
be a problem. 4 88 The problem would arise out of the inherent
need for bureaucracies to justify their continued existence,
usually through interventionist actions in the particular
industry concerned. 48 9 In the past we have seen great
uncertanity result from the implementation of ill-conceived and
ill-implemented policies. 490 It is submitted that in most cases,
the aggrieved parties will be in the best position to resolve their
486. See the excellent discussion by C. Webber Computer Crime: What Has
Not Been Considered (1985), 2 C.C.L.R. 49 of proposed reforms of the

Criminal Code.
487. Note however that a creative sentence may hae a positive effect on B.
In R v. Woods Unreported March 22, 1984 Madame Justice Veit imposed
a community work probation order on the defendant found quilty of stealing
computer equipment from the University of Calgary. A follow up by the
probation officer indicated that the requirement of 30 hours work in the
Department of Computing Science appeared to have a very positive effect
on the defendant.
488. See, for example, the system set up to protect the copyrights of Quebec
writers on June 12, 1984. This system, it appears, will provide some
compensation to Quebec copyright holders for the copying of their works
in Quebec's Cegeps (junior colleges). See Quill & Quive August, 1984.
489. See, for example, the White Paper on Copyright which proposes
arguably needless radical reform on Canada's Copyright law and might, if
implemented in its present form, serve to seriously injure Canada's software
development industry.
490. See, for example, the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code. As
presently drafted, every unauthorized use of a computer system would be
a criminal offence. There would appear to be no limit on this rule. As a
result a wide range of civilly wrong conduct has become criminalized.
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problems once they know what the legal rights and obligations
are.
A third problem with the centralist solution is the fact that
it will tend to expose the vulnerability of a particular party
(such as a bank) to computer related abuse. It is quite likely
that there will be circumstances where the aggrieved party may
wish to solve the problem in a less public forum. There is always
a greater risk of disclosure when the aggrieved party is not
in control of the action, as in a criminal case. It is possible
that a party who feels particularly vulnerable might not wish
to pursue any legal remedies. The decentralist solution would
provide the flexibility that the parties might, as in any civil
case, compromise their differences. The only option open to
a vulnerable party, under a centralist type of solution, is not
to inform the state authorities about the offence. It is submitted
that this will, in fact, be the most common response to a
criminal type computer crime provision. Few institutions can
afford the public exposure of their vulnerability. 491 As a result,
the enactment will not have accomplished its goal - to bring
stability to the volatile computer industry - but rather will
ensure that the computer industry continues to operate without
real legal protection.
It is anticipated that the actual subject matter of the violation,
the secret that was taken, will not be disclosed as is the practice
in present trade secret litigation. 492 As a result, loss of the secret
itself ought not be a deterrent to the reporting of crime to
the state authorities.
The decentralist solution has a problem in that it is possible
that some situations might arise where the aggrieved party is
not financially able to pursue the wrongdoer through legal
means. It is submitted that in such cases the ethical obligations
of the legal profession to the society ought to be able to provide
some assistance.

491. Of course, it may be that precise details of a confidential nature would
be protected. For example, in Printersand FinsihersLtd. v. Holloway, (1964)

3 All E.R. 54 (Ch.D.) Note: on a call for particulars, disclosure to an
independant expert was suficient. Alberta's Rules of Court provide for such

protection in civil actions, see R.200.
492. Polyresins Ltd. v. Stein-Hall Ltd. (1971), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (Ont. H.C.)
as an example.
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In summary, if Canada's common law does not evolve in
a appropriate manner to deal with the new problems of
computer abuse in all its manifestations, then certainly
legislative intervention will be required. However, this
intervention needs to be very well thought out and not merely
a narrow response to one perceived problem. Rather, the
challenge facing our legislatures and Parliament is to determine
what types of creativity they wish to encourage and set in place
a broadly thought and defined and intelligently implemented
system to accomplish that aim. The risks of a poorly
implemented or poorly defined solution are, firstly, the loss
of many of Canada's bright and creative high technology
innovators, likely forever, and secondly, the loss of the
economic growth and stimulation that these new industries
could provide to Canada.

